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Wedel, and Dr. Leonid Koralov for serving on my dissertation committee. I want
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview
The rise of online marketplaces has become one of the predominant economic
and social developments of our time. Some marketplaces have become the most
prominent players in various markets, such as merchandise, service, transportation,
and travel accommodation, once dominated by non-platform companies. Meanwhile,
numerous opportunities and challenges regarding the design and operations in online
marketplaces are emerging. My research focuses on the supply-side management and
design of marketplaces. Since most marketplaces cannot control sellers’ behavior
directly, they need to rely on other market design levers, such as listing policy and
information provision policy, to influence the supply. Moreover, different market
structures have different design options available. In each essay of the dissertation,
I study the supply-side design of a specific market structure.
In my first essay, we study the revenue impact of listing policy design in online
B2B liquidation auction platforms, where salvaging inventory arrives exogenously.
We show that platforms can employ listing policies to schedule the ending time of
auctions to adjust market thickness (i.e., daily supply), which can further improve
revenues. In particular, the high market thickness can incentivize demand, mean-
while, exacerbate cannibalization between auctions. Our structural model enables
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platforms to identify the optimal market thickness that balances the two competing
effects by modeling buyers’ behavior and estimating the model primitives. In this
study, we establish the critical role of market thickness in B2B auction markets and
demonstrate how platforms can use practical operational levers (e.g., listing policies
and recommendation systems) to optimize the market thickness.
In my second essay, we build a dynamic model to investigate the effect of
information disclosure policies on peer-to-peer service platforms, where the quality
of service providers is ex-ante unknown. Due to the information asymmetry, such
a platform suffers an under-experimentation issue that the employment rate of new
providers is low. The issue then leads to a slow discovery of talented providers and a
small proportion of them on the platform. After the platform learns the quality of a
provider, it can decide whether or not to disclose it to customers using informational
levers. To our surprise, delaying the disclosure of the quality information of some
high-quality providers can boost platform revenues. We also identify two effects
of the informational delay: experimentation effect and scarcity effect. Our work
contributes to the market design literature by identifying the operational value of
information disclosure policy in peer-to-peer platforms with quality uncertainty.
In my third essay, we study the effect of sellers’ supply adjustment fric-
tion on two-sided marketplaces’ reactions to unexpected demand shocks using an
empirically-validated analytical model. In the model, sellers are heterogeneous in
terms of their quality, and they engage in a quantity competition under a given
demand. When the demand structure changes, sellers strategically adjust their sup-
ply to maximize their profit, incurring a cost for deviating from the original supply
2
level. We find that sellers’ strategic responses can either benefit or hurt the market-
place, and adjustment friction is an effective factor in influencing sellers’ strategic
decisions. By varying the adjustment friction, the marketplace can amplify positive
effects under favorable demand shocks and reduce negative effect from unfavorable
ones.
To conclude, the findings from the three essays highlight that marketplaces’
design levers on the supply side, including listing policy and information provision
policy, can have significant operational effects on the marketplace. Moreover, they
demonstrate that possible online friction, such as participation cost, information
obfuscation, and supply adjustment cost, plays a critical role in affecting the behav-
iors of all market participants. Through innovative design, online marketplaces can
benefit substantially from the friction.
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Chapter 2: Managing Market Thickness in Online B2B Markets
Abstract. We explore marketplace design in the context of a B2B platform special-
izing in liquidation auctions. Even when the platform’s aggregate levels of supply
and demand remain fixed, we establish that the platform’s ability to use its design
levers to manage the availability of supply over time yields significant value. We
study two such levers, each using the platform’s availability of supply as a means
to incentivize participation from buyers who decide strategically when/how often
to participate. First, the platform’s listing policy sets the ending times of incoming
auctions (hence, the frequency of market clearing). Exploiting a natural experi-
ment, we illustrate that consolidating auctions’ ending times to certain weekdays
increases the platform’s revenues by 7.3% mainly by inducing a higher level of bid-
der participation. The second lever is a recommendation system that can be used
to reveal information about real-time market thickness to potential bidders. The
optimization of these levers highlights a novel trade-off. Namely, when the platform
consolidates auctions’ ending times, more bidders may participate in the market-
place (demand-side competition); but ultimately auctions for substitutable goods
cannibalize one another (supply-side competition). To optimize these design deci-
sions, we estimate a structural model that endogenizes bidders’ dynamic behavior,
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i.e., their decisions on whether/how often to participate in the marketplace and how
much to bid. We find that appropriately designing a recommendation system yields
an additional revenue increase (on top of the benefits obtained by optimizing the
platform’s listing policy) by reducing supply-side cannibalization and altering the
composition of participating bidders.
Keywords: Online markets; Market clearing; Market thickness, Matching supply
with demand; Natural experiment; Structural estimation.
2.1 Introduction
The emergence of Internet-enabled platforms, such as Airbnb and Lyft, has
highlighted that online marketplaces greatly reduce frictions that previously pre-
vented buyers and sellers from connecting, thereby increasing the volume of trade in
a number of markets. Typically, such platforms neither own nor directly control the
goods involved in each transaction, but act as intermediaries. Thus, their success
relies heavily on the design features of their respective marketplaces, e.g., the ways
in which they organize and present information to the buyers and the timing with
which they match and clear (portions of) the market.
The opportunity for online intermediaries to create value has manifested it-
self not only in the cases exemplified by Airbnb and Lyft, but has also reshaped
retail operations, particularly with regard to the handling and resale of liquidation
inventory. The present paper explores marketplace design in the context of an e-
commerce platform specializing in liquidation inventory including merchandise that
5
either remained unsold in its primary market (e.g., due to low demand levels) or
was returned by customers. The secondary market within which the platform oper-
ates is of great economic significance: roughly 20% of inventory goes unsold in the
fast fashion industry Fe05, and whereas brick-and-mortar retailers encounter a 9%
return rate on products – for online retailers, the return rate is a staggering 30%.1
Overall, it is estimated that in 2012, the size of this excess/return product market
was $424 billion or 2.9% of the entire US GDP. However, given the uncertainty
surrounding the volume, quality, and composition of their excess and returned mer-
chandise, retailers have come to expect mere cents-on-the-dollar recovery rates from
traditional channels. Thus, they typically offload this inventory to business buyers
further down the retail food chain, such as discount stores, or donate it to qualifying
recipients for tax purposes.
Online business-to-business (B2B) auction platforms connect an increasing
number of retailers to deeper pools of potential business buyers, both domestic and
foreign. Given the diversity of potential bidders, which range from large wholesale
liquidators to small mom-and-pop stores, online auctions crucially facilitate price
discovery and constitute one of the major sale mechanisms in secondary markets. In
2016, Liquidity Service Inc., one of the fastest-growing online B2B auction platforms,
sold merchandise worth more than $600 million in aggregate retail value.2 Today,





Target, and Costco, utilize online B2B auction platforms to liquidate their products.
The amount of inventory sold in these online platforms is highly variable, owing
to the uncertain and dynamic nature of when products are returned and when excess
inventory is pulled from shelves and made available for resale. In turn, this results
in a varying number of auctions being open on the platform at any point in time.
The uncertainty in supply coupled with the uncertain valuation of potential buyers,
who are downstream resellers with access to different resale channels, implies that
liquidation platforms face a familiar operational challenge: how to tailor their design
so as to profitably match supply with demand.
One relatively under-explored lever that an auction platform can employ to
attain this match is its listing policy or, more specifically, the timing of auctions’
closing dates. By aligning or, conversely, spreading out the closing dates of auctions,
the platform can induce different levels of market thickness. In turn, the level of
market thickness has first-order revenue implications for the platform as it deter-
mines participation in the marketplace. Specifically, buyers who face uncertainty
with regard to actual supply levels on a given day may choose to participate only
when they expect adequate availability, implying that even a fixed level of aggregate
supply should be coordinated and allocated with this uncertainty in mind.
To this end, using a proprietary dataset collected from a leading online B2B
platform, we investigate the role and efficacy of the platform’s choice of listing pol-
icy in inducing different levels of market thickness and coordinating the behavior
of market participants so as to influence market outcomes (i.e., the auctions’ fi-
nal prices). Notably, although, as we show, the listing policy alters neither the
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platform’s underlying supply of arriving liquidation inventory nor its pool of po-
tential bidders, its role in incentivizing bidder participation in auctions can be of
first-order importance. Exploiting a natural experiment, we find that the platform’s
listing policy significantly impacts its revenues: implementing a listing policy to
concentrate (“batch”) auctions’ ending times to certain days of the week increases
sellers’ revenues by 7.3%. Further evidence supports the hypothesis that the exis-
tence of market frictions, specifically participation costs associated with the bidders
visiting the platform and determining their bidding strategies, drives this result.
Our finding underscores the economic significance of inducing the optimal
thickness in the marketplace. In doing so, the platform faces the following trade-off.
On the one hand, increasing supply availability on a given day (by having more
auctions ending on that day) can profitably incentivize demand-side participation.
On the other hand, having auctions end on the same day can induce them to canni-
balize one another. Put differently, daily marketplace demand curves are ultimately
downward-sloping in the quantity supplied on that day.
Prescriptively, we study two relatively simple market design levers available
to the platform to profitably calibrate its market thickness: the listing policy and
(targeted) recommendations that aim to provide real-time information about the
state of the platform to (a subset of) bidders. However, optimizing these levers
involves complex demand-side behavior. For this purpose, we develop a structural
model of bidders’ behavior, i.e., whether and when they choose to participate in
the marketplace and in which auctions and how much they select to bid. These
decisions are based on bidders’ equilibrium beliefs about the supply-side availability
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of auctions on any given day and the demand-side competition from other bidders.
The model also incorporates the dynamics of the platform’s bidder pool and the
heterogeneity of the bidders’ participation costs, valuations, and potential demand.
Out-of-sample revenue forecasts obtained from our estimated structural model align
closely with the treatment effect as obtained from the natural experiment.
By simulating the model, we demonstrate how to design the platform’s listing
policy so as to induce the revenue-maximizing market thickness for any underly-
ing level of expected supply. Our approach accounts for uncertainty in the actual
realization of supply and bidders’ equilibrium participation and bidding decisions.
Additionally, in an effort to further reduce marketplace uncertainty and frictions,
we also consider a recommendation system that notifies potential bidders of the
supply conditions on the auction site. This is motivated by the fact that, although
potential bidders may form accurate beliefs about the expected number of auctions
on the platform on any given day, they typically do not know their exact number
prior to visiting the platform itself. The recommendation system is built to inform
a (randomly) sampled set of recipients about the realized supply on a day without
them having to visit the platform, when the supply is higher than a given threshold.
We find that appropriately designing such a recommendation system improves the
platform’s revenue by an additional 1.6% on the days when the platform sends out
recommendations. This gain is achieved by reducing cannibalization during days




Online marketplaces face a number of design challenges when seeking to match
supply with demand so as to maximize revenue. A recent stream of papers explores
how different aspects of marketplace design may be used to shape the incentives
of market participants. For two-sided service platforms, [1] and [2] deliver novel
pricing prescriptions based on how users respond to higher service levels. On the
other hand, [3] consider pricing for spatially dispersed demand in a ride-sharing
network. In an online auction setting, [4] introduce the notion of a fluid mean-
field equilibrium and illustrate its practical appeal in setting reserve prices. In
addition, [5] show empirically that the platform’s revenues increase by 3% when it
boosts bids in a customized fashion based on bidders’ past behaviors. Our work
contributes to this literature by empirically demonstrating the impact of market
thickness on bidders’ participation and bidding decisions on a platform specializing
in B2B auctions.3 In addition, our focus is mainly on the use of non-price levers
that affect the availability of supply-side inventory and, in turn, influence demand.4
Recent literature also connects participants’ transaction costs and information
frictions to outcomes in online markets. [13] studies the role of the search engine in
reducing transaction costs and improving matches on Airbnb, while [14] explore the
disclosure of product information within online marketplaces. [15] study the revenue
3Relatedly, [6] and [7] explore strategic behavior in B2B spot markets while [8] focus on the
revenue impact of the lot size in the context of a sequence of online auctions.
4In recent work, [9], [10], [11], and [12] explore (non-price) interventions to improve efficiency
in the context of matching platforms.
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and welfare implications of costs associated with customers monitoring a retailer’s
online channel for changes in the price and availability of inventory in which they
are interested. [16] suggests that introducing a signaling feature that allows workers
to indicate availability could increase surplus by as much as 6% in an online labor
market. Closer in spirit to our research questions, [17] use data from TaskRabbit,
a marketplace for domestic tasks, to empirically demonstrate that the growth of
online peer-to-peer markets is largely affected by the thickness they induce. [18]
find that higher market thickness actually leads to lower matching efficiency in an
online peer-to-peer holiday rental platform.5 We contribute to this line of work by
illustrating how design levers such as the platform’s listing policy may lead to a
sizable increase in the platform’s revenues.
Relatedly, prior work explores both the effects of inventory availability on
strategic demand and the related benefits of reducing buyers’ uncertainty about
availability. [20], [21], and [22] consider settings where prospective buyers incur a
search or opportunity cost when visiting physical stores with the intent to pur-
chase a product, if it is available. The seller decides on inventory levels, potentially
across stores, while customers form beliefs about the resulting availability. More-
over, [21], [23], and [24] examine how the seller may benefit from reducing consumers’
uncertainty about its inventory availability. Empirically, [25] study the impact of
sharing inventory information on consumer behavior through credible “buy online,
pick up in store” offers, concluding that brick-and-mortar stores drew increased traf-
fic by resolving availability risks. In contrast to these settings, the online platform
5Relatedly, [19] illustrates the potential for welfare losses in large markets.
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that we focus on can neither set prices nor control the arrival of inventory to its
marketplace. Nonetheless, we highlight that listing policies and state-contingent rec-
ommendations (communicated to a subset of bidders) can successfully complement
the platform’s efforts in boosting the bidders’ participation rates.
Finally, our paper falls within the growing body of literature employing struc-
tural estimation methods to study auction markets (e.g., [26], [27], and [28]) and to
address questions of operational interest (e.g., [29], [30], and [31]).
2.2 Data and Background
Our dataset was obtained from a leading online platform managing private
B2B auction markets for the liquidation inventory of more than thirty US big-box
retailers, such as Costco, Walmart, Sears, and Home Depot (henceforth referred to
as sellers). In contrast to traditional two-sided online markets, where a multitude of
sellers enter and exit freely, each seller on our platform is associated with a private
online auction market through which only its own merchandise (excess or returned
inventory) can be sold. Under a long-term contract, the platform supports each
seller’s online auction presence in exchange for a fixed commission taken out of the
generated revenues. Sourced from customer returns, trade-ins, and unsold items, the
supply of liquidation inventory reaching the platform can be highly stochastic and
is beyond the platform’s control; rather, it is primarily driven by a seller’s reverse
logistics. In other words, the supply of these B2B auction markets can be considered
exogenous to the platform’s design.
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Merchandise is sold through an ascending English auction with proxy-bidding
(similar to the format used on eBay). Each auction lasts for 1 to 4 days and offers
a bundle of similar products for sale in an all-or-nothing auction. While electronics
account for most of the platform’s annual revenues, which are in the hundreds of
millions of U.S. dollars, a broad range of product categories are auctioned on the
site, including household appliances, furniture, and apparel. A typical auction lot
contains a box of goods from the same product category and in roughly the same
condition (e.g., unused, or used and in good condition). Bidders may access the
auction’s manifest, which provides a brief description of the items included in the
box. In addition, bidders are able to observe the current second-highest bid (the
standing bid) and the time remaining in the auction. In contrast to the standing
bid, the highest bid currently placed in an auction cannot be observed by bidders.
The demand side of the market consists of downstream resellers specializing
in liquidation inventory (henceforth referred to as bidders). Reflecting bidders’ in-
dividual downstream resale channels, both bidders’ valuations and levels of demand
(i.e., the number of auctions they intend to win) are substantially heterogeneous
(see [32]). Bidders need to go through a separate registration process for each such
private market in order to be able to view the market’s available inventory and
submit bids. Finally, the pool of active bidders features the continuous arrival of
new registrants and the continuous exit of some existing bidders, both of which
are driven by the demand of downstream secondary markets worldwide. Figure 2.1
summarizes the market dynamics and bidders’ major decisions within the platform.
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Figure 2.1: Market Dynamics and Bidders’ Decisions on a Given Day
2.2.1 Markets for iPhones
In what follows, we empirically examine whether the choice of listing policy
has any impact on the platform’s revenues. To this end, we use data on the iPhone
auctions from the platform’s two major mobile phone sellers. We restrict attention
to iPhone auctions for two reasons. First, to identify the listing policy’s revenue
impact, we must carefully control for the characteristics of the particular products
sold in each auction; iPhones are well-defined products with retail values that are
derived in a straightforward way from their observable specifications, such as their
model, carrier, condition, and time since the model’s release date. This is contrary to
other merchandise sold on the platform, such as furniture and household appliances,
whose retail values depend on a large set of somewhat subjective features. Second,
the revenue generated by iPhone sales alone accounts for approximately 73% of the
revenue of the two major cell phone markets we study. We call these two major
markets Market A and Market B.
Covering February 2013 to October 2015 (our observation period), our dataset
tracks the entire bidding history (i.e., every bid’s time of submission and dollar
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amount) in each of the 679 auctions in Market A and each of the 497 auctions in
Market B. Moreover, we are able to track bidders’ behavior across all auctions in
the observation period.
Table 2.1 summarizes the auctions and bidding activity in the two markets. On
average, 211 new bidders register per month in Market A, and 261 do so in Market
B. Auction lot sizes vary substantially, both within markets (the corresponding
coefficients of variation are 0.54 for Market A and 0.53 for Market B) and across
markets (the average number of iPhones per auction is 150 in Market A versus 62
in Market B). Participation per auction, whether tallied in bidders or bids, tends
to be higher in Market B’s auctions. Nonetheless, Market A exhibits slightly higher
average per-device revenues ($116.10) than Market B ($106.60).
2.2.2 Bidders
More than 2,200 bidders placed at least one bid in either Market A or Market
B during the observation period. In line with prior work on B2B markets Ba04, Pi16
the markets’ bidder pools consist of experienced resellers – certified and registered
in the market – that are heterogeneous in both their demand profiles and valuations.
Over 30% of bidders in both markets exhibit demand for multiple auctions. More
specifically, these multi-unit (MU) bidders either submit winning bids for two or
more concurrent auctions or submit a bid for a new auction shortly after winning an
auction. The remaining bidders, whom we call unit-demand (UD) bidders, exhibit
demand for winning only a single auction lot within our observation period. Though
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Auctions in Markets A and B (means with standard
errors in parentheses)
Market A Market B
Auction duration (in days) 2.60 (1.54) 2.90 (1.09)
Auction lot size (devices) 150.3 (81.0) 61.5 (32.7)
Avg. monthly registrations 211.0 (44.6) 260.7 (63.2)
Number of bidders per auction 4.96 (2.09) 8.20 (2.62)
Number of bids per auction 19.6 (12.1) 27.0 (15.9)
Avg. number of auctions per auction ending day 2.07 1.16
Total number of auctions 679 497
Avg. final per-device price ($) 116.10 (49.97) 106.57 (51.47)
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multi-unit bidders are fewer in number, their behavior affects the operations of the
platform substantially, as they win over 80% of the auctions in both markets during
our observation period.
In addition to their demand characteristics, bidders can also be classified by
their registration status in the two markets. We refer to those who are registered in
both markets as cross-market bidders, and those who are registered in only Market A
or Market B during our study period as Market A or Market B bidders, respectively.
Cross-market bidders can observe and participate in auctions from both markets.
On the other hand, Market A and Market B bidders can observe auctions only from
the single market in which they have registered. In the data, cross-market bidders
account for 20% of the bidder population.
In behavior similar to “sniping” in B2C auctions Ba03, we find that bidders
predominantly submit bids on an auction’s last day. Auctions typically close within
the time window from 6pm to 8pm, and most bids are placed during that time. As
we report in Table 2.2, the median last bid per bidder per auction comes quite late
in both markets (after 99.0% of the auction’s total duration in Market A and 80.3%
of the auction’s total duration in Market B). Moreover, the median winning bid in
both markets arrives when 99.7% of the auction’s duration has elapsed (similar to
98.3% in Ba03). Because an auction’s final price materializes toward its end, we
focus on each auction’s ending day – as opposed, for example, to the entire time it
is open – when studying the impact of the platform’s design on revenues.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics about Bidder Types and Bidding Activity
Market A Market B
Percentage of MU bidders (%) 36.4 33.2
Percentage of auctions won by MU bidders (%) 91.9 73.8
Avg. number of auctions a MU bidder participates in 19.65 12.47
Avg. number of auctions won by a MU bidder ever 4.19 1.76
Avg. number of auctions a UD bidder participates in 2.45 1.69
Avg. number of auctions won by a UD bidder ever 0.29 0.12
Median of normalized time of first bid per bidder-auction (%) 97.2 60.0
Median of normalized time of last bid per bidder-auction (%) 99.0 80.3
Median of normalized time of winning bid per auction (%) 99.7 99.7
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Table 2.3: Empirical Distribution of Inventory Arrivals (i.e., Auctions’ First Day
Listed) by Day of Week
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Market A 16.7% 23.5% 20.4% 17.8% 16.3% 5.2% 0.0%
Market B 16.7% 21.4% 20.0% 17.3% 21.8% 3.0% 0.0%
2.2.3 Listing Policies
In both Markets A and B, as soon as the seller makes an inventory lot available
to the platform (the inventory’s arrival time), a corresponding auction commences
and is listed on the platform. When it lists the auction, the platform must decide
and display the auction’s ending time. The policy governing how auctions’ ending
times are determined is the platform’s listing policy.
Uniform listing. Market B’s auctions typically close 3 business days after the time
they are listed on the platform (which is the time when the corresponding inventory
is made available by the seller). Owing to the fact that the arrival times of inventory
are approximately uniformly distributed across the weekdays in both markets (Table
2.3), the number of auctions expected to close is approximately constant across the
weekdays. We refer to this listing policy, which sets auction ending times to enforce
a fixed duration, as uniform listing. Market B uses uniform listing throughout our
observation period, while Market A uses it from February 2013 to February 2014.
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Batch listing. By contrast, in the second half of our observation period starting
in November 2014 (see Section 2.3 for more details), Market A’s auctions closed
only on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Consequently, the duration for which an auction
remains open on the platform varies depending on the arrival time of its associated
inventory lot. We use the term batch to refer to the listing policy that closes auctions
only on Tuesdays and Thursdays.
Effects of different listing policies. Even when receiving the same stream of in-
ventory arrivals, different listing policies result in several salient divergences in out-
comes. Figure 2.2 illustrates using the uniform and batch listing policies as examples.
First, as shown in Figure 2.2, the number of days on which auctions close is differ-
ent: two days of the week under batch listing, compared to five days under uniform
listing. We call such days the platform’s “auction-clearing days.” Second, it natu-
rally follows that the average number of auctions cleared on one of the platform’s
auction-clearing days will depend on the platform’s choice of listing policy. Given
that bidders predominantly bid in an auction on its last day (Table 2.2), different
listing policies result in different levels of supply-side availability of auctions for the
bidders, and they induce different levels of thickness in the market. As an example,
Figure 2.2 illustrates that compared to uniform listing, batch listing maintains a
higher level of supply-side availability on days when auctions are scheduled to close.
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Figure 2.2: Batch (above) and Uniform (below) Listing Examples (red arrows rep-
resent active auction listings)
Saturday Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
t
Number of Auctions Ending:(0) (4) (0) (3) (0)
Saturday Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
t
Number of Auctions Ending:(1) (1) (2) (1) (2)
2.3 Listing Policies, Market Thickness, and Platform’s Revenues
Prior work has studied both empirically and theoretically how to design an
(online) marketplace so as to induce a better match between supply and demand.
Yet, the primary focus has mostly been on providing incentives for additional supply
to join the marketplace (e.g., through surge pricing in ride-hailing platforms) or on
smoothing out supply to match exogenous demand. By contrast, in our setting the
aggregate levels of supply (incoming inventory) and potential demand (bidder pool)
do not seem to be affected by the design decisions we consider. Instead, our analysis
illustrates the potential merits of appropriately managing the effective availability of
supply when the demand side endogenously determines when to actively participate
in the marketplace.
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By exploiting a natural experiment using Market B as a control, we find a
substantial benefit attached to Market A’s change in listing policy. We estimate
that implementing batch instead of uniform listing boosts Market A’s revenues by
7.3%, amounting to roughly $3.8M annually. Our findings suggest that bidders face
participation costs that cause them to strategically consider when to participate in
the marketplace based on the supply-side availability they expect (i.e., number of
active auctions). In other words, much like the platform offering service-level guar-
antees, assuring adequate market thickness attracts participation. More broadly, the
fact that coordinating a fixed supply process can profitably incentivize marketplace
participation, points to a novel operational trade-off. On the one hand, thickening
the market increases demand-side participation, but, on the other hand, it induces
supply-side cannibalization as substitutable auctions compete against one another.
In the parlance of classic supply and demand theory, the downward-sloping demand
curve dictates that market-clearing prices ultimately fall as the quantity supplied
by the market grows.
As with any field data, our natural experiment possesses considerable richness;
that said, we would like to point out one potential limitation. While our data permits
us to carefully account for individual auctions’ characteristics and for depreciation
in the auctioned phone models (the latter is shared in the form of trends by the two
markets), our study is not a perfect natural experiment: a minority of bidders are
cross-registrants who bid in both Markets A and B. However, we show that their
presence dilutes the treatment effect of batch listing as compared to the case of
completely independent markets; this is because these cross-registered bidders act
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as arbitrageurs who bring the treated and control prices closer together (Appendix
2.8.3). Besides, we discuss how cross-registrants’ participation is consistent with the
hypothesis of participation costs in Section 2.3.4 and Appendix 2.8.5.
2.3.1 Natural Experiment by Change in Listing Policy
Before February 2014, both markets enacted uniform listing and cleared an
approximately equal number of auctions on each weekday (see Section 2.2.3). In
February 2014, Market A had a change in personnel; management reports that
this change was unrelated to the performance of the platform or its marketplaces.
Nonetheless, the change triggered Market A to alter its listing policy twice. First,
in February 2014, it constrained its auctions to close only on 3 days of the week
(Mondays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays). Then, in November 2014, it adopted the
batch policy described in Section 2.2.3 to close its auctions only on Tuesdays and
Thursdays. Meanwhile, Market B’s listing policy remained unaltered throughout
the observation period.
Because we are interested in the effect of supply-side availability (and induced
market thickness) on participation and revenues, we study a natural experiment:
batching the listing policy serves as the relevant treatment of interest. We observe
two clearly defined periods: the pre-treatment period (February 2013 to February
2014), during which both markets practiced uniform listing, and the post-treatment
period (November 2014 to October 2015), during which Market A alone batch-
listed its auctions. Figure 2.3 depicts the monthly percentages of auctions closing
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of Auctions Ending on Each Weekday Aggregated by Month
in Market A (Left) and Market B (Right)
on each of the 5 weekdays, aggregated monthly for each of the Markets A and B:
we observe the changes over the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods, as well
as the intervening time period.
In addition to the market’s listing policy, an auction’s per-device revenue is
affected by the attributes of the iPhones in the auction, market-level characteristics
such as the supply process and the registration rate of new bidders, temporal effects
that encompass new product releases, depreciation, and price fluctuations in the
overall iPhone market. Observing both markets’ pre-treatment period allows us
to account for unobserved differences between the two markets. In the data, we
note that the differences in these market-level features between the two markets
remain roughly constant over time.6 In Table 2.4, we summarize the numbers of
auctions and the newly registered bidders per week for both markets across the pre-
6Our average treatment effect analysis explicitly controls for auction-level characteristics such
as auction size and product types, as detailed in Section 2.3.3.
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Table 2.4: Weekly Supply and Demand Profiles in Markets A and B within Pre-
and Post-treatment Periods
No. of weekly auctions No. of weekly registrations
Market B Market A Market B Market A
Pre-treatment Period 2.49 2.93 53 48
Post-treatment Period 5.11 6.34 60 51
Increase Rate (%) 105% 116% 13% 6%
and post-treatment periods.7 Market A’s aggregate supply grew at a slightly faster
rate than that of Market B while its pool of potential bidders (demand) grew at a
somewhat slower rate than that of Market B.8 Using the average treatment effect
(ATE) methodology reviewed in [33], we estimate the effect of the platform’s listing
policy on auctions’ final prices while controlling for product attributes, temporal
effects, and static market-level differences. Within the observation window, we do
not observe changes in any of the market design levers except for the listing policy.
2.3.2 Descriptive Comparison and Difference-in-Differences Analysis
As a primer to the analysis, Figure 2.4 compares the two markets’ average,
per-device revenues in the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods, respectively.
7The trends of the aggregate supply and demand over time are further displayed in Appendix
2.11.1.
8According to classic supply and demand theory, we would then expect an increase in Market
B’s revenues relative to those of Market A. However, we observe the opposite.
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Figure 2.4: Averages (a) and Trends (b) of Per-device Prices in Markets A and B
across Pre- and Post-treatment Periods
While iPhone prices fall over time in both markets (as the phone models depreciate),
the left plot of Figure 2.4 highlights an emerging gap in the markets’ per-device
revenues during the post-treatment period relative to the pre-treatment period,
consistent with the batch listing policy affording Market A a post-treatment boost
in per-device revenue. The right plot of Figure 2.4 shows that the pre-trends in both
markets are relatively parallel. Notably, the gap between the price trends increases
during the post-treatment period.
A difference-in-differences estimator transparently compares the post-treatment
revenue difference between the two markets against any that existed in the pre-
treatment period. As shown in Table 2.5, the markets’ revenue difference increases
by 10.1% post-treatment, which we might attribute to the effect of Market A’s new
listing policy. Because it remains conceivable that the markets’ inventory compo-
sitions could have changed across the periods, we carry out an average treatment
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Policy Switch on Final Price per
Unit
Dependent Variable
Log (Final Price per Unit)
Treatment: Batch Policy 10.1%∗∗∗
(0.027)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Confidence intervals constructed via bootstrap.
effect analysis that controls for granular differences in the attributes of individual
auction lots and for weekly time trends affecting the phones’ (hence lots’) valuations.
2.3.3 Average Treatment Effect
First, our analysis controls explicitly for observables, such as phone model,
carrier, and auction lot size. Additionally, we include a weekly time fixed effect
to account for temporal price fluctuations in the broader iPhone market, leveraging
that these effects are simultaneously present in both markets. Finally, we exploit the
dataset’s pre-treatment period, during which both markets used the uniform listing
policy, to measure and account for the effect of unobservable differences between
the two markets, including the information they provide about the quality of their
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products.9
For this analysis, we assign an auction lot j at time t to the treatment group
if it is posted to Market A (indicator variable Ajt) and to the control group if
it is instead posted to Market B. Based on its observed attributes, each auction
lot exhibits a propensity for being assigned to the treatment group, known as its
propensity score. As developed in the related literature (e.g., [34–36]), an efficient
estimate of the average treatment effect (ATE), τ , that accounts for such attributes
can be obtained as the difference between post-treatment and pre-treatment out-
comes appropriately weighted using their associated propensity scores. We estimate
separate ATEs for each of the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods (τPre and
τPost, respectively) and are ultimately interested in the difference between the two.
While both τPre and τPost include the net revenue effects of the markets’ unobserved
differences (e.g., product quality categories, reputations, and bidder compositions),
only τPost captures the additional revenue effect of batch listings under Market A’s
revised listing policy. Accordingly, the corresponding estimators, τ̂Pre and τ̂Post, are
each obtained by Expression (2.8) in Appendix 2.8.1. As a technical aside, relative
to employing propensity score methods, mixed-methods approach combines propen-
sity score weighting and a regression model to improve the precision of the resulting
estimate Im04. By “double robustness” Wo07, Gr12, the estimator is consistent if
either the parametric propensity score model or the outcome regression model is
9More than 90% of Market A iPhone auctions are classified into quality “A/B,” and more than
99% of Market B iPhone auctions are classified into quality “Used/Functional.” In our sample, we
focus exclusively on auctions with these two quality types.
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correctly specified. In this study, we adopt an estimator from a class of augmented
inverse probability weighting (AIPW) estimators introduced in [37] (see Appendix
2.8.1).
2.3.4 Revenue and Participation Effects of Batch Listing
As reported in Table 2.6, we find the per-device revenue effect of the batch
listing policy, τ̂Post − τ̂Pre, to be positive and statistically significant. We find that
the batch listing policy, in comparison with the uniform listing policy, yields a 7.3%
average increase in Market A’s per-device revenue (Table 2.6).10 This estimate
translates to more than $3.8M in additional revenues annually for Market A.11
Setting a market’s listing policy may appear to be an innocuous choice born
of convenience, chance, or custom: a priori it is not clear why the platform would
expect anything beyond a marginal impact on its revenues, given that its listing
policy does not have an impact on either its exogenous supply of auctions or its de-
mand pool of certified bidders. We examine whether higher supply-side availability
of inventory (auctions) on the platform actually results in more bidders participat-
ing per auction. First, we estimate the effect of the policy switch on the number of
observed bidders per auction by applying a similar average treatment effect anal-
10We conduct robustness checks to support the validity of our estimates (see Appendix 2.8.2),
including examining the distributional overlap of covariates for the treatment and control groups.In
Appendix 2.8.2, we carry out robustness checks on the only covariate that exhibits possibly insuf-
ficient overlap (i.e., auction lot size).
11Since all posted auctions result in sales in our data, the revenue increase is a direct outcome
of an increase in the auctions’ average final price.
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ysis to the one in the section. All explanatory variables remain the same as those
in the ATE analysis of the final price. As shown in the last column of Table 2.6,
under the batch policy, Market A attracts 0.49 more bidders per auction, on aver-
age. Second, we exploit that cross-market bidders can choose when to participate
in untreated Market B based on availability in both markets. We find that the
cross-market bidders’ participation rate in Market B on Tuesdays and Thursdays
is substantially higher post-treatment (i.e., 84%) than pre-treatment (i.e., 63%).12
The findings suggest that it is costly for bidders to participate in the auctions; thus,
they strategically decide when to visit the platform (see Appendix 2.8.5). Lastly,
a difference-in-differences analysis confirms that the switch of the listing policy has
little impact on the bidders’ bidding amounts (see Appendix 2.11.4), which implies
that the listing policy’s revenue gain is not driven by changes in how bidders choose
to bid. In summary, our findings support the following mechanism to explain the
revenue increase: an increase in market thickness boosts bidder participation rates
both on aggregate and per auction. In turn, this additional traffic results in higher
revenues for the platform. Underlying this mechanism is the fact that it is costly for
bidders to visit the platform on a given day, monitor the set of available auctions,
and choose whether and how much to bid in each auction.
Despite the positive revenue effect of thickening the market, there exist po-
tential pitfalls. First, batching too many auctions together may cannibalize and
12The post-treatment increase in the number of unique participants per week in Market A
(167.1%) likewise exceeds the corresponding figure associated with Market B (88.1%). For more
details, refer to Appendix 2.8.4.
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Table 2.6: Estimated average Treatment Effect of Policy Switch on Final Price per
Device and No. of Bidders per Auction
Dependent Variables
Log (Final Price per Device) No. of Observed Bidders per Auction
Treatment: Batch Policy 7.3%∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗
(0.009) (0.22)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Confidence intervals constructed via bootstrap.
decrease per-device revenues by increasing the number of immediately available sub-
stitutes. Appendix 2.11.3 provides empirical evidence of this cannibalization effect.
Second, some bidders may be disincentivized from participating on the platform due
to the influx of competing bidders. In what follows, we develop a structural model
to characterize the optimal market thickness.
2.4 Structural Model
We present a dynamic, structural model endogenizing the bidders’ decisions
on whether and when to visit the platform, which auction(s) to participate in, and
how much to bid. Our discrete-time model captures the behavior of a dynamic pool
of potential bidders who are heterogeneous in their valuations and demand profiles
while facing an exogenously stochastic supply of liquidation inventory lots arriving
to the platform to be auctioned. We assume that there are St auctions on Day t each
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of which is for a single unit whose valuation is appropriately normalized. Given that
auction lots differ from one another, we assume that a bidder’s valuation for a given
auction has an idiosyncratic term. Motivated by our assertion that cross-market
bidders only dampen the price impact resulting from batching auctions’ ending
times (Appendix 2.8.3), we consider only a single market. To capture heterogeneity
in the bidders’ demand, we define the following two bidder types: (Bidder Types)
Bidders are risk-neutral and have private values. Each bidder belongs to one of the
following two types:
(i) Unit demand (UD): A UD bidder is interested in winning only one auction
throughout her lifetime on the platform. Each UD bidder is permanently
endowed with a private valuation for winning an auction lot that is drawn
independently from distribution FUD.
(ii) Multi-unit (MU): A MU bidder is interested in winning multiple auctions
on the platform. In particular, we assume that a MU bidder is interested
in winning up to K auctions in a single day, where K > 1 is exogenously
specified, regardless of her prior win history.13 Each MU bidder’s endowed
private valuation for an auction lot is drawn independently from distribution
FMU .
In contrast to UD bidders, who operate on relatively low volumes, MU bidders
represent repeat buyers that interact regularly with the platform. To ensure that
the model is tractable, we assume that the bidders’ private valuations for each type
13This assumption on K is critical to making our model and estimation tractable.
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follow the Weibull distribution, which fits the data reasonably well. As described
in Section 2.2.2, most bidding activity takes place toward the ending time of an
auction, and we assume that bidders submit bids only to auctions that are closing
on the day the bid is placed. Because more than 90% of the auctions close within
the narrow time window between 6 and 8 PM, we do not focus on the timing of
visits within the day and assume that if a bidder decides to visit the platform on a
given day, the timing of her visit within the day is exogenous. On each day t, the
following sequence of events transpires:
(1) Supply. First, St new auctions are listed on the platform, with St following
the count distribution PSupply. Each posted auction possesses characteristics
affecting its idiosyncratic fit with a bidder’s resale channels. Therefore, Bidder
`’s valuation for an auction lot j is the sum of Bidder `’s endowed product
valuation, x`, and an idiosyncratic term, ζ`j. Each ζ`j is independently drawn
from mean-zero normal distributions FMUζ and F
UD
ζ , with standard deviations
νMU for MU bidders and νUD for UD bidders, respectively.
(2) Platform Participation. New bidder arrivals join the existing pool of potential
bidders, under an exogenous arrival process. If t is an auction-ending day
as defined in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.2, all potential bidders in the pool must
decide simultaneously whether to visit the platform to bid in ending auctions.
Notably, while each bidder ` knows her own valuation x` for a standard unit
throughout, a bidder does not know either the current state of the platform
(i.e., how many auctions are ending that day and/or the current standing
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bids in those auctions) or the idiosyncratic component of her lot valuation
ζ`j for any listed auction j. Instead, her decision on whether to visit the
platform is based on her expected payoff from visiting, which in turn depends
on her ex ante beliefs about the likely state of the platform. Formally, upon
visiting the platform, the observable state of the market on Day t is ω`t ,
(nt, s`t), where nt is the market thickness (number of auctions ending) on
Day t, with support N = {0, 1, ..., N̄}, and st denotes the vector of standing
bids of the auctions that are ending on Day t. As discussed in Section 2.4.1,
the bidder’s ex ante beliefs about ω`t anticipate the platform’s equilibrium
steady-state distribution. Against her expected payoff, bidder ` weighs her
daily participation cost, c`t, on Day t, which captures the cost in time and
effort at participating on the platform. A bidder’s participation cost is drawn
independently each day from an exponential distribution with rate µMU for
MU bidders and µUD for UD bidders. Thus, across bidders and days, whether
or not a bidder visits the platform depends both on her endowed valuation x`
and on the day’s realized participation cost c`t.
(3) Auction Selection and Bidding. Upon visiting the platform, a bidder observes
the realized state ω`t and the idiosyncratic term of her valuation ζ`j for each
available auction j. First, she decides which auction(s) to participate in based
on her private valuations and her beliefs about the currently highest rival bids
given ω`t, and she then determines how much to bid in each auction so as to
maximize her expected payoff.
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(4) Departure. Given the nature of their demand, UD bidders depart with cer-
tainty upon winning an auction. In addition, we let αMU and αUD denote the
daily retention probabilities of those MU and UD bidders who do not win an
auction, respectively. In particular, at the end of Day t, each bidder departs
the bidder pool with probability (1− αTY ), where TY ∈ {MU,UD}.
2.4.1 Bidder Strategies and Equilibrium
The size of the market (i.e., Market A averages about 160 active bidders daily)
makes it impractical for an individual bidder to fully track her competitors and the
history of their actions. Instead, we assume that bidders respond to their steady-
state beliefs about their rivals, which are not meaningfully affected by their own
actions Ba16. This assumption approximates well a setting that involves a large
group of anonymous bidders, with similarities to other assumptions that have been
employed in related settings, such as the notions of oblivious equilibrium (e.g., [38]),
stationary competitive equilibrium (e.g., [39]), and mean field equilibrium (e.g.,
[40,41]). Prior to defining the steady-state equilibrium, we first introduce a bidder’s
optimal actions on a given day, given her beliefs about the underlying market state
Ψ and the highest rival bid G.
Platform Participation. A bidder determines whether or not to participate in
the platform on a given day so as to maximize her expected payoff. In particular,
for MU bidders, the corresponding maximization problem can be reduced to that of
a single period, since their payoffs on any given day are independent of their actions
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on other days. She receives a payoff of zero if she does not visit. Specifically, a MU
bidder’s platform participation decision is
σMUV ST (x`, c`t) =

1, i.e., visit, if rMU(x`;G,Ψ)− c`t ≥ 0
0, i.e., wait, otherwise,
(2.1)
where rMU(x`;G,Ψ) denotes the expected payoff for a MU bidder who visits the
platform on Day t. For UD bidders, since they have demand for only one auction
throughout their lifetime, their actions on a given day affect their future payoffs.
Thus, a UD bidder’s platform visit decision is
σUDV ST (x`, c`t) =

1, i.e., visit, if vUD(x`;G,Ψ)− c`t ≥ αUDvf (x`;G,Ψ)
0, i.e., wait, otherwise,
(2.2)
where vUD(x`;G,Ψ) denotes the aggregated payoff for a UD bidder who visits the
platform on Day t, and vf (x`;G,Ψ) denotes her continuation value if she does not
exit the platform after Day t.14
Auction Selection and Bidding. After a bidder (of type TY ∈ {MU,UD})
participates in the platform, she selects which auctions to bid in, denoted by σTYSLT ,
and how much to bid in the selected auctions, denoted by σTYBID. Naturally, an
auction’s standing and highest rival bids are not independent. Thus, the bidder
updates her beliefs over the highest rival bids after observing the corresponding
standing bids and the realized market thickness. Under the updated beliefs, σTYSLT
and σTYBID jointly maximize her expected payoff on the platform on a given day. For
14The characterizations of rMU (x`;G,ψ), r
UD(x`;G,Ψ), v
UD(x`;G,Ψ), and vf (x`;G,Ψ) are de-
tailed in Appendix 2.9.1.
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MU bidders, the corresponding maximization problem is
(σMUSLT , σ
MU






(x` + ζ`j − pj)gj(pj|ω`t)dpj, (2.3)




(x` + ζ`j − pj)gj(pj|ω`t)dpj stands for the expected payoff
from bidding in Auction j. If the bidder chooses Auction j, her optimal bidding
strategy is to bid up to her valuation (i.e., σMUBID,j(x`; ζ`j, ω`t) = x` + ζ`j). Then,
her optimal auction selection decision σSLT (x`; ζ`1, ..., ζ`N̄ , ω`t) is to choose up to














where Gj(pj|ω`t) denotes the conditional CDF of the highest rival bid in Auction j.
The first term in Expression (2.4) is equal to the instantaneous payoff if the bidder
wins Auction j, where we establish that gj(pj|ω`t) is independent of the vector of
optimal bids (Appendix 2.9.2). The second term is equal to the bidder’s (expected)
payoff if she does not win the current auction (which occurs with probability 1 −
Gj(b`j|ω`t)). Then, we can show that her optimal bid in Auction j is
σUDBID,j(x`; ζ`j, ω`t) = x` + ζ`j − αUDvf (x`;G,Ψ), (2.5)
and her optimal auction selection σUDSLT (x`; ζ`·, ω`t) is to choose the auction with the
highest payoff.15
15As expected, UD bidders shade their bids by their continuation values. As they are forward-
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Note that the bidders’ decision whether to visit the platform on any given day
largely depends on their beliefs about the steady state of the market (i.e., Ψ) on
that day. On the other hand, once a bidder is already on the platform and has
observed the number of auctions closing on that day, her decisions regarding which
auction(s) to participate in and how much to bid are mainly driven by her beliefs
about the highest rival bids (i.e., G). Thus, anticipated market thickness has a
more direct impact on a bidder’s decision whether to visit the platform compared
to which bidding strategy to use. Formally, the notion of steady-state equilibrium
we employ is defined as follows. [Equilibrium] A steady-state equilibrium is a tuple
({σMU , σUD}, {G,Ψ}) such that:
• (Optimality) For bidder ` with type TY ∈ {MU,UD}, her best response com-
prises three decisions on day t; that is, it takes the form σTY (x`; c`t, ζ`·, ω`t) =






V ST , σ
TY
SLT , and σ
TY
BID are defined by Expressions
(2.1), (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4), respectively, given the steady-state distributions
for the market state Ψ and the highest rival bids G.
• (Consistency) Steady-state distributions {G,Ψ} are induced by bidders fol-
lowing strategy σTY (x`; c`t, ζ`·, ω`t), TY ∈ {MU,UD}.
In equilibrium, both Ψ and G are functions of the market design (e.g., list-
ing policy). A market design lever impacts the platform’s revenues by influencing
bidders’ beliefs about the market state and the competition level. With the notion
looking and realize that their purchases today come at the expense of winning an auction in the
future, they implicitly discount their willingness to pay for a present auction.
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of how bidders behave in equilibrium, we then establish that an equilibrium exists
under a (mild) technical assumption. Assume that νMU = νUD = 0 and N̄ ≤ K.
Then, an equilibrium exists. The proof of Proposition 2.4.1 is in Appendix 2.9.3.
As stated in the proposition, equilibrium existence is shown under the assumption
that bidders have the same valuation for all auctions and the daily demand of MU
bidders is sufficiently large. For the general case where the assumptions of the propo-
sition are relaxed (i.e., νMU ≥ 0, νUD ≥ 0, and N̄ > K), we provide an algorithm
that efficiently converges to the equilibrium (see Appendix 2.11.5), which, in turn,
generates a broad set of counterfactuals (see Section 2.6). It is also worthwhile to
highlight that given Ψ and G, all of the bidders’ decisions can be expressed ana-
lytically. This is crucial in enabling us to structurally estimate the model in the
following section.
2.5 Structural Estimation
In this section, we outline our structural estimation approach and present our
estimates. More specifically, we estimate our structural model on Market A’s data
exclusively from February 2013 to February 2014 (i.e., the pre-treatment period),
throughout which the uniform listing policy was used. By doing so, we are able
to: (i) validate our structural model by deriving out-of-sample projections for Mar-
ket A’s pre-treatment-to-post-treatment revenue improvement, which we compare
against our ATE estimate from Section 2.3.3; and (ii) reserve the post-treatment
period’s data for use in our counterfactual market design analysis.
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As is common in the auction literature Ba16, we first normalize the observed
bids to adjust for heterogeneity in the products’ features and for time fixed effects.
As empirically supported in Appendix 2.10.1, bidders freely substitute between the
iPhone models available on the platform (i.e., iPhone 4, iPhone 4s, and iPhone 5) af-
ter adjusting for differences in their valuations. We likewise treat the iPhone models
as substitutes after appropriately normalizing the bids. Post-normalization, bidders’
valuations are treated as drawn from a common Weibull distribution throughout the
observation period.16
The structural estimation follows two steps: we conduct (1) a nonparametric
estimation of the platform’s steady-state distribution of auctions and bids, followed
by (2) a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimation of our modeling prim-
itives for bidders’ valuation distributions, participation costs, and retention rates.
The pre-treatment period lasts for a year, so it is a fair assumption that Market
A’s pre-treatment period data are generated from a steady-state equilibrium. The
corresponding equilibrium distributions Ψ and G are directly estimated in step (1).
Notably, Ψ and G are equilibrium outcomes rather than exogenously specified model
primitives. Using the iterative algorithm detailed in Appendix 2.11.5, they are re-
computed numerically for each counterfactual scenario corresponding to a given
market design (e.g., listing policy) in Section 2.6.17
16We shift the normalized bids to ensure that they fall within the support of the Weibull distri-
bution.
17If multiple equilibria exist, two-step estimation remains consistent under the assumption that
a single equilibrium is played. The “correct” equilibrium play is recovered directly from data
in step one, and the model primitives are identified by bidders’ strategic best responses to such
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2.5.1 Estimating the Platform’s Steady State
The steady-state belief about the market consists of the distribution of the
market thickness as well as the distribution of the corresponding standing bids. In
particular, it takes the form of Ψ(ω`t) = PMKT (nt)ψ(s`t|n), where PMKT is estimated
by the empirical distribution of auctions ending on a given day. On the other hand,
the PDF of standing bids ψ(s`t|n) conditional on n is estimated using kernel density
estimator to minimize misspecification bias.
Furthermore, a bidder forms beliefs about the highest rival bids given a market
state ω`t. Recall that gj(pj|ω`t) denotes the PDF of the highest rival bid in the jth
auction given the state ω`t. Again, we use a kernel density estimator for gj(y|ω`t)
to mitigate misspecification bias. The kernel density estimators for Ψ(ω`t) and
gj(pj|ω`t) are detailed in Appendix 2.10.2. Lastly, we let the upper bound K on the
MU bidders’ demand be equal to 14 auctions (i.e., the maximum number of auctions
in which a MU bidder submitted a bid on a single day in our observation period).18
2.5.2 Estimating the Bidders’ Primitives
Before describing in detail how we estimate them, we reiterate that the model
primitives for a bidder of type TY ∈ {MU,UD} include: (i) her endowed valuation
of the product F TY that is drawn from the Weibull distribution with scale parameter
λTY and shape parameter γTY ; (ii) her daily participation cost that is exponentially
equilibrium play.
18During our observation period, no bidder submits bids to more than 14 auctions on any single
day.
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distributed with rate µTY ; and (iii) her daily retention rate αTY that represents
her probability of remaining in the bidder pool for another period. As we argue
in Appendix 2.10.4, our dataset exhibits sufficient variation to identify the above
primitives.
Given a bidder’s endowed valuation and her beliefs over the market state and
the highest rival bids (which are estimated in Section 2.5.1), her decisions, including
whether and when to visit the platform, which auction(s) to participate in, and how
much to bid, can be analytically obtained as we described in Section 2.4. This,
in principle, allows us to recover all model primitives in an efficient manner by
iteratively obtaining the likelihood of a given equilibrium outcome as a function of
the set of model primitives using simulation and updating the primitives accordingly.
Bidder `’s observed bidding history X` consists of two parts. The first part
is her participation sequence, B` = [B
t`
` , ..., B
t`+l`
` ], where B
t`
` ∈ {0, 1} indicates
whether she placed a bid on Day t (here, t` and t` + l` denote the first and last
observed bidding days for the bidder in our sample). The second part comprises her
bids on Day t, b`t, in the auctions she entered and the standing bids, S`t, in the
auctions available but not entered within the period from Day t` to Day t` + l`.
Given her endowed valuation x` and her presence in the bidder pool, we
specify the likelihood of each of her observed behaviors. The following formulas
apply to both types of bidders; thus we omit the superscripts specifying the bid-
der type. On Day t, observing a bid by Bidder ` implies that she (i) visits the
market (which occurs with probability P V (X`|θ)) and (ii) places bid b`t (which
has likelihood LB`t(b`t,S`t|x`, θ)). Thus, the likelihood of her placing bid b`t is
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P V (X`|θ)LB`t(b`t,S`t|x`, θ). On the other hand, if no bid is observed on that day,
there are two possibilities: (i) she chooses not to visit the platform (which occurs
with probability 1 − P V (x`|θ)), or (ii) she visits the platform but finds it optimal
to not place a bid (which occurs with probability P V (x`, θ)L
NB
`t (S`t|x`, θ)). Thus, the
corresponding likelihood of not observing a bid is 1−P V (x`|θ)+P V (x`|θ)LNB`t (S`t|x`, θ).19
In addition, we specify the likelihood associated with her exit from the bidder pool.
Given that the day when she exits from the bidder pool cannot be observed, we
assume that she leaves the bidder pool on any day within E days20 of her last bid
(we then take the expectation over the likelihoods of all possible exit days). In
summary, the overall likelihood of a bidder’s entire bidding history conditional on






P V (x`|θ)LB`t(b`t,S`t|x`, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Placing the bid(s) b`t on day t
)Bt`` ( 1− P V (x`|θ) + P V (x`|θ)LNB`t (S`t|x`, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸













1− P V (x`|θ) + P V (x`|θ)LNB`t (S`t|x`, θ)
))
(1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exiting bidder pool within E = 14 days since the last bidding day
. (2.6)
As the bidder’s valuation x` is not observed, we need to consider the unconditional
likelihood function, L`(X`|θ) =
∫
x`
L`(X`|x`, θ)f(x`|λ, γ)dx`, where f(x`|λ, γ) de-
notes the PDF of the Weibull valuation distribution. As L`(X`|θ) has no closed-form
expression, the MLE approach is computationally intractable. To overcome this is-
sue, we construct the simulated likelihood function L̂(X`|θ) by employing Monte
19Expressions for PV (X`|θ), LB`t(b`t,S`t|x`, θ), and LNB`t (S`t|x`, θ) are detailed in Appendix
2.10.4.
20Our estimates are obtained under E = 14 days. We have tested other values (e.g., E = 21
days and 28 days) and found that the resulting estimates do not differ significantly.
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Carlo integration.21 The MSL estimate θ̂MSL is obtained by maximizing the log of








Table 2.7 reports our estimates for MU and UD bidders, including their valu-
ation distribution, average daily participation cost, and daily retention probability.
These estimates highlight several differences between MU and UD bidders. On av-
erage, MU bidders possess higher endowed valuations than UD bidders, but exhibit
substantially lower variability in idiosyncratic valuations within-type across individ-
ual bidders. MU type’s average valuation is higher by $20.86 per unit (the average
auction lot size in Market A is 150.3 units), which is both statistically and eco-
nomically significant. By comparison, UD bidders exhibit more variability in their
idiosyncratic terms. Despite the non-dominance of valuation components across MU
and UD bidders, UD bidders shade their bids (Expression (2.5)), which contributes
to MU bidders winning the majority of auctions.
Per daily platform visit, MU bidders incur a substantially higher average par-
ticipation cost of $107.52 compared with $70.64 for UD bidders. On the other hand,
MU bidders tend to have a lower per-auction participation cost, as they typically
participate in multiple auctions within a day. Evidence suggests that the MU bid-
ders’ higher cost to visit on a day is associated with having to review, compare, and
match downstream channels for multiple auctions: MU bidders, on average, spend
21For additional discussion on L̂`(X`|θ), refer to Appendix 2.10.4.
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87.8 minutes on the platform per day, compared with 75.9 minutes for UD bidders.22
Depending on the profit margin of the bidders’ downstream resale channels, partic-
ipation costs in the order of $100 can be substantial, thus affecting their incentives
to participate on the platform.
To validate the model, we compare the predicted distributions of the number
of bidders per auction and the final price in the post-treatment period with those
observed in the dataset. Our model is fairly accurate in predicting both distributions
(see Appendix 2.10.5).
2.6 Implications for Platform Design
We explore how our findings from Section 2.5 lead to implications for platform
design, with a focus on relating the performance of different listing policies to their
induced levels of market thickness.
A platform’s listing policy influences revenues by manipulating the induced
market thickness. Separate strands in the existing literature contemplate dual, but
countervailing, effects from market thickness/availability on the behavior of po-
tential buyers and on revenues. For example, using a dataset of notebook auctions,
22As a side remark, note that MU bidders incur higher participation costs than UD bidders. This
may be due to the fact that MU bidders have to process more information given that they are bid-
ding and monitoring multiple auctions simultaneously. Similarly, it is plausible that cross-market
bidders incur higher participation costs than single-market bidders, as they have to switch between
marketplaces and process additional information while cross-bidding. Therefore, the presence of
cross-market bidders in the data tends to bias our participation cost estimates upwards.
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Table 2.7: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimates for the Primitives of the Struc-
tural Model
MU Bidders UD Bidders
Valuation per auction (x)
Mean $18,594 $15,459
($138) ($203)
Standard Deviation $876 $897
($127) ($164)
Idiosyncratic Error (SD) (ν) $2,978 $4,313
($72) ($244)
Avg. Daily Participation Cost (µ) $107.52 $70.64
($15.38) ($10.06)
Retention Rate (α) 0.968 0.843
(0.001) (0.014)
Number of Bidders 74 113
Note: Standard deviations of the estimates are in parentheses. Valuations are
at normalized scale.
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Ch07 suggest that increasing the number of concurrently available and substitutable
products reduces bidders’ willingness to pay by up to 10.2%. On the other hand,
the operations literature suggests that higher product availability may increase the
seller’s revenue by stimulating demand (e.g., [21]). In a matching context, Ga16
present evidence that thicker markets enhance efficiency by raising matching prob-
abilities. In this subsection, we decompose and analyze the contending effects of
supply-side cannibalization and demand-side participation in response to market
thickness. Within this framework, we study how market thickness can be adjusted
through the platform’s listing policy to balance these effects.
In simulating counterfactuals, we evaluate the performance of four listing poli-
cies that differ in how auction ending times are distributed throughout the week un-
der six different levels of incoming supply (which together induce a market thickness
level). The four listing policies are
(i) Uniform: The number of auctions ending on each weekday is roughly the same.
(ii) Three-Day Batch: Auctions end only on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
(iii) Batch: Auctions end only on Tuesdays and Thursdays.
(iv) Single-Day Batch: Auctions end only on Wednesdays.
Given the same supply level, market thickness on auction-ending days increases by





x,” “1x” (baseline), “2x,” “3x,” and “5x.” In particular, we first derive our
“baseline” supply case by fitting Market A’s supply data to a gamma distribution to
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appropriately account for variability observed in the data. To derive the remaining
supply levels, we simply scale the average supply level of the baseline case by the
corresponding factor while keeping the coefficient of variation the same.
In simulating the demand side of the platform (i.e., bidder behavior) in our
counterfactuals, we keep the rate of new bidders joining and leaving the bidder pool
the same (except for single-unit bidders departing upon winning), mirroring how
the estimated model treats this arrival process as exogenous. Once a bidder joins
the pool, she endogenously considers when to visit the platform, in which auctions
to bid, and how much to bid in each auction. Thus, the behavior of bidders in
the bidder pool is entirely endogenous and based on equilibrium beliefs that are
updated to match the counterfactual simulation. Each simulated counterfactual
assumes a supply rate at which auction pallets arrive to post on the platform and a
listing policy (in Section 2.6.1, we additionally allow for targeted recommendations).
While the supply rate is exogenously determined by the retailer’s setting and reverse
logistics, we vary it to consider how the optimal listing policy and resulting level of
market thickness depends on the relative balance of supply and demand levels. The
exogenous rate of newly-registered bidders arriving into the bidder pool is estimated
non-parametrically from Market A’s post-treatment period. Bidders’ equilibrium
participation and bidding behavior are simulated using an iterative algorithm.23
In Table 2.8, we present the ratio of the revenue obtained relative to the
23For each listing policy (or recommendation system in Section 2.6.1), we simulate the equilib-
rium beliefs for the market state and the highest rival bids (i.e., Ψ and G), using the iterative
algorithm of Appendix 2.11.5.
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revenue under the batch listing policy at that supply level. Therefore, each row
reports the relative performance of the four listing policies at the row’s associated
supply level. In the brackets next to the relative revenues, we display the average
market thickness associated with each case.
At the baseline supply level, our counterfactual revenue improvement due to
switching Market A from the uniform listing policy to the batch listing policy is
roughly 7.0%, offering out-of-sample validation of the 7.3% increase estimated in
our ATE analysis of Section 2.3.3 using time-wise separate data.24 Besides, the
optimal policy in the baseline case turns out to be the single-day batch policy,
which yields 4.8% more revenue than the batch policy. These relative differences
in performance translate into substantial revenue gains. Over the 10 months of the
post-treatment period, Market A’s revenue from iPhone 4, iPhone 4s, and iPhone
5 auctions amounted to $4, 608, 941: the 11.3% relative difference between the uni-
form and the best-performing single-day policy translates to $520, 810 of additional
revenue for the platform.25
The relative performance of the four policies and consequently which listing





x,” the single-day batch policy performs best by inducing
the thickest market. In this scenario, the participation cost exhibits a dominant
24To illustrate the dampening effect of cannibalization, our simulations project an 8.8% increase
in revenue if the platform were able to exogenously increase bidder participation to the same level,
without adding or batching auctions to attract bidders (i.e., no cannibalization).
25Perhaps reflecting our projections, as of January 2017, Market A enforced a single-day listing
policy that ends all auctions exclusively on Tuesdays.
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Table 2.8: Each Listing Policy’s Simulated Revenues as Percentage of Simulated
Revenue under Batch Listing
Supply Level Uniform Three-Day Batch Batch Single-Day Batch
1
3
x 90.1% [0.6] 96.5% [1.1] 100% [1.6] 106.1% [3.2]
1
2
x 91.3% [0.9] 96.6% [1.5] 100% [2.2] 105.5% [4.4]
1x (baseline) 93.5% [2.1] 97.2% [3.4] 100% [5.2] 104.8% [10.3]
($−299, 581) ($−129, 050) ($221, 229)
2x 97.8% [4.2] 101.0% [6.9] 100% [10.5] 95.0% [20.6]
3x 109.6% [6.3] 110.8% [10.3] 100% [15.7] 88.4% [31.0]
5x 122.1% [10.1] 117.8% [16.7] 100% [25.4] 81.9% [50.2]
Note. Values in bold correspond to the row-optimal listing policies with a significance
level of 0.001. Market thickness averages are in brackets.
effect on the platform’s revenues by deterring bidders’ visits; thus, the platform
finds it optimal to increase the bidders’ expected payoff per visit by providing more
options each auction-ending day. By contrast, for high levels of supply (e.g., “5x”),
the uniform policy and the three-day batch policy perform relatively better than the
rest of the policies by maintaining a thinner market. In this case, the cannibalization
between auctions becomes the dominant effect; thus, the platform finds it optimal
to spread out the auction ending times throughout the week.
The market thickness induced by the platform’s listing policy impacts rev-
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enues. Intuitively, platform revenues are maximized when the platform’s market
thickness comes close to the level that effectively balances its trade-off of overcom-
ing bidder participation costs (thus, inducing higher participation rates) against
competition as substitutes among auctions on the supply side. Using simulated
data from the above counterfactual simulations, Figure 2.5 (the left plot) depicts
an auction’s average final per-device revenue as a function of the market’s (log) av-
erage market thickness. Interestingly, low market thickness does not lead to a high
average final price, due primarily to the participation costs and the hurdles to entry
they present. As shown in the middle plot of Figure 2.5, the expected number of
MU bidders per auction drops from 10 to 4 when market thickness decreases from 7
auctions to 1. On the other hand, cannibalization is also evident in the same plot:
the number of MU bidders in an auction keeps decreasing when market thickness
increases beyond 10 auctions. By comparison, UD bidders are much less sensitive to
the shift in market thickness. As displayed in the right plot of Figure 2.5, there is no
statistically significant increase in the expected number of UD bidders per auction
associated with higher market thickness. Illustrating the trade-off between demand-
side participation and supply-side cannibalization as market thickness increases, the
average final price is maximized at moderate levels of market thickness.
Given the reduced-formed regressions and the counterfactual simulations, Ta-
ble 2.9 summarizes the overall effects of the policy switch on bidder behavior, in-
cluding the rates of platform visit and auction participation, as well as their bidding
amount. As bidders’ non-bidding website visits are not observed, we employ the
counterfactual simulations to estimate the change in the bidders’ rate of platform
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Figure 2.5: Effect of Market Thickness on Auctions’ Final Prices and Bidder Par-
ticipation (Left plot is a scatter plot of simulated final prices. Center and right
plots show the fitted curves for simulated numbers of participants, where grey-curve
represents 95%-CI).
Table 2.9: Revenue Funnel of Participation Effects from Listing Policies
Mechanisms Change in % Evidence Type
Platform Visit 11.9% Counterfactural Simulation
Auction Participation 9.7% (p-value = 0.03) Observed
Bidding Decision Not Significant Observed
visits associated with the policy switch. As evident in Table 2.9, the increase in
the platform’s revenues is primarily due to the increase in traffic to the platform
(which, consequently, results in higher auction participation rates). On the other
hand, additional analysis in Appendix 2.11.4 shows that the listing policy has little
effect on bidders’ bidding decisions.
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2.6.1 Targeted Recommendations
In this section we discuss the design of recommendation systems for a compet-
itive online market (e.g., online auction markets). Complementing the listing policy,
a recommendation system is intended to mitigate cannibalization on days of high
market thickness by incentivizing buyers to visit the platform. As is evident in the
left plot of Figure 2.6, daily market thickness (blue curve) exhibits large variations
even though the listing policy is fixed. On the other hand, bidder participation does
not scale up to match the realized supply; thus, the number of bidders per auction
(red curve) drops on days where the realized supply is high (e.g., from Day 1 to
Day 20 and on Days 55, 89, and 98).26 As shown in the right plot of Figure 2.6,
the ratio of bidders who submit at least one bid to all active bidders in the bidder
pool remains consistently below 60%. Therefore, the decline in the number of bid-
ders per auction on these days is not the result of fluctuations in the overall bidder
pool. Instead, we argue that the daily supply-demand mismatches are mainly due
to the fact that it is costly for bidders to continuously monitor the market and ob-
tain up-to-date information about the realized supply; thus, they decide whether to
visit the platform based on their beliefs about the market in steady state. Namely,
they cannot account for the inherent variability in the realized number of auctions
available on the platform.
Given this, the platform can benefit from communicating credible market
26The left plot of Figure 2.6 also implies that sellers do not strategize the weekly supply or the
time of their listings to match the demand.
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Figure 2.6: Variability of Daily Market Thickness and Demand Response in Market
A (market thickness is defined as the number of auctions ending on a given day,
and vertical dashed lines denote the days with supply shocks)
thickness information to bidders as a way to incentivize additional visits. Yet,
sharing information about the daily supply to the entire bidder pool may actually
backfire. Specifically, our counterfactual simulation of the full information policy,
which discloses the realized market thickness daily to all bidders, indicates that in
the resulting equilibrium the final price drops by 28.3% (on days when the realized
supply is low, bidder participation drops significantly and, consequently, the final
price per device drops).
To remedy the adverse effect of the low-supply information revealed from the
communication, we consider recommendation systems that send recommendations
to disclose the market state only when the market thickness is above threshold κ
and only to η fraction of randomly-selected MU bidders. We focus exclusively on
MU bidders because they win most auctions (Table 2.2) and UD bidders are much
less responsive to market thickness information (right plot in Figure 2.5).
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If a bidder receives a recommendation, she will update her belief about the
realized supply of auctions on the platform, taking into account both the platform’s
revealed supply state and how other bidders who received the same recommendation
may respond. If she does not receive a recommendation, she will still update her
belief by inferring that one of the following two cases must be true: (1) the market
thickness on that day is lower than κ; (2) The market thickness exceeds κ, but she
was not selected to receive the information. Due to Case (1), the bidder will adjust
her belief about market thickness downwards if she does not receive a recommenda-
tion. Our counterfactual will elucidate how this affects the participation decisions
of various types of bidders.
We optimize over parameters κ and η in Market A, which operates under
its optimal single-day batch policy. The optimal system sends recommendations
to 10% of the MU bidders when the market thickness on a given day is above
22. Recommendations are sent out roughly on 11.0% of the days in the simulation
horizon. Implementing this recommendation system further improves the platform’s
overall revenue by 0.9%, including a 1.6% increase during the recommendation days.
Figure 2.7 plots MU bidders’ equilibrium rates of visiting the platform in the
presence and absence of (optimal) recommendations. Bidders’ responses to receiving
a recommendation (blue curve) vary drastically depending on their valuations. For
bidders with lower valuations (below $131), receiving a recommendation is actually
bad news, and substantially decreases their probability of visiting. By contrast, bid-
ders with higher valuations (above $131) become significantly more likely to visit the
platform after receiving a recommendation. Since the supply of auctions is higher on
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Figure 2.7: Effects of Recommendations on Bidders’ Market Participation (the left
vertical dashed line denotes the MU bidder whose participation rate remains un-
changed upon receiving a recommendation. The right vertical dashed line denotes
the MU bidder whose participation rate remains unchanged upon not receiving a
recommendation)
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days when recommendations are sent out, high-valuation bidders’ expected payoff
per visit is higher. Besides, their increased platform visits intensify the competition
and deters the low-valuation bidders. Thus, the optimal recommendation system
increases revenues mainly by altering the composition of participants through self-
selection on the market’s high-inventory days. Figure 2.7 also reveals how bidders
respond to not receiving a recommendation (red curve). First, a high-valuation
bidder (above $140) who did not receive a recommendation in the presence of a rec-
ommendation system is slightly less likely to visit the platform than in the absence
of a recommendation system (black curve). Such a bidder infers that the supply
of auctions may be low, which, in turn, weakens her incentive to participate. On
the other hand, for low-valuation bidders (below $140), not receiving the recom-
mendation can be interpreted as facing less competition on the platform. Thus, the
incentives for participation for low-valuation bidders are (slightly) higher.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we empirically illustrate the role of listing policies in inducing
the optimal market thickness level and, consequently, in generating higher revenues.
In particular, we highlight that optimizing this seemingly innocuous market design
lever affects revenues significantly by inducing the appropriate level of market thick-
ness on the platform. We also explore the design of a recommendation system that
selectively informs bidders about the market state and establish that it can ben-
efit the B2B auction platform by mitigating cannibalization among substitutable
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auctions.
Using a proprietary dataset, obtained from a leading online B2B auction plat-
form, we estimate that inducing higher market thickness (by concentrating the auc-
tions’ ending times on certain weekdays) leads to a 7.3% increase in the platform’s
revenues. Additional analysis points to the presence of significant participation costs
associated with visiting the platform and bidding in auctions that adversely affects
bidders’ participation rates. Motivated by the descriptive results, we develop and
estimate a structural model, which endogenizes bidders’ decision-making including
whether and when to visit the platform, which auction(s) to participate in, and
how much to bid. Notably, the revenue impact of inducing higher market thickness
predicted by counterfactual simulation on the estimated model is consistent with
the results from the reduced-form analysis.
Complementary to illustrating the revenue impact of the listing policy, we
discuss the design of a recommendation system, which alters the composition of
participants through self-selection. Appropriately designing the system yields an
additional revenue increase by successively increasing the level of competition be-
tween bidders when the daily supply is significantly higher than average.
More broadly, our work highlights that marketplace design can have signif-
icantly positive revenue implications for online two-sided platforms by mitigating
frictions that impede participation. Given their growing prominence, we believe
that exploring the impact of platform design, especially focusing on non-price levers,
on market thickness and, consequently, revenues and welfare in the context of other
two-sided marketplaces is a very fruitful direction for future research.
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2.8 Appendix: Natural Experiment
2.8.1 AIPW Estimator of the Average Treatment Effect
The propensity score ejt of an auction j that gets listed at time t is its proba-
bility of being assigned to Market A on the basis of its vector of observable attributes
AUCjt and the listing time t at which the auction lot becomes available. To estimate
the propensity score, we specify
Logit(ejt) = β̃0 + δ̃t + β̃
T
AUCjt, (2.7)
where δ̃t and β̃ respectively denote the week-t fixed effect and the attribute-coefficient
vector. Using the dependent variable Ajt, we first estimate model (2.7) by logistic
regression to obtain predicted propensity scores êjt.





















where Nobs is the period’s sample size, corresponding to the pre- and post-treatment
periods, respectively, and êjt is the estimated propensity score for auction jt obtained
by Expression (2.7). We restrict attention to auctions with estimated propensity
scores between 0.2 and 0.8 in order to ensure that each unit will not have a weight
that is more than 0.025, and that the requisite overlap assumption holds Im04.
While the classic ATE estimate is derived as the difference in observed outcomes
weighted appropriately using the associated propensity score projections êjt, Robins’
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AIPW estimator adds terms involving the projections L̂FP jt,1 and L̂FP jt,0. In
turn, these projections are derived from estimating the following linear models of
log-revenue outcomes, as an alternative to the classic ATE:
LFPjt,A = β0,A + δt,A + β
T
AAUCjt,A + εjt,A, (2.9)
where A is the indicator of Market A, β0,A is the intercept, δt,A is a fixed effect for
week t, and βA denotes the attribute-coefficient vector. Note that Robins’ AIPW
is a doubly robust estimator; that is, it offers a consistent estimator of the ATE if
either the classic ATE propensity score model (i.e., Expression (2.7)) or the linear
outcome model (i.e, Expression (2.9)) is well specified.
2.8.2 Assessing Overlap
The purpose of this section is to assess the overlap in the covariates of Markets
A and B and, subsequently, to argue that our estimation approach is indeed valid. To
this end, we restrict attention to observations that have predicted propensity scores
between 0.2 and 0.8 and, first, present the corresponding distributions of predicted
propensity scores and summary statistics.27 In our propensity score model, we
include variables to capture weekly fixed effects (i.e., the time at which an auction
was held), the auction lot size, and fixed effects for product models and carriers.
We then calculate the differences between the means of each of the covariates in the
treatment and control groups, respectively. A covariate with a difference in means
27Given the sample size, the selection of the cutoff points follows the rule that no observation
will have a weight that is more than 0.05 Im04
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Figure 2.8: Histograms of Propensity Scores in Samples of the Pre-treatment Period
(left) and the Post-treatment Period (right)
that is greater than 0.25 standard deviations is considered to be lacking overlap.
During the pre-treatment period, the treatment effect relates to unobserved
differences between Markets A and B. As deduced from the left plot of Figure
2.8, there is a sufficiently large overlap between the treatment group (Market A)
and the control group (Market B). In the first three columns of Table 2.10, we
present the means of the covariates (with standard deviations in parentheses) and
the cross-market differences for each covariate. All differences in means lie within
0.14 standard deviations, which indicates that the two groups are well balanced.
During the post-treatment period, the treatment effect relates to both the un-
observed differences between Markets A and B and the listing policy switch. In the
right plot of Figure 2.8, we provide a histogram with the predicted propensity scores
of the treatment group (Market A) and the control group (Market B). Although the
overlap is not as large as that in the pre-treatment period, we believe that the level
of overlap in the post-treatment period is sufficient. As both distributions spread
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Table 2.10: Overlap of Covariates in the Selected Samples of the Pre- and Post-
treatment Periods
Pre-treatment Post-treatment
Ctr. Group Trt. Group Diff./S.D. Ctr. Group Trt. Group Diff./S.D.
Auction Lot Size 77.34 (37.58) 80.52 (37.32) 0.08 63.29 (37.65) 92.70 (26.53) 0.78
iPh. 4-AT&T .023 (.152) .012 (.112) -0.07 .075 (.264) .084 (.278) 0.03
iPh. 4-Sprint .192 (.394) .194 (.395) 0.01 .104 (.306) .069 (.254) -0.11
iPh. 4-Verizon .291 (.454) .256 (.436) -0.07 .037 (.191) .045 (.207) 0.03
iPh. 4s-AT&T .175 (.380) .161 (.368) -0.03 .162 (.369) .259 (.438) 0.26
iPh. 4s-Sprint .103 (.304) .129 (.336) 0.08 .223 (.416) .196 (.397) -0.06
iPh. 4s-Verizon .133 (.339) .183 (.386) 0.14 .163 (.369) .165 (.371) 0.01
iPh. 5-Sprint .036 (.188) .031 (.175) -0.02 .154 (.361) .105 (.307) -0.13
iPh. 5-Verizon .020 (.143) .014 (.119) -0.04 .032 (.177) .039 (.194) 0.04
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out within [0.2, 0.8], we have observations from both groups in every propensity
score bin. In the last three columns of Table 2.10, we present the covariate means
(with standard deviations in parentheses) and the cross-group differences for each
covariate. The differences in means for all covariates (with the exception of the auc-
tion lot size) are within 0.26 standard deviations. In general, an outcome regression
model relies on control observations when predicting the outcome of treated units
if they were not treated. A large difference in covariate distributions across groups
implies that the predictions heavily rely on extrapolation; hence, they are sensitive
to the specification of the outcome regression model.
To evaluate how our ATE estimation is affected by the lack of overlap in the
auction lot size (in the post-treatment period), we conduct the following robustness
checks:
(i) First, we rerun the ATE analysis based on a subsample in which the treatment
and control groups have a large overlap and there are sufficient observations to
make statistically significant inferences. Although the assumption of overlap in
the alternative approach is more credible compared to the original estimation,
the estimated effect does not necessarily apply to all observations.
(ii) Second, to test whether the estimation is sensitive to the specification of the
outcome regression model, we conduct two additional robustness checks by
replacing the auction lot covariate with its log scale value (to make it concave)
and by adding a quadratic term for the auction lot (to make it convex).
For the subsample in (i), we select auctions with lot size between 50 and
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90. This results in 49 observations for the control group and 58 observations for
the treatment group. The subsample accounts for 27% of the original sample. To
assess the overlap for the subsample, we present the histogram of predicted propen-
sity scores (left plot of Table 2.11) and the differences in means of the covariates
(right table of Table 2.11). Compared with the original sample, the overlap in the
subsample is sufficiently higher.
Table 2.11: Histogram of the Predicted Propensity Scores in the Selected Subsample
in the Post-treatment Period (left) and a Table Assessing the Overlap of Covariates
in the Selected Subsample (right)
Ctr. Group Trt. Group Diff./S.D.
Auction Lot Size 69.11 (11.44) 69.51 (11.30) 0.03
iPh. 4-AT&T .122 (.327) .030 (.171) -0.28
iPh. 4-Sprint 0 0 0
iPh. 4-Verizon .107 (.309) .092 (.290) -0.04
iPh. 4s-AT&T .109 (.312) .056 (.230) -0.17
iPh. 4s-Sprint .351 (.477) .400 (.490) 0.10
iPh. 4s-Verizon .185 (.388) .129 (.335) -0.14
iPh. 5-Sprint .052 (.223) .093 (.291) 0.18
iPh. 5-Verizon .048 (.214) .085 (.280) 0.17
We perform the ATE analysis based on the subsample and then compare the
result with that obtained from the original sample. The results can be found in
Table 2.12. The estimated ATE of the subsample is significantly positive and on a
similar scale to the ATE estimate corresponding to the original sample. Though the
subsample estimate may suffer from selection bias, comparison of the two results
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Table 2.12: Average Treatment Effect Estimates using the Original Sample and the
Selected Subsample




suggests that the lack of overlap for the auction lot size covariate seems to have a
very limited impact on the ATE estimation. In what follows, we conduct another
analysis to check whether our ATE estimation is sensitive to the specification of the
outcome regression model.
The key issue corresponding to the lack of overlap between treated and con-
trolled units is that the controlled outcome predictions of the treated units with
outlying values heavily rely on extrapolation, as few control units are observed in
this region when estimating the outcome regression model. In other words, the
prediction precision may be sensitive to the specification of the outcome regression
model. In our case, the predicted outcomes may be subject to the functional form of
auction lot size. In our robustness check (ii), we consider concave (log) and convex
(quadratic) specifications regarding the auction lot size in the outcome regression
model. As shown in Table 2.13, the ATE estimates remain almost the same under
different specifications. In particular, there is a strong linear relationship between
the final price of an auction and its size. This is quite intuitive given that the cell
65
Table 2.13: Robustness Check of Auction Lot Size Specification








phones sold in an auction are relatively homogeneous; thus, the price is likely to
increase linearly with the lot size. Within a moderate lot size range, economies of
scale and demand satiation effects are not significant; thus, the dependence between
the final price and the lot size can be well described by a linear relationship. This
implies that the estimated ATE is not significantly influenced by outliers, including
those with auction lots larger than 90, whose predicted control outcomes heavily
rely on extrapolation. In conclusion, our original ATE estimation remains reliable.
2.8.3 Cross-market Bidders
In this section, we establish that the presence of bidders that are cross-registered
in both Markets A and B implies that our estimate on the revenue impact of the
switch in the listing policy is conservative. In other words, if the markets were
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truly independent, then switching to a batch listing policy would result in a higher
increase in the platform’s revenues than our estimated 7.3%. Our approach involves
developing a model that features cross-market bidders and computing the platform’s
revenues as a function of their share in the total population via simulation.
2.8.3.1 Model.
First, we provide an outline of the model.
(a) Model Setting and Assumptions.
1. The platform has two markets, A and B. Each market has a single-market
bidder pool of fixed size M . Both markets share a cross-market bidder
pool of fixed size L. Each bidder has a private valuation x drawn from
a common distribution with cdf F (·), which has a positive support. The
bidder has demand for K auctions upon entry into the pool.
2. The platform operates over an infinite horizon. All auctions are identical,
second-price auctions and last for one day. Under the uniform policy,
auctions are listed every day; under the batch policy, auctions are listed
every other day.
3. Each day, a bidder first decides whether or not to participate on the
platform. If she does, she incurs a participation cost c drawn from the
exponential distribution with rate µ. If the bidder chooses to participate
on a given day, she selects a number of auctions equal to her unsatisfied
demand to participate at random. For each auction j she participates
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in, she places a bid equal to x + εj, where εj is an idiosyncratic term
drawn from N(0, σ2ε ). At the end of the day, she exits the bidder pool
with probability 1 − ρ. As soon as a bidder exits, a new bidder joins so
that the pool size remains constant.
(b) Notation. We use k and sm to denote a bidder’s demand that is still not
satisfied and the number of auctions in Market m that the bidder has chosen
to participate in, respectively. Moreover, we introduce the following notation:
1. Gmt(y), gmt(y): the CDF and PDF of the highest rival bid in an auction
in Market m on Day t.
2. Pmt(w;x, k): the probability of a single-market bidder winning w auctions
in Market m on Day t.
3. Pt(wA, wB;x, sA, sB): the probability of a cross-market bidder winning
wA Market A auctions and wB Market B auctions on Day t.
4. umt(x, k): a single-market bidder’s expected payoff in Market m on Day
t.
5. ut(x, k): a cross-market bidder’s expected payoff by visiting the platform
on Day t.
6. vmt(x, k): a single-market bidder’s aggregate payoff on Day t.
7. vt(x, k): a cross-market bidder’s aggregate payoff on Day t.
(c) Participation decisions when both markets implement the uniform
policy. Suppose that there are Nm auctions in Market m on each day. Since
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both markets use the uniform policy, we omit subscript t.
1. Single-market bidders: The expected payoff of a single-market bidder in
Market m when she visits the platform is given by











vm(x, k − w). (2.10)
The bidder visits the platform if um(x, k)−c ≥ ρvm(x, k), where ρvm(x, k)
is the payoff corresponding to waiting. Hence, her aggregate payoff is
equal to




um(x, k)− c, ρvm(x, k)
}]












Lastly, combining (2.10) and (2.11), we can solve for um(x, k) and vm(x, k)
numerically for k = 1, 2, ..., K, given gm, Pm and x.
2. Cross-market bidders: The expected payoff of a cross-market bidder when

















P (wA, wB;x, kA, kB)v(x, k − wA − wB)
)
, (2.12)
where C(k,NA, NB) =
{
(kA, kB) : kA + kB = min(k,NA + NB), kA =
0, 1, ..., NA, kB = 0, 1, ..., NB
}
. Then, she will visit the platform if u(x, k)−
c ≥ ρv(x, k), where ρv(x, k) is the payoff corresponding to waiting.
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Hence, her aggregate payoff is equal to




u(x, k)− c, ρv(x, k)
)]












Lastly, combining Expressions (2.12) and (2.13), we can solve for u(x, k)
and v(x, k) numerically, for k = 1, 2, ..., K, given gA, gB, P , and x.
(d) Participation decisions when Market A implements the uniform pol-
icy and Market B implements the batch policy. In Market A, there are
0 auctions on odd days, denoted by t = 1 below, and 2NA auctions on even
days, denoted by t = 2 below. In Market B, there are NB auctions every day.
1. Single-Market-A bidders: For a single-market bidder in Market A, she
only visits the platform on even days. Then,











vA2(x, k − w). (2.14)
She will visit the platform if uA2(x, k)−c ≥ ρ2vA2(x, k), where ρ2vA2(x, k)






















Lastly, combining (2.14) and (2.15), we can solve for uA2(x, k) and vA2(x, k)
numerically for k = 1, 2, ..., K, given gA2, PA2, and x.
2. Single-Market-B bidders: For a single-market bidder in Market B, her
expected payoff of visiting the platform on day t ∈ {0, 1} (let t′ ∈ {0, 1}\t)
is











vBt′(x, k − w). (2.16)
She will visit the platform if uBt(x, k)− c ≥ ρvBt′(x, k), where ρvBt′(x, k)



















Lastly, combining Expressions (2.16) and (2.17), we can solve for
uB1(x, k), uB2(x, k), vB1(x, k),
and vB2(x, k) numerically for k = 1, 2, ..., K, given gB1, gB2, PB1, PB2,
and x.
3. Cross-market bidders: For a cross-market bidder visiting the platform,
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her expected payoffs on odd and even days are given as follows:











v2(x, k − wB),
(2.18)




















where C(k, 2NA, NB) =
{
(kA, kB) : kA + kB = min(k, 2NA + NB), kA =
0, 1, ..., NA, kB = 0, 1, ..., NB
}
. On day t ∈ {0, 1} (with t′ ∈ {0, 1}\t), she
will visit the platform if ut(x, k) − c ≥ ρvt′(x, k), where ρvt′(x, k) is the




















Lastly, combining Expressions (2.18), (2.19), and (2.20), we can solve
for u1(x, k), u2(x, k), v1(x, k), and v2(x, k) numerically for k = 1, 2, ..., K,
given gA2, gB1, gB2, P1, P2 and x.
(e) Simulation. We provide a brief summary of how we simulate bids on each
day (through Day T ):
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- Day 0: We initialize gmt(y), Pmt(w;x, k), and Pt(wA, wB;x, sA, sB) for the
first 2M single-market bidders and L cross-market bidders in the three
bidder pools.
- Day t: First, we update the bidder pools by replacing the bidders who
exit with new bidders. The new bidders form their beliefs about the
state of the market, i.e., gmt(y), Pmt(w;x, k), and Pt(wA, wB;x, sA, sB)
based on all bids between Day 1 and Day t. Then, all active bidders
make platform-visit decisions and, if they choose to visit the platform,
they place bids in a random subset of the auctions. When all bids are
placed, auctions are allocated to their winners and we update the latter’s
demand that has not been yet satisfied.
2.8.3.2 Simulation Results.
(a) Parameters. Our simulation scenarios are based on the following parameters:
NA = NB = 3 2M + L = 40 F = N(50, 15) Fε = N(0, 1)
K = 8 µ = 0.01 ρ = 0.8 T = 2, 000.
We chose the parameters above in order to make our simulation scenarios
relatively comparable to what we observe in the dataset. We then simulate
the model for 1,000 days and analyze the corresponding bids.
(b) Arbitrage effect of cross-market bidders. We evaluate the effect of the
policy switch under a number of scenarios corresponding to different ratios
for the cross-market bidders, ranging from 0% to 80%. Under the parameters
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Table 2.14: Average Final Price per Market in Different Simulation Scenarios
Ratio of cross-market bidders 0% 10% 20% 30% 60% 80%
Market A 54.64 55.63 56.81 57.66 59.49 60.67
Market B 49.37 50.61 51.92 53.02 55.67 57.25
Abs. Change 5.28 5.03 4.89 4.64 3.82 3.42
Change in % 10.7% 9.9% 9.4% 8.8% 6.9% 6.0%
noted above, Market A and Market B are identical when they both implement
the uniform policy. Thus, we only need to consider the cross-market price
difference when Market A is under the batch policy, while Market B is under
the uniform policy.
As is evident in Table 2.14, the revenue increase corresponding to the policy
switch is decreasing in the proportion of cross-market bidders in the population
of bidders. This is due to the fact that cross-market bidders play the role of
an arbitrageur and tend to shrink the price gap between the two markets. In
particular, when Market A auctions are expected to have higher final prices
than those in Market B, a cross-market bidder will certainly choose to bid
in Market B, thus intensifying the competition in Market B and resulting
in a decrease in the price gap between the two markets. In summary, this
analysis implies that our estimate of the revenue impact of the policy switch
in Section 2.3.3 is conservative compared to the case where the two markets
are completely independent (i.e., when there are no cross-market bidders).
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Table 2.15: Average Number of Weekly Participants in Markets A and B (S.D. in
the parentheses)
Market B Market A
Pre-treatment Period 27.7 (18.3) 17.3 (14.8)
Post-treatment Period 52.1 (18.5) 46.2 (15.4)
Changing Rate (%) 88.1% 167.1%
Therefore, designating our setting as a “natural experiment” is well justified.
2.8.4 Aggregate Participation Increase in Market A
In this subsection, we measure the increase of the overall auction participation
in Market A resulted from the policy switch. Explicitly, we count the number of
unique bidders participating an auction (not limited to iPhone 4, iPhone 4s, and
iPhone 5 auctions) per market per week and aggregate them across markets and
across periods. The results are displayed in Table 2.15. As is evident in the table,
Market A has a substantial increase of the unique participants per week in the post-
treatment period. This indicates that the policy switch from the uniform policy to
the batch policy attracts more bidders to Market A.
2.8.5 Additional Evidence of Participation Costs
We provide additional evidence for participation costs driving the revenue in-
crease in Market A by examining the platform-visit decisions of cross-market bidders.
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To that end, we examine whether cross-market bidders exhibit different participa-
tion patterns in Market B across weekdays before and after the adoption of the
batch policy in Market A. In particular, we compare bidders’ participation rates
in Market B on Tuesdays and Thursdays to those on Mondays, Wednesdays, and
Fridays by computing the ratio of the total number of participants on Tuesdays and
Thursdays over the total number of participants on the remaining weekdays. As-
suming that cross-market bidders are equally likely to participate in the market on
any given weekday would imply a ratio of 2/3. During the pre-treatment period, we
observe the cross-market bidders’ participation ratio to be 63% (i.e., close to 2/3)
in Market B, consistent with the use of the uniform listing policy in both markets.
However, while Market B persisted in employing the uniform listing period through-
out the post-treatment period, its participation ratio for cross-registrants increased
to 84%, suggesting that these bidders strongly preferred to participate in Market
B on the auction-clearing days of the other market (i.e., Tuesdays and Thursdays
in Market A). Within the same period, an average cross-market bidder bids in a
higher fraction of available auctions in Market B on Tuesday/Thursday than on
Monday/Wednesday/Friday (as shown in Figure 2.9).28 This spillover effect in the
cross-market bidders’ participation rates suggests that the costs involved in visiting
the platform, carefully examining the inventory of open auctions, and placing a bid
are substantial. Thus, bidders are strategic in their decision to visit the platform
and actively participate in auctions. In other words, bidders choose to visit the
28We formally analyze this spillover effect in the cross-market bidders’ participation rate using
a difference-in-differences methodology in Appendix 2.11.2.
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Figure 2.9: Average Auction Participation Rates in Market B in the Post-treatment
Period
platform only when their expected payoffs from doing so exceed some threshold.
In summary, the above discussion (including Section 2.3.4) suggests the fol-
lowing mechanism to explain the revenue increase: an increase in market thickness
boosts bidder participation both on aggregate and per auction. In turn, this addi-
tional traffic results in higher revenues for the platform. Underlying this mechanism
is the fact that visiting the platform on a given day, monitoring the set of avail-
able auctions, and choosing whether and how much to bid entails a significant cost
for bidders. In other words, although one expects that the auction platform would
eliminate frictions and an auction’s ending time would not affect its final price, we
demonstrate that this is not the case (at least in the liquidation auctions). Thus, op-








When a MU bidder ` participates in the platform and observes market state
ω`t, her conditional payoff becomes






(x` + ζ`j − pj)gj(pj|ω`t)dpj. (2.21)






uMU(x`; ζ`·, ω`t, G)dFζ(ζ`·)dΨ(ω`t). (2.22)
For a UD bidder `, her conditional payoff after visiting the platform is given
by














uUDj∗ (x`; ζ`j∗ , ω`t, G)dF
UD
ζ (ζ`j∗)dΨ(ω`t),
where j∗ = σUDSLT (x`; ζ`·, ω`t) denotes the auction in which it is optimal to bid. Lastly,












2.9.2 Independence between b` and gj(pj|ω`t)
In this subsection, we show that Expressions (2.21) and (2.23) can account for
the effect of b` on the distribution of the highest rival bids.
Recall that the market state is denoted by ω`t = (nt, s`t), and let wj denote
the current highest bid in auction j, which is unobservable. The conditional PDF
of wj is denoted by hj(wj|nt, s`t). Let pj denote the highest rival bid (i.e., the final
price) in auction j, and let kj(pj|nt, s`t) denote its conditional PDF. The expected





(x` + ζ`j − pj)kj(pj|nt, wj, s`t,−j)dpj
)
hj(wj|nt, s`t)dwj,
where sj denotes the current standing bid in auction j, and s`t,−j is the vector of
the standing bids excluding auction j. In turn, this is equal to:
∫ b`j
sj



















We can verify that gj(pj|nt, s`t) is a probability density function and that it is
independent of b`. 
2.9.3 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
To establish the existence of the equilibrium, we first establish that the mapping
from beliefs about the highest rival bids to their actual distribution is continuous
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and compact. Then, we conclude that the mapping has a fixed point, using the
Schauder fixed-point theorem.
Mapping Γ.
We denote the unconditional CDF of the highest rival bids by G. Its jth







n (yjn|ω)dΨ(ω), which is the unconditional
distribution of the highest rival bid yjn in the auction with the j
th−lowest standing
bid. We then specify the mapping between G and the resulting unconditional rival
bids distribution Ĝ as
Ĝ(·) = Γ(·; G) = P
(







fh(xMU ,mMU ,b(xUD; G),mUD, o, n) ≤ ·
)




P (dxMU , dxUD).
The notation we use above can be summarized as follows:
(i) o: the exogenous order of bidders in the pool visiting the platform.
(ii) n: number of auctions (i.e., market thickness).
(iii) N̄ : upper bound of n.
(iv) mMU ,mUD: sets of MU and UD bidders who visit the platform.
(v) xMU ,xUD: vectors of valuations of MU and UD bidders in the bidder pool.
(vi) b(xUD; G): bidding function of UD bidders.
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(vii) fh(·): vector of functions that generate the final price in each auction.
We can ignore all discrete variables (i.e., mMU , mUD, o, and n) as they only
take a finite number of values. It is sufficient to establish the continuity and com-
pactness of the following mapping Γsub : H → H, where H is the space of probability
CDFs, with fixed mMU ,mUD, o, and n. Specifically,





fh(xMU ,mMU ,b(xUD; G),mUD, o, n) ≤ ·
)




P (dxMU , dxUD).
Note that Γ =
∑
Γsub. In addition, we have the following specifications for the
components of Γsub(G):




























where rMU(·; G) and rUD(·; G) denote the expected payoffs per market visit for MU
and UD bidders, respectively. Furthermore, Proposition 2.9.4 (specified in Appendix
2.9.4) implies that bidders simply choose to bid in the auction(s) with the lowest
standing bid(s).29 The expected payoffs per market visit for both types of bidders
29We provide proofs for the propositions in the remainder of the Appendix.
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are:


















where `MU and `UD are indices corresponding to the MU and UD bidders. The
probability that there are n auctions is denoted by pn. The optimal bid b`UD placed
by UD bidder `UD is:















where µUD is the parameter of the participation cost distribution of the UD bidders.
By definition, the vector of functions that generate the final price in each
auction can be denoted by fh = (f
1
h , ..., f
N̄
h ), and the element f
j
h maps all bidders’
auction selections and bidding decisions to the final price in auction j. For ease of
exposition, we define f jh as a function of the ordered valuations of the participating




UD to denote the `
th-highest valuation among
MU and UD bidders, respectively, and we use xjMU and x
j
UD to denote the vectors
















UD ,G), if b(x
j,(2)








So far, we have completed the specification of mapping Γsub. In addition, we
note that the steady-state beliefs of the market state (i.e., Ψ(ω)) and the highest
rival bids (i.e., Gj(y|ω)) affect bidders’ behavior only through G. Thus, to establish
consistency, it is sufficient to show that G is induced by bidders playing their optimal
strategies. In what follows, we show the continuity and compactness of Γsub.
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Continuity of Γsub.
We prove the following three lemmas to establish the continuity of Γsub. Given
mMU , mapping Γ1(·; G) , PMU(mMU ; ·,G) is uniformly bounded and Lipschitz
continuous in G.
Proof: The mapping is uniformly bounded since PMU(mMU ; ·,G) is a proba-
bility CDF. To show that Γ1 is Lipschitz continuous, first note that for all G,G
′ ∈ H
and for all x`MU ∈ [0, B] (recall that B is the upper bound of the valuations), we
have:











n (y)|dy ≤ N̄2B|G−G′|∞.
Therefore, rMU(·; G) is uniformly bounded, and Lipschitz continuous in G.
Second, using the fact that the participation costs follow the exponential dis-




is uniformly bounded and Lipschitz
continuous in rMU(·; G). Note that 0 ≤ rMU(x`MU ; G) ≤ N̄B. Moreover, for any




|µexp(−µMU t)|dt ≤ µMU |u− u′|,





uniformly bounded and Lipschitz continuous in rMU(·; G). From the definition of








for a finite number of bidders, we conclude that
PMU(mMU ; ·,G) is Lipschitz continuous in G. 
Given mUD, mapping Γ2(·; G) , PUD(mUD; b(·; G),G) is uniformly bounded
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and Lipschitz continuous in G. Proof: The mapping is uniformly bounded as
PUD(mUD; b(·; G),G) is a probability CDF. To establish Lipschitz continuity, we
decompose Γ2 into three parts:
(i) Mapping Γ2a(·; G) , PUD(mUD; ·,G);
(ii) Function f2b(b) , PUD(mUD; b,G) given G; and
(iii) Mapping Γ2c(·; G) , b(·; G).
We show that each part is uniformly bounded and Lipschitz continuous separately.
Note that mUD is fixed. The claim for Γ2a(G) follows using the same argument as
in Lemma 2.9.3. For f2b(b), it is sufficient to show
P
(
cUD ≤ rUD(b; G)
)
= 1− exp(−µUDrUD(b; G)),
is Lipschitz continuous in b given G. This holds since
∣∣∣∂P(cUD ≤ rUD(b;G))
∂b






Lastly, mapping Γ2c(G) : H 7→ [0, B]L, where recall that L denotes the upper
bound of the size of the bidder pool, is uniformly bounded. For a UD bidder with
x`UD ∈ [0, B] and for all G,G′ ∈ H, according to the optimal bidding decision of
UD bidders, we have


















Note that b− b′ + F (b,G)− F (b′,G′) = 0, which further implies that
b− b′ + F (b,G)− F (b′,G) = F (b′,G′)− F (b′,G).



























which implies that |b− b′ + F (b,G)− F (b′,G)| ≥ |b− b′|. On the other hand,
|F (b′,G′)− F (b′,G)| ≤ 2α
UD
1− αUD









Finally, we conclude that Γ2c(G) is Lipschitz continuous in G, using the triangular
inequality. 









UD; G) ≤ ·
)
P o(dx),
is uniformly bounded and Lipschitz continuous in G, given o, n,mMU ,mUD. Proof:
For any yj ∈ [0, B], and for any G,G′ ∈ H, we have
Γ3(y














































∣∣G̃(yj)− G̃′(yj)∣∣ ≤ I1 + I2 + I3, for I1, I2, and I3, is defined as:
I1 =
∫ ∣∣1(b(xj,(1)UD ; G) < xj,(2)MU ≤ yj)− 1(b(xj,(1)UD ; G′) < xj,(2)MU ≤ yj)∣∣P o(dx)
I2 =
∫ ∣∣1(b(xj,(1)UD ; G) < xj,(2)MU ≤ yj)− 1(b(xj,(1)UD ; G′) < xj,(2)MU ≤ yj)∣∣P o(dx)
I3 =




















The claim follows by showing that I1, I2, and I3 are bounded by |G − G′|∞. For
brevity, we establish that I1 is bounded by |G−G′|∞ (the proofs for I2 and I3 follow

































































MU ) are the CDF and PDF of the second-highest
valuation among MU bidders in auction j, respectively. The last inequality holds




|f j,(2)MU |∞ <∞, which is independent of G. 
In summary, combining Lemmas 2.9.3, 2.9.3, and 2.9.3, we conclude that Γsub
is uniformly bounded and Lipschitz continuous in G. Therefore, Γ is a continuous
mapping.
Compactness of Γsub.
Here we show that Γsub is a compact mapping using the Arzela–Ascoli theorem.
To apply the theorem, Γsub needs to satisfy the following conditions:
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1. The image Γsub(·;H) is uniformly bounded.
2. Sequence {Γsub(y; Gn)} is equicontinuous in y ∈ [0, B]N̄ .
The fact that Γsub(H) is uniformly bounded can be derived in a straightforward
manner. To establish the equicontinuity of the mapping, we show that for any
G ∈ H and for any y,y′ ∈ [0, B]N̄ , we have
∣∣Γsub(y; G)− Γsub(y′; G)∣∣ ≤ K0 · ∣∣y − y′∣∣,
where K0 is a constant, which is independent of G. It is sufficient to show that the
following inequality holds for the jth auction given yj, y
′
j and fixed m1,m2, n, o:
|Γsub,j(yj; G)− Γsub,j(y′j; G)| ≤ J1 + J2 + J3,
where J1, J2, and J3 are defined as follows:
J1 =
∫ ∣∣∣1(b(xj,(1)UD ; G) < xj,(2)MU < yj)− 1(b(xj,(1)UD ; G) < xj,(2)MU < y′j)∣∣∣P o(dx)
J2 =
∫ ∣∣∣1(xj,(1)MU < b(xj,(2)UD ; G) ≤ yj)− 1(xj,(1)MU < b(xj,(2)UD ; G) ≤ y′j)∣∣∣P o(dx)
J3 =



















In each case, the difference within the absolute value takes value −1, 0, or 1. For
brevity, we only show that J3 is bounded by |y− y′| (Using similar arguments, one
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|f j,(1)MU |∞ < ∞. For the second term in Expression (2.25), we
define vectors z, z′ as the solutions to the following equations:




j + F (y
′
j,G).










































|f j,(1)UD |∞ <∞. Finally,




Therefore, we establish that {Γsub(y; G)}, G ∈ H, is equicontinuous in y. Applying
the Arzela–Ascoli theorem, we obtain that Γsub is a compact mapping. 
Finally, employing the Schauder fixed-point theorem implies the existence of
a fixed point such that Γ(G) = G. This completes the proof of the proposition. 
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2.9.4 UD Bidders’ Auction Selection
Assume that νMU = νUD = 0 and K ≥ N̄ ; the UD bidders’ optimal auction
selection decision is to choose the auction with the lowest standing bid.
Proof. The assumptions of the proposition (i.e., νMU = νUD = 0 and K ≥ N̄)
directly imply that MU bidders place a bid in all open auctions (provided that
they place at least one bid). Given this observation, the proposition states that
it is optimal for a UD bidder to bid in the auction with the lowest standing bid
at the time she places her bid, if all other competing UD bidders also bid in the
auction with the lowest standing bid at the time they place their bids. In other
words, participating in the auction with the lowest standing bid (at the time she
determines which auction to participate in) is an equilibrium strategy for a UD
bidder.
Prior to proving the proposition, we first state and prove Lemmas 2.9.4, 2.9.4,
and 2.9.4 that establish the following: if the last agent that places a bid is a UD
bidder, it is optimal for her to bid in the auction with the lowest standing bid,
assuming that all other UD bidders also place bids in the auctions with the lowest
standing bids (at the time they decide which auction to participate in).
Suppose that there are n auctions on the platform, and they are ordered with
respect to their standing bids (i.e., auction i’s standing bid is no greater than auction
j’s if i < j). It is sufficient to show that the conditional CDFs of the current winning
bids satisfy the following relationship:
G01(w|s) ≥ G02(w|s) ≥ ... ≥ G0n(w|s), (2.26)
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where G0j(w|s) is the conditional CDF of the current winning bid in the auction
with the jth-lowest standing bid. In what follows, we focus on the case where the
number of UD bidders is known and denoted by N . One can extend the results to
the case where N is unknown, by taking the expectation over the number of UD
bidders on the platform.
We first start with the simplest case, where there are only two auctions and
all bidders are UD bidders. Suppose that there are 2 identical auctions and N + 1
UD bidders placing bids in an exogenous sequence. It is optimal for the last UD
bidder to bid in the auction with the lowest standing bid, assuming that the rest of
the UD bidders also place bids in the auctions with the lowest standing bids (at the
time they choose which auction to participate in).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that, after the first N UD bidders place their bids, the
conditional CDFs of the winning bids given the standing bids (s1, s2), with s1 ≤ s2,
follow the relationship
G01(w|s1, s2) ≥ G02(w|s1, s2),
where G0j(w|s1, s2) is the conditional CDF of the winning bid in auction j.
We use X1, X2, ..., XN to denote the random variables corresponding to the
bids of the first N bidders. The corresponding order statistics are denoted by
X(1), X(2), ..., X(N) (i.e., X(`) is the `
th-largest bid among these N bids).
One important observation is that after all bids are submitted, the two stand-
ing bids (s1, s2) and the two (invisible) winning bids, denoted by (W1,W2), are
comprised of X(1), X(2), X(3), and X(4). We can verify this observation by way of
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contradiction. In particular, suppose that the last four bids are X(1), X(2), X(3), and
X(`) and X(`) < X(4). Note that the 4
th-highest bid can always be placed (since it
is impossible to have both standing bids greater than X(4)). Before X(4) is removed
from these four remaining bids, it has to first serve as the standing bid of an auc-
tion. In this case, X(4) is the lowest standing bid among these two auctions, and it
is outbid by a higher incoming bid (which can only be one of X(1), X(2), or X(3)).
In this case, bidding X(`) has no impact on the vector of standing bids, which yields
the contradiction.
Given this observation, we note that there are the following three cases to
consider:
Cases (s1, s2) (W1,W2)
1 s1 = X(4), s2 = X(3) W1 = X(1),W2 = X(2)
2 s1 = X(4), s2 = X(3) W1 = X(2),W2 = X(1)
3 s1 = X(4), s2 = X(2) W1 = X(3),W2 = X(1)
In Case 1, we have
∆1 , G
0
1(w|s1, s2,Case 1)−G02(w|s1, s2,Case 1)
= P (X(1)|X(4) = s1, X(3) = s2)− P (X(2)|X(4) = s1, X(3) = s2).
Similarly, in Case 2, we have:
∆2 , G
0
1(w|s1, s2,Case 2)−G02(w|s1, s2,Case 2)
= P (X(1)|X(4) = s1, X(3) = s2)− P (X(2)|X(4) = s1, X(3) = s2)
= −∆1.
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We also note that the conditional probabilities of a bidding sequence falling
into Case 1 or Case 2 given (s1, s2) are identical (i.e., P (Case 1|s1, s2) = P (Case 2|s1, s2)).
The reason is the following: for any bidding sequence that falls into Case 1, switch-
ing the order of bids X(1) and X(2) results in a bidding sequence that falls into
Case 2, as (i) the decisions of these two bidders are the same, provided that their
bids are larger than the standing bids, and (ii) both bids are invisible (thus, they
do not alter the sequence of the following bids). In other words, the total number
of bidding sequences that lead to Case 1 is the same as the corresponding num-
ber for Case 2. We also note that each bidding sequence has the same chance
of occurring (as the order in which bidders place their bids is exogenous); thus,
P (Case 1|s1, s2) = P (Case 2|s1, s2) for any s1, s2. Finally, in Case 3, we have:
∆3 , G
0
1(w|s1, s2,Case 3)−G02(w|s1, s2,Case 3)
= P (X(3) ≤ w|X(4) = s1, X(2) = s2)− P (X(1) ≤ w|X(4) = s1, X(2) = s2).
Note that ∆3 ≥ 0 since {X(1) ≤ w,X(4) = s1, X(2) = s2} ⊆ {X(3) ≤ w,X(4) =
s1, X(2) = s2}. Summarizing the discussion above, we obtain that
G01(w|s1, s2)−G02(w|s1, s2)
= P (Case 1|s1, s2)∆1 + P (Case 2|s1, s2)∆2 + P (Case 3|s1, s2)∆3 ≥ 0.

Next, we extend Lemma 2.9.4 to the case where there are n auctions, but still
all bidders are UD.
Suppose that there are n identical auctions and N+1 UD bidders placing bids
in an exogenous sequence. It is optimal for the last UD bidder to bid in the auction
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with the lowest standing bid, assuming that the rest of the UD bidders also place
bids in the auctions with the lowest standing bids (at the time they choose which
auction to participate in).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that, after the first N bidders place their bids, the
conditional CDFs of the winning bids given the standing bid vector s follow the
relationship specified in Expression (2.26). Equivalently, in the following proof, we
show that for any i < j, we have
G0i (w|s) ≥ G0j(w|s).
Observe that after the first N bids are submitted, the vector of standing bids s
and the vector of current winning bids W are comprised of X(`), where 1 ≤ ` ≤ 2n.
This follows using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.9.4.
Next, we consider the following three cases separately for auctions i and j.
Cases (si, sj) (Wi,Wj)
1 si = X(l), sj = X(k) Wi = X(L),Wj = X(K) Given K < L < k < l
2 si = X(l), sj = X(k) Wi = X(K),Wj = X(L) i.e., X(l) < X(k) < X(L) < X(K)








denotes the set of all valid assignments
of the remaining X(`) (1 ≤ ` ≤ 2n and ` 6= l, k, L,K) to the standing bids and the
winning bids of all auctions excluding auctions i and j, which are denoted by s−i,−j
and W−i,−j, respectively.
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Specifically, for a given assignment in Case 1, denoted by a1, we have:
si = X(l), sj = X(k),Wi = X(L),Wj = X(K) and sm = Xm′ ,Wm = Xm′′ ,
where m 6= i, j,m′ 6= l, k,m′′ 6= L,K, and m′ > m′′. Then, we have:
∆1(a1) ,G
0
i (w|si, sj, a1)−G0j(w|si, sj, a1)
=P (X(L) ≤ w|X(l) = si, X(k) = sj, X(m′) = sm,m 6= i, j,m′ 6= l, k)
− P (X(K) ≤ w|X(l) = si, X(k) = sj, X(m′) = sm,m 6= i, j,m′ 6= l, k).
Based on a given bidding sequence that results in an outcome in assignment a1,
we can develop a new bidding sequence that leads to an outcome in the assignment
described in Case 2, denoted by a2. Specifically, we can switch the order of two
bidders who placed bids X(L) and X(K) in the bidding sequence of a1, to show that
the new bidding sequence belongs to a2 and leads to the same vector of standing
bids s as the original one in a1. In particular, the following is an illustration of a
bidding sequence in a1:
Each circle stands for a bid, and the two red circles represent bids X(L) and
X(K). At the first red circle, a bidder’s auction choice is the same regardless of
whether her bid is X(L) or X(K). Suppose that the corresponding auction is auction
i, given the definition of a1. After the switch, at the first red circle, X(K) will be
placed in auction i. Note that in a1, the highest losing bid in that auction at the
first red circle is no greater than X(l); thus, when X(K) is placed, it does not get
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revealed as X(K) > X(l). In other words, the subsequence of bidding until the second
red circle will not be affected after the switch. Similarly, at the second red circle,
the bidder with bid X(L) will choose to bid in auction j (the same decision at this
circle in the sequence of a1). In addition, bid X(L) does not get revealed as the
highest losing bid in auction j at the second red circle since it is no greater than
X(k), which, in turn, is lower than X(l). In summary, the bidding sequence in a1 is
identical to the new sequence in a2 except that we switched the bids corresponding
to the two red circles. Moreover, these two sequences lead to the same vector of
standing bids.
Given a2 in Case 2, we have:
∆2(a2) ,G
0
i (w|si, sj, a2)−G0j(w|si, sj, a2)
=P (X(K) ≤ w|X(l) = si, X(k) = sj, X(m′) = sm,m 6= i, j,m′ 6= l, k)
− P (X(L) ≤ w|X(l) = si, X(k) = sj, X(m′) = sm,m 6= i, j,m′ 6= l, k)
=−∆1(a1).
In addition, P (a1|s) = P (a2|s), as the numbers of assignments in Cases 1 and 2 are
the same, and their elements can be matched one to one using the above argument.
Given an assignment in Case 3, we have:
si = X(l), sj = X(L),Wi = X(k),Wj = X(K) and sm = X(m′),Wm = X(m
′′),
where m 6= i, j,m′ 6= l, L,m′′ 6= k,K, and m′ > m′′. Then, we have:
∆3(a3) , P (X(k) ≤ w|si = X(l), sj = X(L), a3)−P (X(K) ≤ w|si = X(l), sj = X(L), a3).
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Note that ∆3(a3) ≥ 0, we have
{




X(k) ≤ w, si = X(l), sj = X(L), a3
}
.
Therefore, by taking the expectation of ∆1(a1),∆2(a2) and ∆3(a3) over a1 in











P (a3|s)∆3(a3) ≥ 0.

Lastly, we consider the general case, which includes MU bidders. In particular,
we establish the following lemma.
Suppose that there are n identical auctions. Furthermore, N + 1 UD bidders
and N ′ MU bidders place their bids in an exogenous sequence. If the last one is a
UD bidder, it is optimal for her to bid in the auction with the lowest standing bid,
assuming that the rest of the UD bidders also place bids in the auctions with the
lowest standing bids (at the time they choose which auction to participate in).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that, after all MU bidders and the first N UD bidders
place their bids, the conditional CDFs of the winning bids given the standing bid
vector s follow the relationship specified in Expression (2.26).
Since a MU bidder participates in all auctions (if she chooses to bid at all),
there is at most one MU winner at any given time. Thus, there are two types of
outcomes: either all winners are UD bidders (Case 1) or there is a single MU winner
(Case 2). In what follows, we show that Expression (2.26) holds in both cases.
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In Case 1, where the highest 2n bids are placed by UD bidders, the claim
follows directly from Lemma 2.9.4.
In Case 2, where there is at least one auction being won by a MU bidder, we
denote the winning MU bid by M . Given the vector of standing bids s after the
submissions of all bids, for any two auctions i and j with i < j, we aim to show
that:
G0i (w|s,Case 2) ≥ G0j(w|s,Case 2).
We then use Wi and Wj to denote the winning bids in auctions i and j, and consider
the following three cases:
(i) Wi = M,Wj = M , where the MU bidder is winning both auctions.
(ii) Wi = M,Wj = X(l), where the MU bidder is winning auction i but not auction
j.
(iii) Wi = X(l),Wj = X(l′), where the MU bidder is winning neither auction.




















X(l) ≤ w, s,Case 2(ii)
}
⊆{
M ≤ w, s,Case 2(ii)
}
. In sub-case (iii), we can again apply the argument in the









summary, we have shown that with the presence of MU bidders, Expression (2.26)
holds. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. The optimal bid, given that the bidder has already chosen
an auction, can be directly derived using the first-order conditions for the payoff
maximization problem. For the auction selection decision, we use induction to show
that choosing to bid in the auction with the lowest standing bid is optimal, given
that all other UD bidders follow the same strategy.
Step 1. Consider the bidder that places the last bid on a given day (Bidder
A). Lemma 2.9.4 directly implies that it is optimal for Bidder A to choose to bid in
the auction with the lowest standing bid.
Step 2 (Induction step). We then assume that Auction 1, which has the
lowest standing bid, is the optimal auction choice for a bidder given s and N future
competing bidders. Specifically,
vN1 (b, x; s) ≥ vN2 (b, x; s) ≥ ... ≥ vNn (b, x; s),
where vNi (b, x; s) denotes the expected payoff for the bidder if she places a bid in
auction i. The conditional expected payoff vNi (b, x; s) can be expressed as







1−ĜNi (b|wi, s−i)vf (x)
))
g0i (wi|s)dwi.
In auction i, ĝNi (pi|s) and ĜNi (pi|s) respectively stand for the PDF and CDF of
the highest rival bid against the incumbent winner given standing bids s and N
incoming bidders.
The optimal bid of the next UD bidder (Bidder B) is denoted by b1.
30 Without
loss of generality, we show that for Bidder A, inequality vN+11 (b; s) ≥ vN+12 (b; s) holds.
30For brevity, we omit the discussion of the case where the next bidder is a MU bidder, since
the claim follows in a similar fashion when we classify the information set.
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We construct four information sets and establish that the inequality holds in each
set.
(i) b1 ≤ s1 (i.e., Bidder B does not submit a competing bid). In this case, it
follows from the induction step that it is optimal for Bidder A to place a bid
in Auction 1.
(ii) s1 < b1 ≤ min(W1, s2) (i.e., whether Bidder B submits a bid depends on which
auction Bidder A places her bid in). In this case, Bidder B will not bid in
any auction if Bidder A bids in Auction 1 because bid b1 is lower than both
the standing bid in Auction 2 and the new standing bid in Auction 1 (i.e., the
previously winning bid W1). If Bidder A chooses to bid in auction 1, she will
have only N future competitors and, as a result, the state would be updated
from (s1, s2, ..., sn) with N+1 incoming bids to (b1, s2, ..., sn) with N incoming
bids. Therefore, her conditional expected payoff is





(x− p1)ĝN1 (p1|w1, s−1)dp1
+ αUD
(





=vN1 (b, x; b1, s−1).
On the other hand, if Bidder A places a bid in Auction 2, Bidder B will bid
in Auction 1. In this case, the standing bid in Auction 1 increases to b1. Her
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conditional expected payoff from bidding in Auction 2 is





(x− p2)ĝN2 (p2|b1, w2, s−1,−2)dp2
+ αUD
(





=vN2 (b, x; b1, s−1).
Note that b1 ≤ s2 ≤ ... ≤ sn and, by induction, we conclude that
vN1 (b, x; b1, s−1) ≥ vN2 (b, x; b1, s−1).
(iii) W1 < b1,W1 < s2 (i.e., Bidder B will submit a bid regardless of where Bidder A
places her bid). In this case, no matter which auction Bidder A chooses, Bidder
B always places a bid in Auction 1. If Bidder A enters Auction 1, Bidder B will
also bid in Auction 1 and outbid the new standing bid W1. Bidder B’s bid b1
therefore serves as the new winning bid in Auction 1. Bidder A’s conditional
expected payoff can thus be written as





(x− p1)ĝN1 (p1|b1, s−1)dp1
+ αUD
(





=vN1 (b, x;W1, s−1).
Similarly, if Bidder A places a bid in Auction 2, her conditional expected payoff
can be written as





(x− p2)ĝN2 (p2|W1, w2, s−1,−2)dp2
+ αUD
(





=vN2 (b, x;W1, s−1).
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Note that W1 ≤ s2 ≤ ... ≤ sn and, by induction, we conclude that
vN1 (b, x;W1, s−1) ≥ vN2 (b, x;W1, s−1).
(iv) s2 < b1, s2 < W1 (i.e., Bidder B will also submit a bid regardless of Bidder
A’s decision). In this case, Bidder B will submit a bid in Auction 2 if Bidder
A enters Auction 1, whereas Bidder B will place a bid in Auction 1 if Bidder
A places a bid in Auction 2. When Bidder A places a bid in Auction 1
knowing that W1 > s2, she will update her belief about W1 accordingly (i.e.,
the conditional PDF of W1 becomes g
0
1(w1|s2, s−1)). Her conditional expected
payoff then becomes






(x− p1)ĝN1 (p1|w1,min(b1,W2), s−1,−2)dp1+
αUD
(







b, x; s2,min(b1,W2), s−1,−2
)
,
where W2 is the current winning bid in Auction 2. On the other hand, when
Bidder A submits a bid in Auction 2, she expects Bidder B to place a bid in
Auction 1. In addition, she only knows that the standing bid is the smaller
one between b1 and W1 (i.e., min(b1,W1)). Therefore, her conditional expected
payoff of submitting a bid in Auction 2 is





(x− p2)ĝN2 (p2|min(b1,W1), w2, s−1,−2)dp2+
αUD
(











Note that both W1 and W2 have the same conditional PDF (i.e., g
0
1(w1|s2, s) =
g02(w2|s2, s)) as Auctions 1 and 2 are indistinguishable given Bidder A’s in-
formation set. Furthermore, expressions vN1
(





b, x; min(b1,W1), s2, s−1,−2
)












b, x; min(b1,W1), s2, s−1,−2
)]
and for Bidder A, bidding in Auction 1 is a weakly dominant strategy.
In summary, given N incoming competing bids, it is a weakly dominant strat-
egy for a UD bidder to bid in the auction with the lowest standing bid. This strategy
depends on neither the bidders’ valuations nor the market state. In the case of an
unknown number of incoming bidders, one can derive the same conclusion by taking
an expectation over N . 
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2.10 Appendix: Structural Model
2.10.1 Substitutability of iPhone 4, iPhone 4s, and iPhone 5 Models
In this section, we present evidence supporting that bidders view auctions for
iPhone 4, iPhone 4s, and iPhone 5 as substitutes. In particular, we test whether
bidders significantly prefer one model to the others at both the population and
individual bidder levels.
Stated more precisely, we allow that devices substitute for one another after
controlling for a price (value) differential. For example, an iPhone 5 may be worth
more than an iPhone 4s. Supposing that the normalizing price difference were $100,
bidders would be indifferent in substituting between the two at that differential.
That is, if the bidder’s valuation for the iPhone 4s is $200, then she would be
willing to purchase instead the iPhone 5 at $299 but not $301. In equilibrium,
bidders would be willing to substitute freely across the auctions of different phone
models, but that the going bids in auctions would tend to differ by fixed, normalizing
amounts. In our example, prices would tend to be $100 higher for iPhone 5 auctions
than iPhone 4s auctions.
Accordingly, we examine the substitutability assumption by testing its key
empirical prediction that bidders should freely substitute across auctions of the
different phone models, in proportion to their availability that day. Thus, we carry
out two critical, empirical tests regarding whether the number of bids placed for
each model type varies in proportion with its supply.
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First, does the market’s total number of bids for each type of phone model
accrue in proportion to each model’s share of the available supply? In other words,
suppose that today’s marketplace features 50% iPhone 5 and 50% iPhone 4s auc-
tions. If we were to find that a disproportionate 80% of bids are placed for iPhone 5,
this would provide evidence refuting the claim that the two models are substitutable
to bidders. On the other hand, suppose that 50% of bids are for iPhone 5, followed
the next day by 25% of bids when iPhone 5 constitutes 25% of the supply. This
pattern supports our hypothesis of substitutability. Thus, our primary statistical
test is designed to importantly distinguish these cases, showing that bidders do not
exhibit an overriding preference for one model over another as models’ supply varies
from day to day.
Second, while our primary test provides our most critical piece of evidence, we
carry out a second test that provides additional assurance. In particular, even if we
observe that the proportion of bids matches the daily, available share of supply for
each model, it remains conceivable that some bidders greatly prefer, for example,
the iPhone 5 but simply do not bother to bid if they do not see a sufficient supply
of iPhone 5 auctions available that day. However, such a bidder would still reveal
her strong preference for focusing her bidding in iPhone 5 auctions when tracked
across her own visits to the platform. Thus our second, bidder-level statistical
test examines whether individual bidders act to flexibly match the available, daily
supplies of the phone models when placing bids.
At the population level, given a model pair, i.e., (iPhone) Model 1 and (iPhone)
Model 2, we use b1t and b2t to denote the number of bids placed in auctions for Model
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1 and Model 2 phones that end on Day t, respectively. Also, we use n1t and n2t to
denote the total number of auctions for Model 1 and Model 2 phones that end on
Day t, respectively. Then, we propose to test the following null hypothesis: On a
given day, the expected ratio of bids placed in Model 1 auctions to bids placed in
Model 2 auctions is equal to the ratio of the total number of Model 1 auctions to the















where T is the number of days when at least one Model 1 auction ends. On a given
day, a consistent mismatch between b1t/(b1t + b2t) and n1t/(n1t + n2t) indicates that
bidders prefer one model to the other. For an iPhone model, the statistic R̂ manages
to capture not only the daily mismatch between its shares of bids and auctions, but
also how the trend of bid shares matches the trend of auction shares over time. If
R̂ differs significantly from zero, we reject Hypothesis 2.10.1 and conclude that one
model is preferred to the other at the population level; thus, the models cannot be
considered as substitutes.
Our findings are presented in the first two columns of Table 2.16. For all three
model pairs, we cannot reject Hypothesis 2.10.1. This implies that on a daily basis,
the number of bids for each model is proportional to the number of auctions for that
model. Therefore, each model is not more or less popular than other models at the
population level. Thus, we can treat the three models as substitutes.
Furthermore, we test whether the models are substitutable at the individual
bidder level. We find that more than 90% of the bidders do not show a strong
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Table 2.16: Hypothesis Testing Results regarding Bidders’ Preference for iPhone
Models
Population Level Test Individual Level Test
(Model 1, Model 2) R̂ p-value % of Bidders without a Strong Preference
(iPhone 4, iPhone 4s) 0.055 0.157 94.7%
(iPhone 4, iPhone 5) 0.000 0.987 92.6%
(iPhone 4s, iPhone 5) -0.039 0.122 96.8%
preference for a specific model. In particular, given Bidder `, we construct the
following null hypothesis to test: On a given day, when Bidder ` participates in
at least one Model 1 or Model 2 auction, the expected ratio of Model 1 auctions
to Model 2 auctions that Bidder ` participates in is equal to the ratio of the total
number of Model 1 auctions to the total number of Model 2 auctions. In other















where T` is the set of days when Bidder ` participated in at least one Model 1 or
Model 2 auction, and p1t` (resp., p2t`) are the numbers of Model 1 (resp., Model 2)
auctions which Bidder ` participated in on Day t. If R̂` differs significantly from zero,
we reject Hypothesis 2.10.1 and conclude that the bidder has a strong preference for
either Model 1 or Model 2. Specifically, we say that the bidder does not exhibit a
strong preference for either of the two models if the p-value of the test result is less
than 0.01. We report our findings in the last column of Table 2.16. For each model
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pair, there are more than 90% of bidders without a strong preference. Therefore,
the findings provide convincing evidence that supports the idea that auctions of the
three models can be viewed as substitutes.
2.10.2 Kernel Density Estimators
In this section, we specify the kernel density estimators for Ψ(ω`t) and gj(pj|ω`t).
Assuming the within-day timing of a participating bidder’s bids to be exogenous,
the steady-state vector s`t of standing bids encountered by bidders per platform visit
can be viewed as identically and independently distributed. We use Sn = {s`t,n}
and yn = {y`t,n} to denote the observations of the vectors of standing bids31 and
highest rival bids (final prices), respectively, when the market thickness is n auc-
tions. The corresponding sample size is denoted by Nn. The kernel density esti-







, where Khs(s) is the multivariate Gaussian kernel














The selection of the optimal bandwidth h∗s is conducted by minimizing the cross-
validation (CV) estimator of the risk function. Finally, the kernel density estimator
of the highest rival bid in auction j (i.e., y(j)), given market state ω = (n, s), can be
31If a bidder places multiple bids within a day, we assume that the market state is observed

















`t,n is the j
th element of y`t,n, and hy,1 is the bandwidth associated with
the highest rival bid. For tractability, we assume that the bandwidth matrix of





determined by minimizing the CV estimator of the risk function, CV (hy,1, hy,2), of
the conditional density estimation.32
2.10.3 Bandwidth Selection in Kernel Density Estimation
In this subsection, we describe the bandwidth selection process we use when
we non-parametrically estimate the distributions of the steady state of the market
and the highest rival bids, respectively. The risk, or mean integrated squared er-
ror R(f, f̂), which we define below, is a metric for the distance between a density
estimator f̂ and the true density f :







where X ∼ f . As f is unknown, the risk cannot be evaluated. Therefore, we










where f̂(−i)(Xi) is the kernel density estimator obtained by removing the i
th obser-
vation, Xi. In our case, f̂ is the kernel density estimator with bandwidth h, which
32We provide additional details on the bandwidth selection procedure for both ψ̂n(sn) and ĝj(y|ω)
in Appendix 2.10.3.
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is the parameter to be optimized (i.e., the bandwidth h is chosen so that the CV
estimator of risk is minimized).
For the kernel density estimator of the standing bids, the CV estimator of risk























where N denotes the total number of observations (here, we use `t and `′t′ as
observation indices). Furthermore, the bandwidth matrix is given by Hs = hsIn and
K, K̄ denote the kernel and the corresponding convolution functions, respectively.
Note that when estimating the conditional distribution of highest rival bids,
directly optimizing the cross-validation of the risk function may lead to very small
bandwidths (due to the fact that multiple vectors of standing bids can be associated
with the same vector of highest rival bids). To resolve this issue, we employ boot-
strap sampling from the original dataset, drawing only one observation (y`t,n, s`t,n)
per auction (to ensure that we do not duplicate the vectors of highest rival bids
within a bootstrap sample). Given a bootstrap subsample b, the subsample CV
estimator of risk can be specified as


















































Lastly, we consider the average of the subsample CV estimators of risk (we draw
50 bootstrap samples) as the objective function to optimize when selecting the
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bandwidth for the kernel density estimation.
2.10.4 Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation
In this subsection, we provide expressions for P V (x`|θ), LB`t(b`t,S`t|x`, θ), and
LNB`t (S`t|x`, θ), where θ = [α, µ, ν, λ, γ], and describe how we derive the simulated
likelihood function L̂`(X`|θ), using importance sampling. Before presenting the tech-
nical details, we preview how each primitive is estimated by exploiting the variations
in the data.
The data contain sufficient variations for us to identify all the model primitives.
First, in the data, a bidder (whose endowed valuation x` is given) may choose a
subset of auctions on a given day and place bids in the selected auctions. The
variations in her auction selections and in her bids can be mainly explained by
the idiosyncratic valuation distribution (characterized by ν). In addition to the
bid variations of a given bidder, we observe sizable bid variations across bidders
(e.g., some bidders consistently submit much higher bids than others in the same
auction). The cross-bidder bid variations are characterized by the bidders’ endowed
valuations (i.e., x`), whose distribution is characterized by λ
TY and γTY . Second, we
observe that each bidder’s platform-visit sequence follows a stochastic process with a
certain frequency (e.g., some bidders tend to participate on the platform more often
than others). In our model, a bidder’s platform-visit pattern is determined by the
interplay between her expected payoff, which depends on the endowed valuation (i.e.,
λTY and γTY ) as well as the idiosyncratic valuation (i.e., νTY ), and the distribution
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of participation cost (characterized by µTY ). Note that λTY , γTY , and νTY are
pinned down by the above bid variations; thus, the variation in bidders’ platform
visits can be employed to identify µTY . Lastly, in the data, each bidder exits the
platform at some point, while her stay in the bidder pool may vary from a few days
to a few months. The variations in the duration of bidders’ stays in the bidder pool
are then used to estimate the retention rate α. Therefore, our data have enough
variations to recover all the modeling primitives.
We use P V (x`|θ) to denote the probability that Bidder ` visits the platform
on Day t:
P V (x`|θ) = P
(




− µr(x`; θ, Ĝ, Ψ̂)
)
,
where recall that r(x`; θ,G,Ψ) is the unconditional payoff per platform visit (Section
2.4). Given x`, θ
MU , Ĝ, and Ψ̂, a MU bidder’s payoff per platform visit rMU can be
calculated using Expressions (2.21) and (2.22). For a UD bidder, given x`, θ
UD, Ĝ,



















and vf (x`; θ


















where Expression (2.27) is derived from Expressions (2.5) and (2.23), and Expression
(2.28) is derived from Expression (2.24). For computational tractability, we employ
Monte Carlo integration to approximate all the integrations over ζ`·. Any integration
of Ĝ or Ψ̂ can be done quickly due to the selection of the Gaussian kernel.
Conditional on Bidder ` visiting the platform on Day t, we let LB`t(b`t,S`t|x`, θ)
denote the likelihood of her placing bid(s) b`t, and we let L
NB
`t (S`t|x`, θ) denote the
likelihood of her not placing any bid.
First, assume that ` is a MU bidder (who is interested in winning K = 14
auctions, which are all open auctions, on a given day).33 Then, when she visits the
platform on Day t, she will not bid in auction j if and only if her bid is lower than
the current standing bid s`j (i.e., b`j = x` + ζ
MU






where Φ(·|x`, νMU) denotes the CDF of the normal distribution with mean x`
and standard deviation νMU , and At denotes the set of all auctions on Day t. On
the other hand, if she places bids b`t = {b`j}, and J t` denotes the set of auctions













Next, assume that Bidder ` has unit demand. Then, given that she visits
33Recall that K is the observed maximum auction participation on a given day.
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the platform on Day t, she will not place a bid if and only if all auctions on the
day have standing bids that are higher than her potential bids (i.e., b`j = x` −
αUDvf (x`; θ










s`j′|x` − αUDvf (x`; θUD, Ĝ, Ψ̂), νUD
)
.
On the other hand, if she places a bid b`t = b`j in auction j, this implies
that participating in auction j yields the highest payoff among all open auctions
on the same day (as was shown in Proposition 2.9.4). In addition, if she chooses
auction j (i.e., σUDSLT (x`; ζ`·,S`t, θ
UD) = j), the likelihood of placing bid b`j = x` −
αUDvf (x`; θ
UD, Ĝ, Ψ̂)+ζUD`j is equal to φ
(

































fI(xI |λI , γI)
)
, (2.29)
where fI(xI |λI , γI) is PDF of the candidate Weibull distribution with parameters λI
and γI . Then, we draw M samples for the bidder’s valuation xm,I ,m = 1, 2, ...,M
from the candidate Weibull distribution. Finally, we (approximately) compute in-








fI(xm,I |λI , γI)
.
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In our estimation process, we draw M = 200 samples and set λI , γI such that they
satisfy the first and second moment conditions of the empirical bid distribution.
2.10.5 Model Validation
To validate the model, we compare the predicted distributions of (i) the num-
ber of bidders participating in an auction and (ii) the final price in the post-treatment
period, with those observed in the dataset. Given that these distributions concern
outcomes in the post-treatment period, they can be viewed as out-of-sample predic-
tions (recall that the model was estimated using pre-treatment data). Our findings
provide support for the validity of the model. In particular:
(a) The mean and the standard deviation of the simulated distribution of partici-
pating bidders (who placed at least one bid) per auction in the post-treatment
period are shown in the first two columns of Table 2.17 (with standard errors
in parentheses). As is evident from the table, our counterfactual simulations
provide a relatively accurate prediction of the corresponding distribution. In
particular, both the mean and the standard deviation of the simulated distri-
bution are not significantly different from those observed in the data.
(b) Similarly, we simulate the mean and the standard deviation of the final price
distribution (on a normalized scale) in the post-treatment period. The re-
sults are shown in the last two columns of Table 2.17 (with standard errors in
parentheses). As one can deduce from the table, the simulations provide an ac-
curate out-of-sample prediction of the average final price in the post-treatment
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Table 2.17: Comparison between Observed and Simulated Distributions of the Num-
ber of Bidders per Auction and Final Price per Device in the Post-treatment Period
No. of Bidders per Auction Final Price per Unit ($)
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Observed 5.24 2.33 168.75 15.49
Simulated 5.79 2.01 167.97 18.30
(0.68) (0.35) (5.24) (1.99)
period.
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2.11 Appendix: Supporting Material
2.11.1 Effects of Policy Switch on Aggregate Supply and Demand
In this subsection, we first check whether the aggregate supply and the aggre-
gate demand are affected by the policy switch, by plotting their trends during the
pre- and post-treatment periods in Markets A and B. We further employ difference-
in-differences analyses to test the hypothesis that both the supply and the demand
remain parallel over time between two marketplaces.
In Figure 2.10, we plot the weekly number of auctions and weekly number
of registrants in Markets A and B, respectively, over time. For both the supply
and the demand, the gap between the trends of the two markets does not seem to
consistently change across periods.
2.11.2 Spillover Effects on Participation Rates
This subsection focuses on auction participation behaviors in Market B and the
subset of cross-market bidders (i.e., bidders that are registered in both Markets A
and B). The objective is to establish that the change in Market A’s market thickness
has a strong positive effect on the cross-market bidders’ participation rates in Market
B. To this end, we specify the following linear model for the bidders’ participation
rates in Market B:
APR`tw = ξ` + ηw + β1CMB` + β2TTt + β3CMB` · TTt + ε`tw, (2.30)
where the dependent variable APR`tw is defined as
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Figure 2.10: Trends of Weekly Supply and Weekly Demand
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APR`tw =
No. of Mkt. B auctions Bidder ` bids on Day t in Week w
No. of Mkt. B auctions ending on Day t in Week w
.
In Equation (2.30), ξ` denotes the fixed effect associated with Bidder `’s id-
iosyncratic participation behavior, and ηw denotes a weekly fixed effect introduced
to control for changes over time.
We include fixed effect ξ` to control for Bidder `’s idiosyncratic participation
behaviors. We also include fixed effect ηw to control for changes over time (e.g.,
releases of new products on participation rates) in Week w. Furthermore, CMB` and
TTt are binary variables denoting whether i is a cross-market bidder and whether
the day of the Week t is Tuesday or Thursday, respectively. Thus, coefficient β1
captures the participation pattern of cross-market bidders in Market B, and β2
captures the baseline difference in participation rates between [Tuesday, Thursday]
and [Monday, Wednesday, Friday]. Finally, the quantity of interest, β3, is meant
to capture the potential spillover effect on the cross-market bidders’ participation
rates on Tuesdays and Thursdays.
For the results that follow, we focus only on the treatment period and re-
strict attention to iPhone 4 (thus, we do not need to control for product char-
acteristics). In this sample, cross-market bidders account for 49% of the total
Market B bidders. First, we plot in Figure 2.9 the average participation rates
corresponding to cross-market bidders and exclusively to Market B bidders on Mon-
day/Wednesday/Friday and Thursday/Thursday, respectively. Although on Mon-
day/Wednesday/Friday, cross-market and Market B bidders have similar participa-
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tion rates, on Tuesday/Thursday, the participation rate of cross-market bidders is
substantially higher than the participation rate of Market B bidders.
Second, we employ difference in differences to estimate coefficient β3. As we
report in Table 2.18, we estimate that the relative increase in the cross-market
bidders’ participation rates that can be attributed to the change in Market A’s
market thickness is roughly 39% (2.7% in absolute terms).
Table 2.18: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Spillover Participation Effect
Caused by Batch Listing
Dependent Variable
Auction Participation Rate
Spillover Participation Effect β̂3 0.027
∗∗∗
(0.005)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The size of the spillover effect provides evidence supporting the presence of
participation frictions associated with visiting a market on any given day and ac-
tively bidding and monitoring the auctions listed on the platform.
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2.11.3 Regression Analysis in Support of Cannibalization among Auc-
tions
In this section, we establish that high market thickness may have a negative
impact on the final price of the platform’s auctions. To this end, we conduct a
regression analysis using data on Samsung Galaxy S3 auctions in Market A. We
address the potential issue of demand endogeneity by using an additional dataset
tracking the retail price of Galaxy S3 phones that was obtained from Amazon.
Demand Endogeneity.
To address the potential issue arising from demand endogeneity, we use a
dataset tracking the price of Galaxy S3 phones that was obtained from Amazon.
The prices on Amazon, which is a retail market, are largely exogenous to the prices
on the platform, which is a secondary market. This allows us to control for market
trends in the demand for Galaxy S3 phones; thus, we can attribute price fluctuations
we observe on the platform to changes in the induced market thickness.
Data and Variables.
The data we use for this analysis includes (1) detailed Galaxy S3 auction data
from Market A, and (2) weekly retail price data from Amazon. Our observation
window is from March 15, 2013 to December 7, 2015.34 In the Galaxy S3 auction
34We collect Amazon’s retail prices for Samsung Galaxy S3 from CamelCamelCamel.com, a tool
tracking prices for products sold on Amazon.
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Figure 2.11: Weekly Supply and Prices of Samsung Galaxy S3 (the vertical dashed
line highlights the release of Galaxy S5 on 04-11-2014)
dataset, there are 376 observations within the observation window. For each auction,
the dataset contains the start and ending times of the auction, its final price, lot
size, and carrier information. Market thickness on a given day is measured by two
metrics: the number of auctions ending on that day and the number of units in
those auctions. The dataset we obtained from Amazon tracks the retail price of a
Galaxy S3 phone within our observation window.
In Figure 2.11, we plot the price trends of Galaxy S3 phones in Market A (red
curve) and on Amazon (green curve) as well as the weekly supply in Market A (blue
curve). The supply shock in the local market (corresponding to the dashed line in
the figure) is due to the release of a new Samsung Galaxy model.
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Empirical Evidence.
Here, we establish that high market thickness may have a negative impact on
the final price of an auction. To this end, first, we compute the correlation between
market thickness and the auction’s final price without controlling for demand endo-
geneity. As already mentioned, market thickness on a given day is measured in two
ways: (1) by the number of auctions ending on that day and (2) by the number of
units in those auctions. We find that the correlation coefficients corresponding to the
market thickness metrics are equal to -0.30 and -0.31, respectively, thus establishing
the negative impact of market thickness on price.
Next, we address demand endogeneity by explicitly controlling for the market
value of Galaxy S3 phones using the Amazon data. In the regression analysis, we
select the final price per unit as the dependent variable. We include fixed effects for
both the product carrier and new product releases.
The estimation results are displayed in Table 2.19. As is evident in the results
for Models 1 and 2 (without including the fixed effect corresponding to a new product
release), high market thickness has a significantly negative impact on the final price.
Particularly, we note that adding one Galaxy S3 auction to the platform’s market
thickness results in a decrease in the final price per unit by $7.63. Similarly, adding
10 units of Galaxy S3 phones decreases the final price per unit by $1.10.
Furthermore, we control for possible supply endogeneity by considering the ex-
ogenous shocks corresponding to new product releases (i.e., the releases of Samsung
Galaxy S4, S5, and S6). When a new Samsung Galaxy model is released, we expect
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Table 2.19: Regression Estimates in Support of the Cannibalization Effect
Dependent Variable
Final Price per Unit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of units per day -0.11∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.02) (0.017)
No. of auctions per day -7.63∗∗∗ -3.06∗∗∗
(1.39) (1.06)
Auction lot size -0.15∗∗ -0.08∗
(0.06) (0.048)
Amazon retail value 0.54∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.027) (0.027)
FEs of Rel. of S4, S5, S6 No No Yes Yes
FEs of carriers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -54.42∗∗∗ -43.42∗∗∗ 122.44∗∗∗ 128.20∗∗∗
(7.39) (8.02) (15.56) (15.61)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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a jump in the number of Galaxy S3 phones that become available in the secondary
market. As shown in Table 2.19 (Models 3 and 4), the cannibalization effect remains
significant even after we account for the release of new products. In particular, our
results indicate that adding an auction to the platform’s market thickness results in
a decrease in the final price per unit by $3.06, whereas adding 10 Galaxy S3 phones
results decreases their unit price by $0.43.
2.11.4 Listing Policy Has Little Impact on Bids
In this section, we look into how bidders’ bidding strategies respond to the
listing policy switch in Market A. We focus on a sample of bidders who placed a
bid in either only Market A or only Market B in both the pre- and post-treatment
periods (i.e., cross-market bidders are excluded). Therefore, in the post-treatment
period, Market A bidders are directly subject to the policy switch, while Market
B bidders are not. There are 14 Market A bidders, 21 Market B bidders, and 814
total bids observed in the sample. Then, we estimate the following difference-in-
differences model to capture any effect on their bidding strategies:
log(Bidi) = β0 + FEProdi + β1IsMktAi + β2IsPosti + β3IsMktAi · IsPosti + εi,
where for each observation i, Bidi is the variable corresponding to the placed bid
(normalized to a single unit), FEProdi captures fixed effects associated with prod-
uct features, IsMktAi is the dummy variable of Market A auctions, and IsPosti is
the dummy variable of the post-treatment period. Thus, the coefficient of interest is
β3, which captures the effect of the policy switch on the size of the bids. As shown
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IsMktA · IsPost −0.173
(0.146)
FEs of Products Yes
Constant 3.359∗∗∗
(0.765)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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in Table 2.20, the policy switch does not seem to affect bidders’ bidding strategies,
given that β3 is not significantly different from zero. This finding rules out the al-
ternative mechanism that could explain the increase in revenues observed after the
listing policy switch, i.e., that the increase is the outcome of bidders changing their
bidding strategies.
2.11.5 Algorithm for Estimating a Steady-State Equilibrium
In this subsection, we describe an iterative algorithm that converges to the
steady-state equilibrium. Given the stochastic supply, a dynamic bidder pool, and
a listing policy, a bidder’s decision whether to visit the platform, which auction(s)
to participate in, and how to bid are all endogenously determined. Overall, the
algorithm starts by initializing the beliefs for the highest rival bid G and the state
distribution Ψ, based on which bidders decide whether to visit the platform and
how to bid. Once the corresponding bidding data are generated, they are used to
re-estimate G and Ψ. The algorithm iterates between the data simulation step and
the belief estimation step until they converge (Algorithm 1). The expected payoff
r(x;G,Ψ) is calculated numerically for MU and UD bidders separately. We employ
kernel density estimation for the conditional distribution of the highest rival bid G
and the distribution of standing bids Ψ, which are specified in Section 2.5.1.
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Algorithm 1 Estimating a steady-state equilibrium
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Chapter 3: Information Provision in Service Platforms: Optimizing
for Supply
Abstract. This paper explores the interaction between information design and
supply-side decisions, including supplier entry/exit and pricing, in peer-to-peer ser-
vice platforms. We develop a dynamic model of a two-sided platform that allows
us to analyze the long-run implications of alternative information-provision policies.
Our analysis highlights three mechanisms through which such a policy may increase
platform revenues. First, in cases where the platform is not dominant in the mar-
ket, a downgrading policy increases the volume of transactions on the platform and,
surprisingly, may also result in an increase in the volume of high-quality providers
active in the platform. Second, when the platform is dominant in the market, a
downgrading policy helps the platform modulate the composition of suppliers active
on the platform, leading to an overall more revenue-efficient set of suppliers. Third,
when commission subsidies are used by the platform to incentivize entry of new
providers, a downgrading policy helps the platform achieve equivalent new-provider
entry while extracting higher revenue per transaction.
Keywords: platform operations, information provision, social learning, product
line design, applied game theory
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3.1 Introduction
Online peer-to-peer service platforms, such as Upwork, Taskrabbit, and Thumb-
tack, have been proliferating over the years. They serve the intermediaries to connect
service providers with different quality with consumers who have various pending
tasks, which have different equality sensitivity. Some work (e.g., article editing)
values high-quality services more than others (e.g., plumbing). In other words, such
platforms feature substantial heterogeneities on both supply and demand sides of
the market. Moreover, like any two-sided marketplaces, participants on both sides
are strategic. In addition to participants’ entry decisions, consumers choose which
provider to transact, and service providers set prices for their service to maximize
their utilities, respectively.
Service platforms’ revenues primarily come from the commission charged from
each transaction, which usually is proportional to the transaction price. Notice that
services delivered by high-quality providers charge high prices. Service platforms
may benefit from expanding the pool of active, high-quality professionals.
A critical challenge encountered by service platforms is that providers’ quality
is ex-ante unknown, and it has to be learned through their services delivered on the
platform. In other words, the size of high-quality providers population depends on
the scale of employment of new providers (i.e., experimentation) on the platform. If
a service platform fails to experiment with sufficient new providers in the first place,
the discovered high-quality providers will be in short later.
In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of a service platform’s information
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provision policy joint with its commission scheme in maximizing the platform’s com-
mission revenue. In particular, we investigate when and how information provision
policy complements the commission scheme in incentivizing experimentation on new
providers and optimizing provider composition. To address these questions, we de-
velop a discrete-time infinite-horizon model with learning on new providers’ quality.
The model characterizes the strategic behaviors of all participants and specifies the
matching with heterogeneity on both sides of the market.
We focus on a class of information provision policies, which delay the disclosure
of high-quality providers to consumers by labeling them as new providers. We hence-
forth refer to them as informational delay policy. We establish that informational
delay policy adds values to a service platform through three distinct mechanisms.
First, the informational delay can increase the experimentation on new providers by
improving their expected quality, when it is difficult for the platform to do so under
a single commission scheme. Second, even though the platform achieves the maxi-
mum experimentation on new providers solely using the single-commission scheme,
the informational delay can further improve the platform’s revenue by optimizing
the providers’ composition. Third, when the platform implements a differentiated
commission scheme, which can incentivize the experimentation on new providers




Our work ties to the burgeoning literature that addresses the issues resulted
from the information friction of the uncertainty of workers’ quality in online labor
markets. [42] shows that the information friction can lead to market failure. He
demonstrates that a labor market could fail by hiring too many mediocre workers
and too few novices with potential when the quality of inexperienced workers can
only be revealed on the job. Some recent work has established the effectiveness of
several online labor marketplaces’ information provision mechanisms (e.g., agencies,
reviews, and ratings) in mitigating the inefficiencies incurred by the information
friction. In a field experiment, [43] observes that a public evaluation significantly
increases the chance of inexperienced workers being hired as well as their wages in an
online labor marketplace. Based on a proprietary dataset, [44] identify that buyers
are willing to pay higher for sellers with a higher reputation (revealed by reviews
and ratings). [45] study the role of outsourcing agencies in reducing the informa-
tion friction by signaling the high quality of affiliated inexperienced workers. They
further estimate that the presence of agencies increases the revenue generated per
worker by 11%. [46] highlight the research opportunities of platforms’ information
design to reduce friction. Our work contributes to the literature by studying the
design of a straightforward yet effective information provision policy, which exploits
the workers’ quality uncertainty to maximize the platform’s revenues.
Our work is related to the rich literature that focuses on the settings involving
experimentation, quality uncertainty, and self-interest agents. In the case where the
131
realized outcomes are observable to all agents (i.e., information transparency), the
equilibrium is very likely to be suboptimal regarding social surplus. [47] show that in
a market with two-sided learning, sellers’ pricing decisions joint with buyers’ choices
in equilibrium result in excessive experimentation compared to the socially efficient
solution. On the other hand, [48] and [49] present that in a multi-armed bandit prob-
lem with incentive constraints, the system suffers from the under-experimentation
issue. Both papers show that information provision policies can effectively allevi-
ate the issue. In our work of two-sided online service marketplace, we also observe
the under-experimentation issue under the full information setting, and informa-
tion provision policies, especially the one with imprecise information disclosure, can
effectively elicit experimentation, which echoes [49].
3.2 Model Description
We consider a dynamic model of a two-sided platform that connects service
providers with consumers. The model consists of three types of players, who interact
with one another over an infinite discrete-time horizon: (i) the platform, which
chooses a commission to be charged per transaction and an information provision
policy; (ii) the supply (i.e., a population of service providers), who choose whether
to join the platform and, if so, what price to charge for providing service, and (iii)
the demand (i.e., consumers), who choose whether to seek service on the platform
and, if so, with which service provider.
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Consumers.
We assume that in each period there is a short-lived population of consumers
with total mass normalized to one who enters the platform seeking service. Con-
sumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for service quality. We use
θi to denote consumer i’s type, and we assume that consumer types are uniformly
distributed on the interval [1, 2]. A consumer’s net utility from transacting with
provider j is given by
ui = θiqj − pj,
where qj is the provider’s service quality and pj is the provider’s service price. Upon
entering the platform, each consumer observes the set of available service providers,
the price set by each provider, and any information on the provider’s service quality
provided by the platform (the latter is determined by the platform’s information
provision policy, described in detail below). Then, each consumer chooses among
the available service providers to maximize her expected utility. Apart from the
providers available on the platform, consumers also have the option of seeking service
outside of the platform; we assume that doing so results in service quality q0 ∈ (0, 1)
at a price p0 ∈ (0, 1). We further assume that q0 ≥ p0, so that the outside option
results in non-negative utility for all consumer types.
Service Providers.
We assume that there is a large pool of potential service providers, a fraction
1 − β of whom cease to exist in each period and are replaced by new potential
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providers of equal mass. In every period, the potential providers may choose to
enter the platform or pursue employment outside of it. Employment outside of the
platform yields an expected profit of w0 per period. Inside the platform, expected
profits depend on the platform’s commission and information-provision policies, and
the resulting equilibrium behavior of the service providers and consumers. We as-
sume that the service quality of each provider j can be high or low, qj ∈ {qH , qL},
where we normalize qH = 1 and qL = 0. The probability of a randomly chosen
provider being of high quality is denoted by γ := P (qj = qH). Our analysis will be
primarily concerned with environments where the supply of high-quality providers
is relatively scarce. Accordingly, we assume that (i) E[qj] = γqh + (1 − γ)ql < q0
(i.e., although there are high-quality providers in the market, the expected quality
of a randomly drawn provider is lower than that of the outside option), and (ii)
γβ < 1− β (i.e., the volume of surviving high-quality providers in each period does
not exceed the volume of providers who cease to exist).
We assume that the service quality of a new provider entering the platform
is initially unknown, but is perfectly revealed to the platform after the provider
engages in a single transaction with a consumer.1 In every period, each provider,
taking into account the platform’s commission and information-provision policies,
chooses whether to join the platform and, if so, what price to charge for service.
Finally, we assume that the price set by a provider is bounded below by b0, for some
b0 ∈ [0, p0] (e.g., this may represent the per-period cost of providing service).




The platform is long-lived and seeks to maximize its expected per-period profit
by choosing a commission rate of τ and an information-provision policy. The com-
mission rate is a percentage fee collected by the platform on any transaction that oc-
curs between a consumer and a provider. The information-provision policy specifies
a message or label for each provider that is displayed to the consumers and contains
information on the provider’s service quality, based on the platform’s observations of
the provider’s past service outcomes. According to the platform’s quality-learning
process described above, the platform’s information about provider j’s quality in
any given period is summarized by the state sj ∈ {H,L, U}, corresponding to high,
low, or unknown quality, respectively. The information-provision policy employed
by the platform is expressed as a (possibly stochastic) mapping from the platform’s
private information about provider j to a “label” which is assigned to the provider
and published on the platform, i.e.,
g(sj) =

H w. p. ρHsj
L w. p. ρLsj





+ρUsj = 1, for all sj ∈ {H,L, U}. Designing an information-provision
policy consists of choosing the probability with which each label is assigned to each




U = 1 corresponds to
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full information disclosure, since the platform’s knowledge can be perfectly inferred




chosen independently of sj corresponds to no information disclosure, since none of
the platform’s information can be inferred from the labels it assigns to the suppliers.
Policies involving intermediate levels of information provision can be constructed
by choosing the probabilities ρHsj , ρ
L
sj
, ρUsj appropriately “between” the above two
extremes.
Concerning the design of information-provision policies, it is straightforward
to show that the platform cannot benefit by concealing the quality of a provider
who is known to be of low quality. However, as we demonstrate in our analysis, it
is far from evident that the same holds for providers known to be of high quality.
In the analysis that follows, we will focus on the class of policies satisfying
ρLL = ρ
U
U = 1, and ρ
U
H = 1− ρHH =: α ∈ [0, 1]. (3.2)
In words, the platform always assigns label L to providers of low quality and label
U to providers of unknown quality. However, providers of high quality are assigned
label U with probability α ∈ [0, 1], and label H otherwise. At first glance, it may
appear counter-intuitive for the platform to conceal the quality of its best providers,
given that these providers are its highest earners. However, in Section 3.4, we
demonstrate three mechanisms, along with sufficient conditions, through which a
policy involving α > 0 improves platform profits.
From a practical standpoint, we note that the class of policies described in
(3.2) is particularly appealing in that it is operationally equivalent to a policy that
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delays disclosing information on the quality of a high-quality service provider. To
emphasize this connection, we refer to a policy of the form (3.2) as an “information-
delay” policy with delay α.
3.3 Equilibrium
Given that the underlying supply and demand processes are time-invariant in
our model, our analysis will focus on steady-state equilibria of the supply-demand
game, for a fixed platform policy {τ, α}. For the existence of a steady-state equilib-
rium, the supply-demand game must simultaneously satisfy several conditions relat-
ing to supply-side participation and pricing, demand-side participation and provider
choice, and supply-demand matching. We now describe these conditions in detail.
Consider first the platform participation decisions of individual suppliers. In
a steady-state equilibrium, the expected lifetime earnings of a high-quality provider
who is assigned label H in any given period are given by








That is, such a provider will stay in the platform provided the price he can charge
as an H-labeled provider is sufficiently high, or the platform’s commission rate is
sufficiently low. Otherwise, he will seek employment outside the platform. The
expected lifetime earnings of a high-quality provider who is assigned label U are
given by
V HU = max
{
η(1− τ)pU + β
(








where the (endogenous) parameter η ∈ [0, 1] here accounts for rationing that may
occur if in equilibrium the demand for U -labeled providers is lower than the avail-
ability of such providers.2 Finally, for a supplier of unknown quality (i.e., who has
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For the quantities V HH , V
H
U , and V
U
U , they are complicated by the fact that prices
are determined endogenously by the demand for each provider type, as well as the
competition between providers. Moreover, we note that (i) our model assumes that
each provider must receive a minimum payment b0 ≥ 0 for providing service, which
implies that in any equilibrium with positive i-labeled provider participation, we
have (1− τ)pi ≥ b0, for i ∈ {U ,H}, and (ii) free entry of providers into the platform
implies V UU =
w0
1−β . Assuming that a steady-state equilibrium exists, we use δ
j
i to
denote the mass of providers of quality j ∈ {U,H} who are active in the platform
2Note that there can never be rationing among providers labeled H in equilibrium since, in
such a case, a provider could increase his earnings by unilaterally lowering his price slightly, which
would guarantee being matched to a customer. Note also that if η < 1 then (1− τ)pU = b0, that
is, rationing in equilibrium occurs only if the providers’ compensation when they provide service
is equal to the minimum possible, i.e., b0.
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in any period and who are assigned label i ∈ {U ,H}.3,4
Next, we discuss the demand for different provider types (i.e., labels) in a
steady-state equilibrium. Recall that each consumer chooses a provider to maximize




where {0,U ,H} represents the set of available options to customers, i.e., transacting
with the outside option or with a provider on the platform carrying with label U
or H. According to the information policy (3.2), the expected quality of a provider
with label H is qH = qH = 1, while the expected quality of a provider with label U
is given by
q̂U(α) =














The latter expression reflects the fact that, as a result of the platform’s information-
delay policy, label U may contain providers of high quality in addition to providers
of unknown quality, so that q̂U(α) ∈ [qU , qH ]. Given expected qualities qi and equi-
librium prices pi, let ζi denote the mass of customers that engage in a transaction
with a provider carrying the label i, for i ∈ {U ,H}. The following result describes
how the quantities qi, pi, and ζi are related, and provides the main structure of a
3A provider of low quality never remains in the platform: according to (3.2), the platform
immediately reveals his quality so that he cannot demand a positive price inside the platform.
4Note that these quantities must satisfy the time-invariance conditions
δHH = β
(
δHH + (1− α)(δHU + γδUU )
)









Proposition 3.3.1 Consider a steady-state equilibrium under a platform policy
{τ, α}.
1. Suppose qU(α) < q0. Then the equilibrium satisfies:





1−q0 < 2, then ζU =
pU−p0
qU−q0




















ζH = 2− pH−pU1−qU .
2. Suppose qU(α) ≥ q0. Then the equilibrium satisfies:
- If pU−p0
qU−q0
< 1 < pH−pU
1−qU
< 2, then ζU =
pH−pU
1−qU
− 1 and ζH = 2− pH−pU1−qU .









and ζH = 2− pH−pU1−qU .
To conclude this section, we establish that a steady-state equilibrium, as de-
scribed above, indeed exists for any given platform policy.
Proposition 3.3.2 For any policy {τ, α}, a steady-state equilibrium exists.
In summary, a steady-state equilibrium exists for any platform policy {τ, α},
and the supply-demand interactions induced by the platform’s policy are fully de-
scribed by the endogenous quantities δij, ζi, and pi, for j ∈ {U,H} and i ∈ {U ,H}.
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3.4 Value Drivers of Information Provision
In this section, we demonstrate the mechanisms through which optimizing the
platform’s information provision increases the platform’s equilibrium profits. The
mechanisms through which optimal information provision may benefit the platform
depend on the platform’s market position, and in particular, the extent to which
the platform “covers” the available customer demand.
To illustrate each mechanism, our exposition proceeds in two steps: first,
we characterize the equilibrium outcome assuming that platform employs a full-
information policy. That is, in any period, the platform discloses all information
it processes regarding the quality of each provider active on the platform. Next,
we show that employing an appropriately designed information-delay policy of the
form given in (3.2) leads to higher profits for the platform, focusing on the intuition
underlying each mechanism.
Before proceeding to the first mechanism, we place two assumptions on our
model parameters.
Assumption 1 The following inequalities hold: (a) q0 − p0 < E[qj] − b0; (b) q0 <
(2−β)γ
2(1−β)+βγ .
Assumption 1a ensures that the platform’s profit under a full-information policy is
positive. In particular, when this assumption is violated, no consumer would ever
transact with a provider inside the platform, preferring the outside option instead.
Assumption 1b is a technical condition we impose for tractability, which essentially
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places an upper bound on the quality of the outside option.
3.4.1 Information Obfuscation Leads to Experimentation
The first setting we consider involves markets where it is not profitable for
the entire population of customers to engage in transactions within the platform.
In other words, the customers’ outside option provides sufficiently high utility to a
subset of customers. Formally, in this section, we restrict attention to markets that
satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 2 There exists a consumer type θ̄ ∈ (1, 2) such that θ̄q0− p0 > θ̄E[qj]
.
The implication of Assumption 2 is that, irrespective of the platform’s chosen com-
mission τ , a subset of customers in equilibrium will always prefer to use the outside
option. That is, when Assumption 2 holds, the platform’s market coverage under
full information is only, which is formalized in the following result.
Proposition 3.4.1 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, when the platform employs
a full-information policy (i.e., α = 0), the mass of customers that choose the outside
option under the optimal commission is strictly positive.
Proposition 3.4.1 suggests that the platform may increase its revenues by incentiviz-
ing a higher volume of transactions. Indeed, Proposition 3.4.2 below establishes that
setting α appropriately (and higher than zero) leads to a higher mass of customers
engaging with the platform. However, this (direct) effect does not imply that the
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platform’s revenues would also increase. Besides, we show that the overall increase
in the volume of transactions has a second (indirect) effect. In essence, customers
transact with a higher mass of novice providers and, thus, the mass of providers la-
beled H at the resulting steady-state is also higher than the case when the platform
follows a full-information provision policy.
Proposition 3.4.2 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, the optimal information
provision policy for the platform features positive delay, i.e., α∗ > 0. Moreover, the
overall volume of transactions and the volume of transactions with providers labeled
H is higher than under the case when the platform uses a full-information provision
policy.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.4.2 can be best described as follows: set-
ting α > 0 results in bundling a subset of high-quality providers with novices. In
turn, the expected quality of transacting with a provider labeled U is higher than
under a full-information provision policy. Customers find transacting within the
platform more attractive, which leads to an increase in the overall volume of trans-
actions. Finally, the higher overall volume of transactions has a second (indirect)
effect. Although each provider in the platform has a lower number of transactions
labeled as H (given that the platform “delays” labeling a high-quality provider as
H), the mass of providers labeled H at each period is higher than under a full in-
formation provision policy. Obfuscating information leads to more experimentation
with novice providers and results in a higher mass of providers labeled H available
on the platform.
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3.4.2 Improving the Composition of Service Providers
The next setting we consider involves markets where it is profitable for the en-
tire population of customers to engage in transactions within the platform. In other
words, the customers’ outside option is not sufficiently attractive to customers, who
find it optimal to seek service from the platform’s service providers. In particular,
in this section, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 3 There exists a consumer type θ ∈ (1, 2) such that θq0−p0 < θE[qj].
We establish that when Assumption 3 holds, and the platform discloses all the
information it has at its disposal, all customers would choose the platform under
the optimal commission.
Proposition 3.4.3 Suppose Assumption 3 holds and b0/w0 < ρ for a constant ρ ∈
(0, 1). Then, when the platform follows the full-information provision policy and
sets the single commission optimally, the entire population of customers engages in
transactions within the platform.
Proposition 3.4.3 states that under Assumption 3, the platform finds it optimal to
set its commission so that the entire population of customers transacts within the
platform at equilibrium. In this case, the platform cannot increase its revenues
by inducing more transactions. However, appropriately designing its information
provision policy can still add value: Proposition 3.4.4 below establishes that setting
α appropriately (and introducing a delay in revealing high-quality providers) leads
to higher revenues for the platform. Although the volume of transactions remains
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the same, introducing the optimal level of delay, leads to an increase in the average
commission per transaction.
Proposition 3.4.4 Suppose Assumption 3 holds and b0/w0 < ρ for a constant ρ ∈
(0, 1). Then, the optimal information provision policy for the platform features
positive delay, i.e., α∗ > 0. Moreover, the volume of transactions with providers
labeled H is lower than under the case when the platform uses a full-information
provision policy.
Intuitively, the mechanism described in Proposition 3.4.4 is analogous to price
discrimination by reducing the quality of a portion of a firm’s output, i.e., “dam-
aging” a firm’s product solely to offer two versions of it and engaging in price dis-
crimination. In particular, by setting α∗ > 0, the platform essentially downgrades a
subset of its high-quality providers. In turn, the price set by the providers labeled
H at equilibrium is higher than in the case that the platform uses a full-information
provision policy. Thus, the volume of transactions with providers labeled H de-
creases, the revenue per transaction increases, and the platform’s revenue benefits.
3.4.3 Experimentation via Commission Subsidies
So far, our analysis has exclusively considered the case when the platform sets
the same commission rate for every transaction. The single commission scheme is
widely adopted in practice and allows us to transparently describe the mechanisms
through which delayed information provision may benefit a platform. In this section,
we extend our original setting by considering the case when the platform may set
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different commission rates for transactions with providers of different labels, i.e., the
platform sets τU and τH, i.e., the commission rates for transactions with providers
labeled U and H, respectively.
Moreover, we restrict attention to settings where it is not profitable for the
platform to cover the entire market. In such a case, a natural alternative to induce
a higher volume of transactions (and more experimentation with new providers) is
to “subsidize” transactions with providers labeled U by setting τU ≤ τH. The propo-
sition below establishes that when the platform uses a full-information provision
policy setting τU ≤ τH is indeed optimal.
Proposition 3.4.5 When the platform follows the full-information provision policy,
it finds it optimal to set the commission rate for transactions with providers labeled
U lower than that for transactions with providers labeled H.
The intuition behind this proposition is straightforward: the platform benefits
from inducing a higher volume of transactions in markets, as doing so also increases
the rate at which it reveals high-quality providers. The platform can incentivize an
increase in the volume of transactions with new providers by setting the correspond-
ing commission rate lower, i.e., effectively subsidizing engaging in transactions with
them.
Finally, Proposition 3.4.6 below establishes that appropriately designing the
platform’s information-provision policy leads to benefits even in this case where
commission rates associated with different provider labels may be different. To state




optimal commission rate for transactions with providers labeled U , H, respectively,
when the platform uses an information delay policy with parameter α.
Proposition 3.4.6 Then, the optimal information provision policy for the platform
features positive delay, i.e., α∗ > 0. Moreover, the commission rate for transac-
tions with providers labeled U is higher than the case when the platform uses a
full-information provision policy, i.e., τ ∗U(α
∗) > τ ∗U(0).
Proposition 3.4.6 suggests that introducing a delay in revealing high-quality
providers can complement setting a lower commission rate for providers labeled U
in increasing the overall volume of transactions and subsequently the platform’s
revenues. The optimal policy uses both design levers, i.e., the information provision
policy and different commission rates, and, thus, establish the value of such joint
optimization.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate the benefits of information provision policy in
online peer-to-peer service platforms. Services providers are strategic in terms of
entering the platform and pricing their service. Their service qualities are hetero-
geneous and learned through transactions. Consumers are strategic in terms of
their hiring decisions. Therefore, when designing the information provision policy
and commission fee structure, the platform needs to take into account the strategic
behaviors of all participants, as well as the learning process of providers’ qualities.
We establish that the informational delay can benefit the platform implements
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either a single commission scheme or a differentiated commission scheme. Under an
optimal single commission scheme, the informational delay can further increase the
platform’s revenue by increasing the experimentation of new providers or optimiz-
ing the provider composition and inducing profitable price discrimination. Under
an optimal differentiated commission scheme, the informational delay can further
improve the platform’s revenue by lowering the revenue loss incurred by subsidizing
new providers.
3.6 Appendix: Technical propositions and lemmas
Definition 3.6.1 Given an information provision policy {α} and commission struc-
ture {τU , τH}, if qU ≤ q0, then we classify the equilibrium into the following four types
as their characterization are different.
E1: There is no rationing among providers with label U (i.e., η = 1), and all
customers choose the platform (i.e., δU + δH = 1).
E2: There is rationing among providers with label U (i.e., η < 1), and all customers
choose the platform (i.e., δU + δH = 1).
E3: There is rationing among providers with label U (i.e., η < 1), and not all
customers choose the platform (i.e., δU + δH < 1).
E4: There is no rationing among providers with label U (i.e., η = 1), and there
not all customers choose the platform (i.e., δU + δH < 1).
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Lemma 3.6.1 The equilibrium quantities of H providers with label U and label H












where λ = α
1−βα .
Proof. The claim immediately follows from (3.6). 
Lemma 3.6.2 In equilibrium, the free-entry condition for new providers (i.e., V UU =
w0
1−β ) is equivalent to
F (λ, η) ,
βγ
1− β
· 1− (1− β)λ
1 + βγλη
(





− (1− τU)pU , (3.9)
where λ = α
1−βα .
Proof. First, by (3.5), V HU ≥ w01−β , and V
H












Second, we substitute V HU and V
H












(1− τH)pH − w0
)
= 0.
Lastly, by substituting δUH and δ
H
H in the above equality using (3.8) and letting
λ = α
1−βα , we obtain (3.9). Therefore, we have shown that the free-entry condition
is equivalent to (3.9). 
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3.6.1 Single commission scheme
In this section, we introduce technical lemmas and propositions related to the
single-commission structure (i.e. τU = τH).
Lemma 3.6.3 Suppose τU = τH = τ and λ =
α
1−βα ≥ 0. Then, in equilibrium,
the quantity and the expected quality of hired providers with label U are δU = (1 +
βγλη)δUU and qU =
γ+βγλη
1+βγλη
, respectively. The remaining quantities have different
characterizations across types:
If an E1 holds,
- Quantity of hired new providers: δUU =
1−β
1−β+βγ .
- Prices of providers with label U and providers with label H:




















- Rationing rate: η = 1.
- Platform revenue: πr,1(τ, λ) =
τ
1−τw0.
- The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:
· Providers with label U are not financially constrained. That is, (1 −
τ)pU ≥ b0.
· The customer at 1+δU prefers providers with label U to the outside option.











If an E2 holds,





- Prices of providers with label U and providers with label H:
· pU = b01−τ .








- Rationing rate: η is solved from (3.9).












- The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:
· Providers with label U get rationed. That is, 0 < η < 1.
· The customer at 1+δU prefers providers with label U to the outside option.
That is, 1 + δU ≤ p0−pUq0−qU .
If an E3 holds,





- Prices of providers with label U and providers with label H:
· pU = b01−τ .










- Rationing rate: η is solved from (3.9).













- The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:
· Providers with label U get rationed. That is, 0 < η < 1.
· There are customers choosing the platform. That is, δUU > 0.
· Not all customers choose the platform. That is,
(
1−β+βγ




If an E4 holds,
















- Prices of providers with label U and providers with label H:




q0 − γ − βγλ(1− q0)
)
.










- Rationing rate: η = 1.







- The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:
· Providers with label U are not financially constraint. That is, (1−τ)pU ≥
b0.
· There are customers but not all choosing the platform. That is, 0 < δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ .
Proof. First of all, the quantity of hired providers with label U is δU = ζU =
δUU + ηδ
H
U = (1 + βγλη)δ
U
U , where the last equality is obtained from (3.8). Then, the
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expected quality of hired providers with label U is:
qU =










The second equality follows from (3.8).
Next, we characterize the rest equilibrium quantities by types:
E1: In this case, there is no rationing among providers with label U (i.e., η = 1),
and all customers hire providers from the platform (i.e., δU + δ
H
H = 1). From
these two equalities and (3.8), we solve for δUU =
1−β
1−β+βγ . We then characterize








(1−γ), which is a function of pU .
Then, we solve for pU from (3.9). To characterize the platform revenue, we
have (1−τ)(δHHpH+δUpU) = w0 from (3.9), from which we obtain πr,1 = τ1−τw0.
E2: In this case, providers with label U are financially constraint, so their price is
pU =
b0
1−τ . Note that all customers choose to hire providers from the platform
(i.e., δU + δ
H
H = 1). So, we solve for δ
U
U from the last equality and (3.8).
Then, we characterize pH based on Case 2 of the equilibrium definition. In








Given the characterization of pU and pH, we determine η from (3.9). Lastly,













, where the second equality is obtained by substituting pH using
the above characterization.




1−τ . Then, by the Case 1 of the equilibrium definition, we solve for δ
U
U
and pH. Given the characterization of pU and pH, we determine η using (3.9).












from which we obtain the characterization of πr,3.
E4: In this case, there is no rationing (i.e., η = 1). By Case 1 in the equilibrium







γ − βγλ(1 − q0)
)














(1 − q0). Notice that pU and pH only depends on δUU , so we can plug
them into (3.9) and solve for δUU in closed from. Lastly, we obtain πr,4 by
letting η = 1 in πr,3.
Therefore, we have completed the equilibrium characterization for all four types. 
Lemma 3.6.4 Suppose τU = τH = τ and α = 0. Then, each equilibrium type can
be characterized as follows.
In E1,






pH = pU + (1 + δ
U
U )(1− γ).







- Rationing rate: η = 1.
- The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:






· New providers are not financially constrained (i.e., (1− τ)pU ≥ b0).




- Prices of new providers and H-label providers: pU = b01−τ , pH = pU + (1 +
δUU )(1− γ)














- The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:





· New providers get rationed (i.e., 0 < η < 1).














- Quantities of new providers and H-label providers: δUU =
p0−pU













- The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:
· Not all customers choose the platform (i.e., δUU + δHH < 1).
· New providers get rationed (i.e., 0 < η < 1).















































pH = p0 + (2− βγ1−β δ
U
U )(1− q0).
- Quantities of new providers and H-label providers: δUU =
p0−pU







- Rationing rate: η = 1.
- The equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:
· Not all customers choose the platform (i.e., δUU + δHH < 1).
· New providers are not financially constrained (i.e., (1− τ)pU ≥ b0).
· There are customers choosing the platform δUU > 0.
- Platform revenue:
πr,4(τ) =
(1− β + βγ)2
βγ(1− β)
w0




















Proof. We show Lemma 3.6.4 by letting α = 0 in Lemma 3.6.3. 
Proposition 3.6.1 specifies the equilibrium type under a given single commis-
sion with full information.
Proposition 3.6.1 Suppose τU = τH = τ and α = 0. Then, an equilibrium exists.
Moreover,
If p0 ≤ q0 − γ, then there is no provider on the platform.
If q0 − γ < p0 ≤ 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ) and
1. If 0 < b0 ≤ p0−(q0−γ)p0+ 1−β1−β+βγ (q0−γ)( 2η−1)
w0, then
b0




































, then an E3 holds.



















, then an E4
holds.








w0 < b0 ≤ w0, then
(a) If 0 < τ < 1− b0
p0−(q0−γ) , then an E3 holds.
(b) Otherwise, there is no provider on the platform.
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If 2(1−β)+βγ


















p0 − (q0 − γ)
p0 +
1−β









































1−γ , then an E2 holds.















































































(a) If 0 < τ ≤ 1− b0
p0− 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0−γ)
, then an E2 holds.
(b) If 1− b0
p0− 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0−γ)












, then an E3 holds.



















, then an E4
holds.








w0 ≤ b0 ≤ w0, then
(a) If 0 < τ ≤ 1− b0
p0− 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0−γ)
, then an E2 holds.
(b) 1− b0
p0− 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0−γ)
< τ < 1− b0
p0−(q0−γ) , then an E3 holds.








p0 − (q0 − γ)
p0 +
1−β













































(1− β + βγ)2
βγ
(











1−γ , then an E2 holds.
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)b0 − 1−β+βγβγ w0
( 1
η



























1−γ , then an E2 holds.













































< τ < 1− b0
p0−q0+γ , then an E3 holds.










w0 < b0 ≤ w0, and
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(a) If 0 < τ ≤ 1− b0
p0− 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0−γ)
, then an E2 holds.
(b) If 1− b0
p0− 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0−γ)
< τ < 1− b0
p0−q0+γ , then and E3 holds.
(c) Otherwise, there is no provider on the platform.
Proof. By the equilibrium characterization in Lemma 3.6.4, to show the exis-
tence of equilibrium of a given type, it suffices to verify the conditions it satisfy. In
particular,
- To show that E1 occurs, we need to verify:





· New providers are not financially constrained (i.e., (1− τ)pU ≥ b0).
- To show that E2 occurs, we need to verify:





· New providers get rationed (i.e., 0 < η < 1).
- To show that E3 occurs, we need to verify:
· Not all customers choose the platform (i.e., δUU + δHH < 1).
· New providers get rationed (i.e., 0 < η < 1).
· There are customers choosing the platform δUU > 0.
- To show that E4 occurs, we need to verify:
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· Not all customers choose the platform (i.e., δUU + δHH < 1).
· New providers are not financially constrained (i.e., (1− τ)pU ≥ b0).
· There are customers choosing the platform δUU > 0.
First, it is straightforward to verify that when p0 ≤ q0−γ, no providers choose
to stay on the platform.
Second, we show the cases when q0 − γ < p0 ≤ 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ). There









w0 < b0 ≤ w0, respectively.
1. In the case with low b0, we first show that the inequalities in (3.10) hold. In
particular, it is straightforward to verify that both inequality in (3.10) are
equivalent to b0 ≤ p0−(q0−γ)p0+ 1−β1−β+βγ (q0−γ)( 2η−1)
w0.
(a) Then, to show an E3 arises in case 1-(a), it suffices to verify conditions
δUU +δ
H
H < 1, 0 < η < 1, and δ
U
U > 0. Notice that δ
H







The first condition is equivalent to δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ , which is equivalent to
p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ) <
b0
1−τ . The last inequality holds since its left-
hand side is non-positive while the right-hand side is positive. Then, by
Lemma 3.6.4, we have the closed-form characterization of η. Using the
characterization, we show η > 0, since it is equivalent to
τ < 1−

























Moreover, we show η < 1, which is equivalent to (3.18). Lastly, we verify
the third condition (i.e., δUU > 0). Notice that it is equivalent to
τ < 1− b0
p0 − q0 + γ
, (3.19)
which holds because of (3.18) and (3.10). Therefore, an E3 occurs under
in this case.
(b) Then, to show an E4 arises in case 1-(b), it suffices to verify conditions
δUU + δ
H
H < 1, (1 − τ)pU ≥ b0, and δUU > 0. For the first condition, it is
equivalent to show that δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ , which holds because τ < 1, b0 > 0,
and p0 ≤ 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ). By Lemma 3.6.4, we have a closed-form
characterization of pU in E4. By the characterization, we show that the














which is the given condition. Besides, the last condition (i.e., δUU > 0)
holds as it is equivalent to
τ < 1− w0
p0 +
1−β





which is the given condition. Therefore, an E4 occurs.
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(c) For bigger τ , no new providers engage in the platform. We omit the proof
for brevity.
2. In the case with high b0, there are two cases to consider.
(a) In case 2-(a), we show that an E3 arises. Similar to case 1-(a), it suffices
to show conditions 0 < δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ and 0 < η < 1 hold. Follow the
same argument as in case 1-(a), we show these conditions hold for this
case.
(b) For bigger τ , no new providers engage in the platform. We omit the proof
for brevity.
Third, we show the cases when 2(1−β)+βγ











−1 , which is given. There



































b0 ≤ w0, respectively.
3. In the case of low b0, we first show that (3.12) holds. In particular, it is









w0, which is given.
(a) Then, to show an E2 arises in case 3-(a), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < η < 1 and p0−pU
q0−γ ≥
2(1−β)+βγ
1−β+βγ . We notice that η < 1 holds as it is
equivalent to









which is given. Moreover, notice that η > 0 is equivalent to
τ < 1− 1− β + βγ
2(1− β) + βγ
·
w0 − 1−β+βγβγ b0
1− γ
, (3.23)














1−β+βγ is equivalent to
τ < 1− b0
p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ)
. (3.24)


















Therefore, an E2 occurs.




1−β+βγ and (1 − τ)pU ≥ b0. The first condition is equivalent
to











which is given. The second condition is equivalent to








which is also given. Therefore, an E1 occurs.
(c) Then, to show an E4 holds in case 3-(c), it suffices to verify conditions
δUU + δ
H
H < 1, δ
U
U > 0, and (1− τ)pU ≥ b0. Notice that the first condition
is equivalent to δU <
1−β
1−β+βγ , which is equivalent to












and it is given. Notice δUU > 0 is equivalent to (3.21), which is also









































which is the threshold of shifting from E1 to E4. The last inequality holds
because of the continuity of the equilibrium regarding τ .5 Therefore, an
E4 occurs.
(d) For bigger τ , no new providers engage in the platform. We omit the proof
for brevity.
4. In the case of moderate b0, we first show that (3.13) holds. In particular, the



















w0, which is also given.
(a) Then, to show an E2 holds in case 4-(a), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < η < 1 and p0−pU
q0−γ ≥
2(1−β)+βγ
1−β+βγ . By the proof of case 3-(a), we notice
that η > 0 is equivalent to (3.23), and η < 1 is equivalent to (3.22). Using
w0 > 0, we can show that (3.23) holds if (3.22) holds. Next, we show
that (3.22) holds under the following given condition:
τ ≤ 1− b0
p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ)
. (3.28)








1−γ as it is
5The continuity of equilibrium is straightforward to show, and we omit it for brevity.
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w0, which is given. Thus,




it is equivalent to (3.28). Therefore, an E2 occurs.
(b) Then, to show an E3 holds in case 4-(b), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ and 0 < η < 1, similar to case 1-(a). Notice that
δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ is equivalent to
τ > 1− b0
p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ)
. (3.29)
which is given. Then, we notice that δUU > 0 is equivalent to (3.19). To



























p0−(q0−γ) . The last inequality








w0, which is given. Then, in case
1-(a), we have shown η > 0 is equivalent to (3.17), and η < 1 is equivalent
to (3.18). Since w0 > 0, (3.17) holds as long as (3.18) holds. Besides,
(3.18) is given in this case. Therefore, an E3 occurs.
(c) Then, to show an E4 holds in case 4-(c), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ and (1 − τ)pU ≥ b0, similar to the proof of case 1-
(b). Notice that δUU > 0 is equivalent to (3.21), which is given, and
(1 − τ)pU ≥ b0 is equivalent to (3.20), which is also given. Lastly, we
show δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ . In particular, we notice that δ
U
U is decreasing in


















, which the threshold of shifting from E3 to
E4. Therefore, δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ holds in this case, and an E4 occurs.
(d) For bigger τ , no new providers engage in the platform. We omit the proof
for brevity.
5. In the case of high b0, there are two cases to consider.




1−β+βγ as in case 3-(a). Notice that η > 0 is equivalent to




to (3.24). (3.24) holds as it is given. As in the proof of case 3-(a),










. The last inequality holds









w0, which holds as
b0 ≥ p0−(q0−γ)p0+ 1−β1−β+βγ (q0−γ)( 2η−1)
w0, which is given, and (3.11). Therefore, an E2
occurs.
(b) Then, to show an E3 holds in case 5-(b), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ and 0 < η < 1, similar to case 1-(a). Notice that δ
U
U > 0
is equivalent to (3.19), which is given, and δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ is equivalent to
(3.29), which is also given. Moreover, η > 0 is equivalent to (3.17), and
η < 1 is equivalent to (3.18). Besides, (3.17) will hold if (3.18) holds.














the last inequality is equivalent to b0 ≥ p0−(q0−γ)p0+ 1−β1−β+βγ (q0−γ)( 2η−1)
w0, which is
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given. Therefore, an E3 occurs.
(c) For bigger τ , no new providers engage in the platform. We omit the proof
for brevity.






−1 , (3.14) holds. In fact,






−1 . Then, there are three groups cor-



























w0 < b0 ≤ w0, re-
spectively.
6. In the case of low b0, we first show that (3.15) holds. Given η > 0, it is
straightforward to show the first inequality of (3.15) holds. Then, we can show



















(a) Then, to show an E2 arises in case 6-(a), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < η < 1 and p0−pU
q0−γ ≥
2(1−β)+βγ
1−β+βγ . By the proof of case 3-(a), we notice
that η > 0 is equivalent to (3.23), and η < 1 is equivalent to (3.22). Using
w0 > 0, we can show that (3.23) holds if (3.22) holds. Notice that (3.22)
is given in case 6-(a). Moreover, p0−pU
q0−γ ≥
2(1−β)+βγ
1−β+βγ is equivalent to (3.28).



















holds by (3.14). Therefore, an E2 occurs.





1−β+βγ , which is equivalent to (3.25), and (1 − τ)pU ≥ b0,
which is equivalent to (3.26). Notices that (3.25) and (3.26) are given in
this case. Therefore, an E1 occurs.
(c) Then, to show an E4 holds in case 6-(c), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ and (1 − τ)pU ≥ b0, similar to the proof of case 1-
(b). Notice that δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ is equivalent to (3.27), which is given,
and δUU > 0 is equivalent to (3.21), which is also given. Lastly, we show






)b0 − 1−β+βγβγ w0
( 1
η
− 1)p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β (1− q0)
. (3.31)


























which is given. Therefore, an E4 occurs.
(d) For bigger τ , no new providers engage in the platform. We omit the proof
for brevity.
7. In the case of moderate b0, we first show that (3.16) holds. The first in-
equality holds because it is equivalent to b0 ≥ p0−(q0−γ)p0+ 1−β1−β+βγ (q0−γ)( 2η−1)
w0, which









w0, which is also given.
(a) Then, we show an E2 arises in case 7-(a). We omit the proof as it is the
same as case 6-(a).
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(b) Then, we show an E1 arises in case 7-(b). We omit the proof as it is the
same as case 6-(b).
(c) Then, to show an E4 arises in case 7-(c), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ and (1 − τ)pU ≥ b0, similar to the proof of case 1-(b).
Notice that δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ is equivalent to (3.27), which is given. Then, we
notice that (1− τ)pU ≥ b0 is equivalent to (3.31), which is given. Lastly,


























w0. Notice that the last inequality is given.
Therefore, an E4 occurs.
(d) Then, to show an E3 arises in case 7-(d), it suffices to verify conditions
0 < δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ and 0 < η < 1, similar to case 1-(a). Notice that










− 1)p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β (1− q0)
, (3.32)






)b0 − 1−β+βγβγ w0
( 1
η
− 1)p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β (1− q0)
. (3.33)
























, which implies that (3.32)
holds as long as (3.33) holds. We further notice that (3.33) is given.
Lastly, we notice that δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ is equivalent to (3.29). To show (3.29)
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which is given. Therefore, an E3 occurs.
(e) For bigger τ , no new providers engage in the platform. We omit the proof
for brevity.
8. In the case of high b0, there are three cases to consider.
(a) To show an E2 holds in case 8-(a), it suffices to verify conditions 0 <
η < 1 and p0−pU
q0−γ ≥
2(1−β)+βγ





to (3.28), which is given. Then, we notice that η > 0 is equivalent
to (3.23), and η < 1 is equivalent to (3.22). Using w0 > 0, we can





















given. Therefore, an E2 occurs.
(b) To show an E3 holds in case 8-(b), it suffices to verify conditions 0 <
δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ and 0 < η < 1, similar to case 1-(a). Notice that δ
U
U > 0
is equivalent to (3.19), which is given, and δUU <
1−β
1−β+βγ is equivalent
to (3.29), which is also given. Then, we notice that η > 0 is equivalent






−1 , we can show that (3.32) holds as long as (3.33) holds,
























given. Therefore, an E3 occurs.
(c) For bigger τ , no new providers engage in the platform. We omit the proof
for brevity.
Therefore, we have completed the proof of Proposition 3.6.1. 
Proposition 3.6.2 specifies the revenue optimal single commission under a full-
information policy. We use τ ∗(0) to denote the optimal single commission under the
full information.
Proposition 3.6.2 We let τ ∗4 = 1− 2w0p0+w0+ 2βγ1−β+βγ (1− 12η)(1−q0)
. Under the full infor-
mation, τ ∗(0) can be characterized as follows:
If q0 − γ < p0 < 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ) and
1. If 0 < b0 ≤ p0−(q0−γ)p0+ 1−β1−β+βγ (q0−γ)( 2η−1)
w0, then















τ ∗(0) = arg maxπr,3(τ)1
{
0 < τ < 1−
1−β+βγ
βγ












and an E3 holds.








w0 < b0 ≤ w0, then
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τ ∗(0) = arg maxπr,3(τ)1
{
0 < τ < 1− b0
p0 − (q0 − γ)
}
,
and an E3 holds.
If 2(1−β)+βγ

















τ ∗(0) = max
{














p0 ≥ w0 +
2(1− β)
1− β + βγ
(3(1− β) + βγ
2(1− β + βγ)
− 1− β




(q0 − γ), (3.36)


































τ ∗(0) = arg maxπr,3(τ)1
{
1− b0
p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ)
≤ τ < 1−
1−β+βγ
βγ












and an E2 or E3 holds.
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w0 ≤ b0 ≤ w0, then
τ ∗(0) = arg maxπr,3(τ)1
{
1− b0
p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0 − γ)
≤ τ < 1− b0












6. If 0 < b0 ≤ p0−(q0−γ)p0+ 1−β1−β+βγ (q0−γ)( 2η−1)
w0, then τ
∗(0) is characterized by (3.35). More-
































terized by (3.35). Moreover, if (3.36) holds, then an E1 holds. Otherwise,
an E4 holds.
(b) Otherwise,







)b0 − 1−β+βγβγ w0
( 1
η
− 1)p0 − 2(1−β)+βγ1−β (1− q0)
< τ < 1− b0














w0 < b0 ≤ w0, then τ ∗(0) is characterized by
(3.38), and an E2 or E3 holds. If τ ∗(0) = 1 − b0
p0− 2(1−β)+βγ1−β+βγ (q0−γ)
, then an E2
occurs. Otherwise, an E3 occurs.
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Proof. We show this proposition based on three observations.
First of all, by Lemma 3.6.4, the platform revenue increases in τ under E1
and E2. Therefore, the first observation is that τ ∗(0) is not in the interior of the
commission intervals in cases 3-(a), 3-(b), 4-(a), 5-(a), 6-(a), 6-(b), 7-(a), 7-(b), and
8-(a) in Proposition 3.6.1. By the continuity of the equilibrium with respect to τ ,
we only need to search for τ ∗(0) in the boundary and interior of the commission
intervals in the remaining cases where E3 and E4 holds.
The second observation is that, if τ ∗(0) is in the interior of the commission







, τ ∗4 . By




















where u = 1
1−τ . By maximizing the above expression, we obtain τ
∗(0) = τ ∗4 .
The third observation is that if E3 and E4 can occur in the same case when
changing τ (e.g., case 1 in Proposition 3.6.1), then there does not exist τ̂3 and τ̂4
such that π′r,3(τ̂3) = 0, π
′
r,4(τ̂4) = 0, and τ̂3 and τ̂4 follow the same order as the
order of E3 and E4 occurring when τ increases in a given case.6 In other words,
we cannot have interior local optimal commission in E3 and E4 at the same time.
In particular, by the equilibrium characterization of E3 and E4 in Lemma 3.6.4, we
notice that the platform revenue under E3 and E4 can be written as π = τh(pU),
6In cases 1 and 4, we require τ̂3 < τ̂4 as E3 occurs first and in case 7, we require τ̂3 > τ̂4 as E4
occurs first.
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where h(pU) is a function of pU . In particular,
h(pU) = δ
U













































Notice that τ influences h(pU) only through pU . Therefore, π
′(τ) = 0 is equivalent
to τp′U = −
h(pU )
h′(pU )
, where p′U is the derivative of p
′
























which is decreasing in pU . Then, we show the observation by considering the follow-
ing two possible types of cases:
1. In cases 1 and 4, where E3 occurs before E4 as we increase τ , we show that
such τ̂3 and τ̂4 do not exist simultaneously. We show this by the way of














) . Moreover, we show that p′U(τ̂3) <








To show the last inequality holds, it suffices to show that
b0 ≤
1− β + βγ
1− β + βγ 1
η
w0. (3.40)








w0 in cases 1 and 4. Then, to


















−1 , which holds in cases 1 and
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4. Therefore, we have shown p′U(τ̂3) < p
′











, which results in a
contradiction. Therefore, such τ̂3 and τ̂4 do not exist simultaneously.
2. In case 7, where E4 occurs before E3 as we increase τ , we show that such τ̂3
and τ̂4 do not exist simultaneously. We show this by the way of contradiction.





















) . Moreover, we show that p′U(τ̂3) > p′U(τ̂4), which






(1−τ̂4)2 . To show the
last inequality holds, it suffices to show that
b0 ≥
1− β + βγ
1− β + βγ 1
η
w0. (3.41)








w0 in case 7. Then, to show











w0. The last in-






−1 , which holds in case 7. There-
fore, we have shown p′U(τ̂3) < p
′











, which results in a contradic-
tion. Therefore, such τ̂3 and τ̂4 do not exist simultaneously.
Given the above observations, we can characterize τ ∗(0) and the equilibrium
type under τ ∗(0) in each case:














1− β + βγ














Based on the third observation, if (3.42) holds, then τ ∗(0) is determined by
(3.34) and an E3 occurs under τ ∗(0). Otherwise, τ ∗(0) = τ ∗4 and an E4 occurs
under τ ∗(0).
2. The characterization of case 2 is straightforward so we omit the proof for
brevity.
3. We establish (3.35) as the characterization of τ ∗(0) in case 3 based on the
first and the second observations. Then, it is straightforward to show that








is equivalent to (3.36). Therefore, if
(3.36) holds, the platform revenue is decreasing in τ in the commission interval
associated with E4 (i.e., case 3-(c) in Proposition 3.6.1), and an E1 holds under
τ ∗(0). Otherwise, an E4 holds.












. Therefore, τ ∗(0) is obtained by (3.37), and an E2 or an
E3 occurs under τ ∗(0). Otherwise, we have τ ∗(0) = τ ∗4 and an E4 occurs.
5. We can show case 5 based on the first observation. We omit the proof for
brevity.
6. We can show case 6 based on the first and second observation. Since the proof
is similar to case 3, we omit the proof for brevity.
7. In case 7, based on the third observation, we only need to search for τ ∗(0) when












, which is equivalent
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w0. In this case, τ
∗(0) is given
by (3.35), and we can determine whether an E1 or an E4 occurs under τ ∗(0)
based on (3.36) (similar to the proof of case 3). On the other hand, we can



























w0. By all three
observations, we can show that in this case τ ∗(0) is characterized by (3.39)
and an E3 occurs under τ ∗(0).
8. We can show case 8 based on the first observation. We omit the proof for
brevity.
Therefore, we have completed the characterization of τ ∗(0) as well as the corre-
sponding equilibrium type in each case. 
Lemma 3.6.5 Suppose an E1 holds under (τ ∗(0), 0) and η < 1. Then, λ∗ > 0.
Besides, the optimal delay policy results in lower δHH compared the full-information
policy with τ ∗(0).
Proof. In this proof, we first show that λ∗ > 0 by finding a policy with λ > 0, which
results in an E1 with higher platform revenue than that under (τ ∗(0), 0). We then
show that for any policy with λ > 0, the corresponding quantity of providers with
label H is less than βγ
1−β+βγ , which is the quantity of providers with label H under
λ = 0 and E1.
First, we notice that the platform revenue in E1 is τ
1−τw0 by Lemma 3.6.3.
Therefore, within E1, the conditional optimal τ given λ is the maximum τ such that
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E1 holds. By Lemma 3.6.3, to show an E1 holds, we need to check two conditions:







q0 − γ − βγλ(1 − q0)
)
and (1 − τ)pU ≥ b0. Next, we
show that at the optimal commission given λ, denoted by τ ∗(λ), the first condition is
binding while the second condition is not binding. In particular, it is straightforward
to verify that the left-handed side of both conditions (i.e., pU and (1 − τU)pU)








q0 − γ − βγλ(1− q0)
)





























we notice that τ ∗(λ) is increasing in λ. In other words, if both policies (τ ∗(λ), λ),
where λ > 0, and (τ ∗(0), 0) result in an E1, then τ ∗(λ) > τ ∗(0). Hence, the first
policy with delay leads to a higher platform revenue than the second policy, which
is the full-information policy with the optimal commission. To show such (τ ∗(λ), λ)
policy exists, it suffices to show that condition (1− τ)pU ≥ b0 holds under the given
policy. It is straightforward to verify that the left-handed side of the condition is
increasing in λ. Therefore, if policy (τ ∗(0), 0) satisfies the condition, then policy
(τ ∗(λ), λ) will satisfy the condition. In sum, we have establish that λ∗ > 0 under
the given conditions.
Second, we show that any policy with a positive delay (i.e., λ > 0) results in
fewer providers with label H compared a full-information, which results in an E1.
We let δH+H and δ
H0
H denote the quantity of providers with label H under the given
delay policy and the given full-information policy, respectively. By Lemma 3.6.3,
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we have δH0H =
βγ




H holds, when E1, E2, E3, and E4
occurs under the given delay policy (λ > 0):






(by Lemmas 3.6.1 and 3.6.3). Therefore, δH+H < δ
H0
H .
2. If an E2 holds under the given delay policy, then by Lemma 3.6.3 the quantity




. The last inequality
holds because η > 0. Then, by the characterization of δHH in Lemma 3.6.1,









. Then, it is straightforward to
show that the right-handed side of the last inequality is decreasing in λ, which





3. If an E3 holds under the given delay policy, then by Lemma 3.6.3 the quantity
of hired new providers is less than 11−β+βγ
1−β −βγλ(1−η)
. By following the same
proof as in case E2, we can show δH+H < δ
H0
H .
4. If an E4 holds under the given delay policy, then by Lemma 3.6.3, the total











1−β+βγ . Then, by the characterization





Therefore, we have shown that a full-information policy, which results in an E1,
have more providers with label H than an policy with a positive delay. 
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3.6.2 Differentiated commissions
In this sections, we introduce technical lemmas and proposition for the case
of differentiated commissions.
Lemma 3.6.6 The revenue maximization problem over informational delay and
















(Expected quality of unrevealed providers) qU =







(Price of newcomers) pU =

p0 − (1 + δUU + ηδHU )(q0 − qU), qU ≤ q0
p0 + (2− δUU − ηδHU − δHH)(qU − q0), qU > q0
(Price of H-label providers) pH =

p0 + (2− δHH)(1− q0), qU ≤ q0
pU + (2− δHH)(1− qU), qU > q0
(Free-entry condition) (3.9)
(Stay of H-label providers) (1− τH)pH ≥ w0
(Financial constraint) (1− τU)pU ≥ b0
Proof. In this proof, we only focus on the characterization the price functions
of unrevealed and H-label providers as other components are straightforward to
verify. We consider the four matching structures in the equilibrium definition in








which are the market clearing conditions.
1. In case 1 (qU < q0), we have ζU =
pU−p0
qU−q0
− 1 and ζH = 2− pH−p01−q0 . Then by the
market-clearing conditions, we obtain pU = p0 − (1 + δUU + ηδHU )(q0 − qU) and
pH = p0 + (2− δHH)(qH − q0).
2. In case 2 (qU ≤ q0), we have ζU = pH−pU1−qU − 1 and ζH = 2−
pH−pU
1−qU
. Then by the
market clearing conditions, we obtain pH = pU + (2− δHH)(qH − qU). Besides,
customer with sensitivity ζU + 1 (weakly) prefer the providers with label U to
the outside option (i.e., (ζU + 1)qU − pU ≥ (ζU + 1)q0 − p0 or, equivalently,
pU ≤ p0− (ζU + 1)(q0− qU)). Next, we show that pU < p0− (ζU + 1)(q0− qU) is
suboptimal. If the inequality holds, the platform can increase the revenue by
raising the commissions. In particular, by (3.9), increasing τH or τU or both
can increase pU given all other equilibrium outcomes fixed. In other words, if
pU < p0−(ζU+1)(q0−qU) holds, the platform can always increase its revenue by
slightly increasing either commission. Therefore, if the optimal policy leads to
the matching structure specified in case 2, equality pU = p0− (ζU + 1)(q0− qU)
should hold. Therefore, we obtain pU = p0 − (1 + δUU + ηδHU )(q0 − qU) and
pH = p0 + (2− δHH)(1− q0).
3. In this case (qU ≥ q0), we have the same matching structure as case 2. Thus,
we have pH = pU + (2 − δHH)(qH − qU). Besides, customer with sensitivity 1
(weakly) prefers unrevealed providers over the outside option (i.e., qU − pU ≥
q0 − p0 or, equivalently, pU ≤ p0 + qU − q0). Follow the same argument in
case 2, if the optimal policy leads to the matching structure specified by case
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3, we have pU = p0 + qU − q0. Therefore, pH = pU + (2 − δHH)(qH − qU), and
pU = p0 + (2− δUU − ηδHU − δHH)(qU − q0), where δUU + ηδHU + δHH = 1.





and ζH = 2 − pH−pU1−qU . By
the market clearing conditions, we obtain pH = pU + (2 − δHH)(qH − qU) and
pU = p0 + (2− δUU − ηδHU − δHH)(qU − q0).
Therefore, we have formulated the platform’s revenue maximization problem using
information provision policy and differentiated commissions. 
Lemma 3.6.7 Suppose γ < 1−β
β
holds. Then, the optimal information-commission
policy results in no rationing (i.e., η = 1) in equilibrium. Moreover, under the full
information (i.e., λ = 0), the optimal commission scheme results in no rationing in
equilibrium.
Proof. It suffices to show that given a policy (τU , τH, λ), which leads to η < 1 in
equilibrium, we can always find another policy (τ̃U , τ̃H, λ̃), which leads to a strictly
higher platform revenue.




















Note that (3.43) is independent of the commissions. Then, we consider the following
two cases:
- qU ≤ q0. In this case, by the characterization of pU and pH from Lemma 3.6.6,

































(1− q0)δUU − (1 + βγλη)
(






Given λ, η, and δUU , it is evident that πr is fully determined (i.e., it is indepen-
dent of τU and τH). Noticeably, we can show that
∂πr
∂η
> 0. To see this, ∂πr
∂η
has the same sign as:





The last inequality holds as 1 + γ − 2q0 > 0 (note that η < 1 and γ < 1−ββ ).
Then, given (τU , τH, λ), which results in δ
U
U , η and pU , we let λ̃ = λ, and we






(1− τ̃H)p̃H − w0
)
= w0 − (1− τ̃U)p̃U , and (1− τ̃U)p̃U = (1− τU)pU ,









(1− q0), and p̃U = p0 − δUU
(
q0 −
γ − βγλ(1 − q0)
)





yet, η̃ = 1. Besides, it is straightforward to verify that (1 − τ̃H)p̃H ≥ w0 and
w0 ≥ (1 − τ̃U)p̃U = (1 − τU)pU ≥ b0. Lastly, by (3.45), we show that policy
(τ̃U , τ̃H, λ̃) strictly outperforms policy (τU , τH, λ) in revenue.
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- qU > q0. In this case, we first show that given a policy (τU , τH, λ) with δ
U
U
and η in equilibrium, we can find an alternative policy (τ̃U , τ̃H, λ̃) such that
its equilibrium outcomes satisfy δ̃UU = δ
U
U , η̃ = 1, and λ̃ = λη. Note that if
we can find such policy, it will have the same expected quality of unrevealed
providers (i.e., q̃U = qU). In particular, we choose τ̃U and τ̃H such that:
βγ
1− β
· 1− (1− β)λ̃
1 + βγλ̃
(
(1− τ̃H)p̃H − w0
)
= w0 − (1− τ̃U)p̃U , and (1− τ̃U)p̃U = (1− τU)pU ,

















(1 − qU). It is straightforward to show that we can solve for τ̃U and
τ̃H from the above two equations.
Next, we show that the alternative policy leads to a higher platform revenue.
We let u , λη = λ̃η̃ = λ̃, which is the same under both policies. Then, given
u, we can write down the platform revenue as (by (3.43) and Lemma 3.6.6):
πr(λ) =
δUU






































To simplify the notation, let A(λ) , 1−β+βγ



































Notice that u and δUU are fixed while we change the policy following the above
rules, it suffices to show that πr(λ) is decreasing in λ given u and δ
U
U . Besides,
it is straightforward to verify that ∂πr
∂λ












The above inequality holds as A(λ)δUU = δU + δ
H
H ≤ 1 and B(λ)δUU = δHH < 1.
In other words, we have shown that ∂πr
∂λ
< 0 and the proposed policy without
rationing results in a higher platform revenue than the original policy with
rationing. Therefore, we conclude that in the case qU ≥ q0, the policy with
η < 1 is suboptimal.
In sum, any general commission scheme with η < 1 is suboptimal. Besides, the
above argument applies in the set of full-information policies. 
In Lemma 3.6.8, we characterize the quantity of hired new providers resulted
from the optimal general commission scheme given an informational delay.
Lemma 3.6.8 Suppose γ < 1−β
β
holds. Then, given λ ∈ [0, q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) ], the number of
hired new providers under the optimal commission scheme is






1−β (p0 − w0)− (q0 − γ) +
2βγ
1−β (1− q0)− βγλ(1− q0)







1 + γ − 2q0 + 2βγ1−β (1− q0)
) , 1− β








Proof. By Lemma 3.6.7 (under γ < 1−β
β
), we only need to consider the equilibrium
with η = 1. For λ ∈ [0, q0−γ






































1− β + βγ
1− β
(p0 − w0)− (q0 − γ) +
2βγ
1− β
(1− q0)− βγλ(1− q0)
−
(















which is maximized by δU∗U (λ) characterized in Lemma 3.6.8.
Given δU∗U (λ), we can find corresponding τU and τH such that the equilibrium
with δU∗U (λ) holds. In particular, we can verify that τ
∗
U = 1 − w0p∗U and τ
∗
H = 1 − w0p∗H ,
where p∗U = p0 −
(
1 + (1 + βγλ)δUU
∗(λ)
)











(1− q0) satisfy the free-entry condition, stay of H-label providers, and
the financial constraint.
Next, to show that δU∗U (λ) is increasing in λ, it suffices to show that it holds
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when δU∗U (λ) <
1−β
1−β+βγ . In this case, we note that
dδU∗U
dλ
(λ) has the same sign as:
(




)(1− β + βγ
1− β





















(1− β + βγ
1− β





























(1− q0)− (q0 − γ)
)
>










The third and second to last inequalities hold because βγ
1−β (1 − q0) − (q0 − γ) > 0
(Assumption 1). 
Proposition 3.6.3 characterizes the optimal full-information policy with differ-
entiated commissions.
Proposition 3.6.3 Suppose γ < 1−β
β
holds. Then, the optimal general commissions
under the full-information policy, τ ∗U(0) and τ
∗
H(0), can be characterized as:
τ ∗U(0) = 1−
w0
p∗U(0)





δU∗U (0) = min
(
1−β+βγ











) , 1− β
1− β + βγ
)
, (3.50)
p∗U(0) = p0 −
(
1 + δU∗U (0)
)












Proof. First, by Lemma 3.6.8 (under γ < 1−β
β
) and λ = 0, it is straightforward
to verify that δU∗U (0) is characterized by (3.50).
Next, we characterize the optimal commissions given λ = 0 (i.e., τ ∗U(0) and
τ ∗H(0)). The optimal commissions may not be unique as they can result in the same
equilibrium. Among the equivalent commission pairs, we choose the commission
pair with the largest τH. In particular, given an equilibrium with pU and pH under
λ, the following conditions hold at the optimal commissions:
(1− τU)pU = w0 and (1− τH)pH = w0. (3.51)
Notice that τU and τH determined by the above conditions satisfy the free-entry
condition ((3.9)). On the other hand, by the condition that providers with label H
stay on the platform in Lemma 3.6.6 (i.e., (1− τH)pH ≥ w0), any higher τH becomes
infeasible.
Lastly, by (3.51), we obtain (3.49). Moreover, given λ = 0 and η = 1, p∗U(0)
and p∗H(0) in (3.49) are characterized by Lemma 3.6.6. 
In Lemma 3.6.9, we provide a sufficient condition under which the platform
serves all customers under the full information with the optimal differentiated com-
missions.
7The optimal commissions are not unique and we choose the pair with the largest τH. In the
following analysis, if there are multiple optimal commission pairs, we present the pair with the
largest τH.
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Lemma 3.6.9 Suppose γ < 1−β
β
and η < 1
2
. Then, δU∗U (0) =
1−β
1−β+βγ , where δ
U∗
U (0)
is characterized by (3.50).
Proof. By (3.50), to show δU∗U (0) =
1−β
1−β+βγ , it is equivalent to show
1−β+βγ











) ≥ 1− β
1− β + βγ
.
It is straightforward to verify that the above inequality is equivalent to






1− β + βγ
1
η
≥ 1 + 2(1− β)
1− β + βγ
. (3.52)





1−β+βγ , which is equivalent to η ≤
2(1−β)
3(1−β)+βγ . Then, the last inequality holds
given γ < 1−β
β
and η < 1
2
. 
In Lemma 3.6.10, we establish that all customers choose the platform under
the optimal differentiated commissions given λ = q0−qN
βγ(1−q0) .
Lemma 3.6.10 Suppose γ < 1−β
β







where δU∗U (λ) is characterized in Lemma 3.6.8.
Proof. Given the characterization of δU∗U (λ) in Lemma 3.6.8 (which holds under
γ < 1−β
β





1−β (p0 − w0)− (q0 − γ) +
2βγ
1−β (1− q0)− (q0 − γ)







1 + γ − 2q0 + 2βγ1−β (1− q0)
) ≥ 1− β
1− β + βγ
.
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The above inequality can be rewritten as:
1− β + βγ
1− β
(p0 − w0) +
2βγ
1− β
(1− q0)− 2(q0 − γ)
≥ 2(1− β)
1− β + βγ
(


































(1− q0)− (q0 − γ)
)2
.
Note that p0 − w0 > 0, to make the above inequality holds, it suffices to show that
2 >
2(1− β)









1− β + βγ
(1− η),
The above inequality holds as βγ < 1− β (γ < 1−β
β
) and η > 0 (Assumption 1). 
In Lemma 3.6.11, we specify the shape of the platform revenue regarding the
informational delay λ under the optimal differentiated commissions.
Lemma 3.6.11 Suppose γ < 1−β
β
holds and δU∗U (λ) is characterized by (3.47) in
Lemma 3.6.8. Then, for λ ∈ [0, q0−γ




1−β+βγ , the platform revenue
under the optimal commission rates is convex in λ. Otherwise, the platform revenue
under the optimal commission rates is linearly increasing in λ.
Proof. First, we show that when δU∗U (λ) <
1−β
1−β+βγ the platform revenue is convex in
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λ. To simplify the notation, we introduce
A ,
1− β + βγ
1− β




B , βγ(1− q0), (3.54)





and D , βγ
(






Then, by (3.48), the platform revenue under the optimal commission rates given λ























Therefore, π∗r(λ) is convex in λ as C −Dλ > 0.
Next, by (3.48), it is straightforward to verify that when δU∗U (λ) =
1−β
1−β+βγ the
platform’s revenue under the optimal commission rates is linearly increasing in λ.
Besides, the coefficient of λ has the same sign as:
− (1− q0) +
1− β + 2βγ
1− β + βγ
(1− q0)−
1− β




1− β + βγ
(1− q0)−
1− β
1− β + βγ
(q0 − γ)
> 0.
The last inequality holds as 1−β
βγ
· q0−γ
1−q0 < 1 (Assumption 1). 
In Lemma 3.6.12, we characterize the optimal informational delay and a suf-
ficient and necessary condition for the optimal informational delay to be positive
within [0, q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) ].
Lemma 3.6.12 Suppose γ < 1−β
β
holds and λ ∈ [0, q0−γ




1−β+βγ , then λ
∗ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) . Otherwise, λ
∗ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) if (3.57) holds, and λ
∗ = 0 if
(3.57) does not hold.
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, we have qU ≤ q0. Besides, by Lemma
3.6.7 (under γ < 1−β
β
), we only need to consider the policies with η = 1.
First, we show that the optimal informational delay is λ∗ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) , if all
customers choose the platform under the full information and the optimal differ-
entiated commissions (i.e., δU∗U (0) =
1−β
1−β+βγ ). The result holds by Lemma 3.6.11
(under γ < 1−β
β
), where we show that the platform revenue is linearly increasing in
λ.
Next, we consider the case where not all customers choose the platform un-
der the full information and the optimal differentiated commissions (i.e., δU∗U (0) <
1−β
1−β+βγ ).




































can characterize the platform revenue as (by (3.48))
πr




















where B and D are defined by (3.54) and (3.56).
It is straightforward to verify that x̄
(







is equivalent to q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) ≥
(A−2x̄C)2
4Cx̄(x̄D−B) , which is (3.57). Notice that πr is convex
in λ (Lemma 3.6.11), we conclude that the optimal informational delay within [0,
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q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) ] is λ ∈
q0−γ










< πr(0). Notice that πr is convex in λ (Lemma
3.6.11), we conclude that the optimal informational delay within [0, q0−qN
βγ(1−q0) ] is zero.

In Lemma 3.6.13, we characterize the optimal informational delay when λ ≥
q0−qN
βγ(1−q0) .
Lemma 3.6.13 Suppose γ < 1−β
β






has delay λ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) .
Proof. By Lemma 3.6.7 (under γ < 1−β
β
), we only need to search for the optimal
policy among those with η = 1 in equilibrium.
First, we show that given a policy (τU , τH, λ) with δ
U
U , η = 1, and λ >
q0−γ
βγ(1−q0)




U , η̃ = 1,
and q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) ≤ λ̃ < λ. In particular, we select τ̃U and τ̃H such that
βγ
1− β
· 1− (1− β)λ̃
1 + βγλ̃
(
(1− τ̃H)p̃H − w0
)
= w0 − (1− τ̃U)p̃U , and (1− τ̃U)p̃U = (1− τU)pU ,

















q̃U). It is straightforward to show that we can solve for τ̃U and τ̃H from the above
two equations.
Then, we show the alternative policy results in a higher platform revenue
compared to the original policy. It suffices to show that given η = 1 and δUU ∈
[0, 1−β
1−β+βγ ], we have
∂πr
∂λ
(δUU , λ) < 0, where πr(δ
U
U , λ) is the platform revenue. By
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(3.46) and η = 1, we have:
πr(δ
U




1− β + βγ
1− β
(p0 − w0) +
1− β + βγ
1− β
(
2− 1− β + βγ
1− β
δUU


















To simplify the notation, we let θU0 , 2 − 1−β+βγ1−β δ
U

































































(δUU , λ) has the same sign as:
−1− β + βγ
1− β
· θHU − θU0
1 + βγλ
+ 2− θHU = −









The last inequality holds as 1−β+βγ
1−β δ
U




1 − (1 − β)λ
)
δUU is quantity of providers with label H. Notice that the pro-
posed policy has lower delay compared with the original policy (i.e., λ̃ < λ), so the
proposed policy results in higher platform revenue.
Therefore, for λ ∈ [ q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) ,
1
1−β ), the platform revenue is decreasing in the
informational delay, and the optimal policy has informational delay q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) . 
Proposition 3.6.4 characterize the optimal information-commission policy un-
der the differentiated commission scheme.
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Proposition 3.6.4 Suppose γ < 1−β
β
holds. Then, if δU∗U (0) =
1−β
1−β+βγ , then λ
∗ =
q0−γ













































and λ∗ = 0 if (3.57) does not hold.
Moreover, if λ∗ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) , then
τ ∗U(λ
∗) = 1− w0
p∗U(λ
∗)






∗) = p0 and p
∗
H(λ






(1− q0). If λ∗ = 0, then
the optimal policy is given by Proposition 3.6.3.8
Proof. We characterize the global optimal informational delay by characteriz-
ing the optimal delay within two complement intervals [0, q0−γ





We have qU ≤ q0 in the first interval and qU > q0 in the second interval.
First, we search for the optimal delay within [0, q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) ]. In particular, the
optimal informational delay is characterized by Lemma 3.6.12. Moreover, Lemma
3.6.12 provides a sufficient and necessary condition for the optimal informational
delay to be optimal.
8The optimal commissions are not unique and we choose the pair with the largest τH. In the
following analysis, if there are multiple optimal commission pairs, we present the pair with the
largest τH.
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3.6.13, we establish that λ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) is revenue optimal.
By the continuity of the equilibrium regarding λ at λ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) as well as
Lemmas 3.6.12 and 3.6.13, we conclude that the revenue optimal delay found within
[0, q0−γ







. Therefore, the character-
izations of the optimal informational delay as well as the sufficient and necessary
condition for the optimal informational delay to be positive in Lemma 3.6.12 apply
to the entire interval (i.e., λ ∈ (0, 1
1−β )).
Lastly, we characterize the optimal commissions when λ∗ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) (i.e.,
τ ∗U(λ
∗) and τ ∗H(λ
∗)). By (3.51), we obtain (3.58), where p∗U(λ
∗) and p∗H(λ
∗) are
determined by Lemma 3.6.6.
In sum, we have proved Proposition 3.6.4. 
In Corollary 3.6.1, we compare the optimal commissions when λ∗ > 0 with
those under the full information policy (i.e., λ = 0).
Corollary 3.6.1 Suppose γ < 1−β
β
and η < 1
2




and τ ∗H(0) < τ
∗
H(λ







are the optimal com-
mission rates for providers with label U and label H, respectively, given λ.
Proof. First, by Lemma 3.6.9 and Proposition 3.6.4, we know λ∗ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) .
Second, we compare τU . At λ = 0, we notice that τ
∗
U(0) = 1− w0p0−(1+δU∗U (0))(q0−γ)
by (3.49), where δU∗U (0) is characterized by (3.50). Then, at λ = λ
∗, we have
τ ∗U(λ
∗) = 1 − w0
p0
(as pU = p0 at λ
∗ = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0)) by Proposition 3.6.4. Therefore, we





Third, we compare τH. At λ = 0, we notice that τ
∗
H(0) = 1 − w0p∗H(0) , where







(1− q0), by (3.49). Moreover, we can simplify p∗H(0)
as p∗H(0) = p0 +
2(1−β)+βγ








At λ = λ∗, we obtain τ ∗H(λ


















it is straightforward to show the last inequality holds. 
3.7 Appendix: Proofs for Section 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
We take three steps to establish the existence of an equilibrium. First, we
construct an auxiliary normal form game with finitely many players and convex and
compact strategy spaces. Second, we establish the existence of the auxiliary game
by [50]. Third, we show that the equilibrium of the auxiliary game corresponds to
an equilibrium defined in Section 3.3.
In the first step, we construct the auxiliary game. In this auxiliary game, we
assume there are 15 agents. In what follows, we characterize each agent’s strategic
space and payoff function, denoted by ui. Given agent i, we further establish that ui
is the upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) in the actions of all agents and quasi-concave
(q.c.) in agent i’s action, and maxui is lower semi-continuous (l.s.c.) in the actions
of all agents other than agent i. For the notation, we let a denote the action vector
of all agents and let a−i denote the action vectors of all agents except agent i. We
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then let {Mi} a set of large constants such that Mj Mi  0 if i < j.




U , a−1) = −ηδ̃UU
∣∣∣V UU − w01− β ∣∣∣,
where η is the action of agent 13 with action space [0,M1], and V
U
U is the
action of agent 6 with action space [0,M4]. Therefore, u1 is u.s.c. in a and
q.c. in δ̃UU . Besides, maxδ̃UU
u1 = 0, which is l.s.c in a−1.




U , a−2) = −
∣∣∣δHU − βγρUH1− βρUHsU ηδ̃UU
∣∣∣,
where sU is the action of agent 4 with action space [0, 1]. Therefore, u2 is u.s.c.
in a and q.c. in δHU . Besides, maxδHU u2 = 0, which is l.s.c. in a−2.




H , a−3) = −
∣∣∣δHH − β(1− ρUH)1− βsH (sUδHU + γηδ̃UU )
∣∣∣.
Therefore, u3 is u.s.c. in a and q.c. in δ
H
H . Besides, maxδHH u3 = 0, which is
l.s.c. in a−3.
- Agent 4: We denote the agent’s action by sU ∈ [0, 1] and the payoff function
by
u4(sU , a−4) = −sU max
( w0
1− β
− V HU , 0
)









where V HU is the action of agent 7 with action space [0,M3]. Therefore, u4 is
u.s.c. in a and q.c. in sU . Besides, maxsU u4 = 0, which is l.s.c. in a−4.
- Agent 5: We denote the agent’s action by sH ∈ [0, 1] and the payoff function
by
u5(sH, a−5) = −sHmax
( w0
1− β
− V HH , 0
)








where V HH is the action of agent 9 with action space [0,M2]. Therefore, u5 is
u.s.c. in a and q.c. in sH. Besides, maxsH u5 = 0, which is l.s.c. in a−5.




U , a−6) =
−
∣∣∣∣∣V UU − η1− (1− η)β((1− τU)pU + βγρHU sHV HU + βγ(1− ρHU )sHV HH
+ β
(








is u.s.c. in a and q.c. in V UU . Besides, maxV UU u6 = 0, which is l.s.c. in a−6.











η(1− τ)pU + β(1− ρHU )sHV HH + β
(




Therefore, u7 is u.s.c. in a and q.c. in V
H
U . Besides, maxV HU u7 = 0, which is
l.s.c. in a−7.




H , a−8) = −
∣∣∣V HH − (1− τH)pH1− β ∣∣∣,




is u.s.c. in a and q.c. in V HH . Besides, maxV HH u9 = 0, which is l.s.c. in a−8.
- Agent 9: We denote the agent’s action by ζH ∈ [0, 1] and denote the payoff
function by


























∣∣∣2−max{pH−p0qH−q0 , pH−pUqH−qU , 1}∣∣∣, otherwise.
Therefore, maxζH u9 is l.s.c. in a9.
- Agent 10: We denote the agent’s action by ζ̃U ∈ [0, 1] and the payoff function
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by
u10(ζ̃U , a−10) =
−























































− 1, if qU = q0 and pU < p0,
0, if qU = q0 and pU ≥ p0.
In the characterization of DU(a−10), qH = 1 and qU is the action of agent
15 with action space [γ, 1]. Next, we show that DU(a−10) is continuous in
{a−10|qU 6= q0} ∪ {a−10|pU 6= p0}. By the definition, it follows that DU(a−10)
is continuous in {a−10|qU < q0} ∪ {a−10|qU > q0}.
Then, we show that DU(a−10) is continuous at any point within {a−10|qU =














































U) = DU(q0, p). (3.60)
The first equalities in (3.59) and (3.60) hold because DU ’s is continuous in
{a−10|qU < q0} and {a−10|qU > q0}, respectively. To show the second equality
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DU(q0, p) = max
{
min
















. Similarly, to show the second equality































DU(q0, p) = max
{
min
















. Therefore, DU(a−10) is continuous at
any points with qU = q0 and pU = p < p0.
Next, we show that DU(a−10) is continuous at any point within {a−10|qU =














































U) = DU(q0, p̄). (3.62)
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The first equalities in (3.61) and (3.62) hold because DU ’s is continuous in
{a−10|qU < q0} and {a−10|qU > q0}, respectively. To show the second equality


















converges to DU(q0, p̄) = 0, as
piU−p0
qiU−q0






































converges to DU(q0, p̄) = 0, as
piU−p0
qiU−q0







DU(a−10) is continuous at any points with qU = q0 and pU = p̄ > p0. In sum, we
have established the continuity of DU(a−10) in {a−10|qU 6= q0}∪{a−10|pU 6= p0}.
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Then, based on continuity of DU(a−10), we rewrite the u10(ζ̃U , a−10) as follows:
u10(ζ̃U , a−10) =

0, if qU = q0 and pU = p0
−
∣∣ζ̃U −DU(a−10)∣∣, if qU > q0 and pU = p0
or qU < q0 and pU = p0
or qU = q0 and pU > p0
or qU = q0 and pU < p0
−2
∣∣ζ̃U −DU(a−10)∣∣, if qU > q0 and pU > p0
or qU < q0 and pU > q0
or qU > q0 and pU < q0
or qU < q0 and pU < q0
Based on the above characterization, it immediately follows that u10 is u.s.c.
in a and q.c. in ζ̃U . Besides, maxζ̃U u10 = 0, which is l.s.c.
In addition, we observe that when qU 6= q0 or pU 6= p0, we have
ζ∗H +DU(a−10) ≤ 1 (3.63)
where















In particular, we show (3.63) holds in four possible cases (1) qU < q0, (2)
qU > q0, (3) qU = q0 and pU < p0, and (4) qU = q0 and pU > p0, separately.





















































It is straightforward to verify that under qU < q0, either
pH − p0
qH − q0
≤ pH − pU
qH − qU





≤ pH − pU
qH − qU
≤ pH − p0
qH − q0

























































































The above inequality holds as the difference between the first two terms
is non-negative, and the third term is no less than 1.
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− 1 ≤ 1.




















which has been established in case (2).
(4) Notice that DU(a−10) = 0 in this case. Since ζ
∗
H ≤ 1, (3.63) follows.
Therefore, we have shown (3.63) when qU 6= q0 or pU 6= p0.
- Agent 11: We denote the agent’s action by ζU ∈ [0, 1] and the payoff function
by
u11(ζU , a−11) = −
∣∣∣ζU −min(ζ̃U , 1− ζH)∣∣∣.
Therefore, u11 is u.s.c. in a and q.c. in ζU . Besides, maxζU u11 = 0, which is
l.s.c. in a−11.














(ζH − sHδHH), 0
}
, which is l.s.c. in a−12.
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- Agent 13: We denote the agent’s action by η ∈ [0,M1] and the payoff function
by
u13(η, a−13) = −
∣∣∣ζU − η(δ̃UU + sUδHU )∣∣∣.
Therefore, u13 is u.s.c. in a and q.c. in η. Besides, maxη u13(η, a−13) =
min
{
− ζU +M1(δ̃UU + sUδHU ), 0
}
, which is l.s.c. in a−13.
- Agent 14: We denote the agent’s action by pU ∈ [ b01−τU ,M1] and the payoff
function by












(η − 1), 0
}
, which is l.s.c. in a−14.
- Agent 15: We denote the agent’s action by qU ∈ [γ, 1] and the payoff function
by
u15(qU , a−15) = −
∣∣∣qU − ηγ(δ̃UU + sUδHU ) + sHδHH
η(δ̃UU + sUδ
H




Therefore, u15 is u.s.c. in a and q.c. in qU . Besides, maxqU u15 = 0, which is
l.s.c. in a−15.
Therefore, we have specified the auxiliary game.
In the second step, we show that the auxiliary game has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. It follows by the corollary of Theorem 2 in [50]. Then, we observe the
following in any equilibrium:
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(1− τU)pU + βγρHU sHV HU + βγ(1− ρHU )sHV HH
+ β
(









η(1− τ)pU + β(1− ρHU )sHV HH + β
(
ρHU (1− sU)









Furthermore, if ηδ̃UU > 0 occurs in the equilibrium, we have the following
observations :


















- By the equilibrium action of 14, we have
0 < η ≤ 1. (3.71)
We show (3.71) by the way of contradiction. Suppose η > 1, then pU =
M1 → +∞ by the equilibrium action of agent 14. As a result, ζ̃U = 0 by the
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equilibrium action of agent 10, and hence ζU = 0 by the equilibrium action of
agent 11. Further, we have η = 0 by the equilibrium action of agent 13 (note
that δ̃UU + sUδ
H
U ≥ δ̃UU > 0), which yields a contradiction.










We first show ζH ≤ sHδHH by the way of contradiction. Suppose ζH > sHδHH .
Then, agent 12’s equilibrium action is pH = M1 → +∞. Then, we have
pH−p0
qH−q0
→ +∞ and pH−pU
qH−qU
→ +∞. By the equilibrium action of agent 9, we
have ζH = 0, which yields a contradiction. Then, we show ζH ≥ sHδHH by
the way of contradiction. Suppose ζH < sHδ
H






, which then results in V HH <
w0
1−β . By the equilibrium
action of agent 5, we have sH = 0, which yields a contradiction.
In the third step, we show the equilibrium of the auxiliary game coincides
with the equilibrium we defined in Section 3.3. It is straightforward to verify that
(i) the free-entry condition holds because of (3.69). (ii) Providers’ lifetime earnings,
(3.5), (3.4), and (3.3), coincide with (3.66), (3.67), and (3.68), respectively. (iii)
Providers’; retention decisions, sU and sH, coincide with the equilibrium actions of
agents 4 and 5. (iv) The mass of providers, (3.6), coincide with (3.65). (v) Condition
ζU ≤ δUU + sUδHU and ζH ≤ sHδHH
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holds because of (3.72) and (3.73). (vi) Minimum payment constraints hold because
of the action spaces agents 12 and 14.
Next, we verify that ζU and ζH are equal to the mass of customers who choose
providers with label U and label H as their best choice. For the notation, we use ΘU
and ΘH denote the set of customers within [1, 2], whose best choice are providers
with label U and label U , respectively. We use µ(·) to denote the measure a given
customer set.
We first verify that ζH = µ(ΘH), where ζH is characterized by the equilibrium
action of agent 9. Notice that given θ ∈ ΘH, we have θqH − pH ≥ θq0 − p0 and

































Then, we verify ζU = µ(ΘU), where ζU is characterized by the equilibrium
action of agent 11. We verify the condition in the following 5 possible cases:
1. Suppose qU < q0 occurs in equilibrium. Notice that for any θ ∈ ΘU , we































− 1 = ζ̃U = ζU , where the last
equality holds because of (3.63) and the equilibrium action of agent 11.
2. Suppose qU > q0 occurs in equilibrium. Notice that for any θ ∈ ΘU , we have
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= ζ̃U = ζU ,
where the last equality holds because of (3.63) and the equilibrium action of
agent 11.
3. Suppose qU = q0 and pU < p0 occur in equilibrium. Notice that for any
θ ∈ ΘU , we have θqU − pU ≥ θq0 − p0 and θqU − pU ≥ θqH − pH, which results



















−1 = ζ̃H = ζU , where the last equality
holds because of (3.63) and the equilibrium action of agent 11.
4. Suppose qU = q0 and pU > p0 occur in equilibrium. Notice that for any θ ∈ ΘU ,
we have θqU − pU ≥ θq0 − p0 and θqU − pU ≥ θqH − pH. However, the first
inequality cannot hold for any θ. Therefore, ΘU = ∅, and µ(ΘU) = 0 = ζ̃U =
ζU , where the last equality holds because of (3.63) and the equilibrium action
of agent 11.
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5. Suppose qU = q0 and pU = p0 occur in equilibrium. Notice that for any
θ ∈ ΘU , we have θqU − pU ≥ θq0 − p0 and θqU − pU ≥ θqH − pH, which results
in θ ≤ pH−p0
qH−q0
. Besides, since providers U and customers’ outside option are
identical, customers are indifferent in choosing between them, and any
ΘU ⊆
(














− 1. On the other
hand, ζU ≤ 1 − ζH, since ζ̃U can take any value within [0, 1]. To estab-











− 1 = 1 − ζH. By the characterization of ζH from






















































in this case. Then, it is straight-




















Therefore, we show that given ζU , there exists ΘU such that µ(ΘU) = ζU .
In sum, we have established the existence of the equilibrium defined in Section
3.3. 
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3.8 Appendix: Proofs for Section 3.4
3.8.1 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
If p0
q0−γ < 1 +
1−β
1−β+βγ , then cases 1 and 2 of Proposition 3.6.2 occur. So, E3 or
E4 arises under the optimal full-information policy. Besides, by Section 3.6.4, there
are customers choosing the outside options in E3 and E4. 
3.8.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
We take two steps to show the proposition. In the first step, we show that the
optimal delay is λ? = q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) > 0 and the optimal commission is





1− q0 + 1−β1−β+βγ (1− γ)
)
under the given conditions. In the second step, we show that under the given
condition, δHH is higher under the optimal delay policy than that under the full-
information policy.
In the first step, we first show that E1 holds under λ? and τ ?. It is straight-
forward to verify that under λ? and τ ?, we have qU = q0 and pU = p0. By Lemma
3.6.3, it suffices to verify that at λ?, the customer at 1+δU prefers U -label providers
to the outside option and U -label providers are not financially constraint. That is,
pU ≤ p0 and (1 − τ)pU ≥ b0. Besides, we need that the free-entry condition (i.e.,
(3.9)) holds. For pU ≤ p0, it holds because pU = p0. Then, for (1− τ)pU ≥ b0, it is
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equivalent to show:




1− q0 + 1−β1−β+βγ (1− γ)
) .











1− q0 + 1−β1−β+βγ (1− γ)
) .
To show the above inequality hold under b0 < p0 − (q0 − γ) (Assumption 1), it
suffices to show that
w0 −
(











1− q0 + 1−β1−β+βγ (1− γ)
) .
Notice that the above inequality is equivalent to:
p0
q0 − γ









Since p0 > q0 − γ, to show the above inequality, it suffices to show the following
holds (we substitute p0 with q0 − γ):
p0
q0 − γ
≤ 1 + w0
q0 − γ + βγ1−β+βγ (1− η)
(
1− q0 + 1−β1−β+βγ (1− γ)
) ,
which satisfies Assumption 2. Lastly, for the free-entry condition to hold, it is











(1− τ)pH − w0
)
= w0 − (1− τ)pU ,
where
(1− τ)pH = w0 + (1− τ)
( 1− β
1− β + βγ
+
βγ









(1− τ)pU = w0 − (1− τ)
βγ


















1− β + βγ
+
βγ


























1− β + βγ
+
βγ





1− β + βγ
.
Next, we show that the equilibrium under λ? and τ ? is the same as the equi-
librium under the optimal information-commission policy with differentiated com-
missions. In particular, by Proposition 3.6.4 and Lemma 3.6.9, we notice that when
η < 1/2 the optimal information-commission policy with differentiated commissions
has delay q0−γ
βγ(1−q0) , which is the same as λ
?. By Lemma 3.6.6, it is straightforward
to verify that under the optimal information-commission policy with differentiated
commissions, the λ, η, δUU , pU , and pH are the same as those under λ
? and τ ?. There-
fore, they have the same revenue by (3.43). In other words, λ? and τ ? is the optimal
information-commission policy with single commission.
In the second step, we show that under λ? and τ ?, the δHH is higher than that
under the full-information policy. In particular, under λ? and τ ?, the quantity of
providers with label H is δH?H = (1− η)
βγ
1−β+βγ . On the other hand, under the full-







(under E3 or E4). To show δH?H > δ
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(Assumption 2). Besides, the second inequality holds as pU ≥ 0.
Therefore, we have shown that λ∗ > 0 under the given conditions. Besides,
under the optimal information-commission policy with single commission, more
providers with label H are hired compared with the full-information policy. 
3.8.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
First, we let θ = 1+ 1−β
1−β+βγ ∈ (1, 2). Then, Assumption 3 is equivalent to p0 >
2(1−β)+βγ
1−β+βγ (q0 − γ). Therefore, to characterize τ
∗(0) and determine the equilibrium
type, we only need to consider cases 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Proposition 3.6.2. Second,
under condition b0/w0 < ρ, for some ρ ∈ (0, 1), we only need to focus on cases 3
and 6 in Proposition 3.6.2, as other cases do not hold when b0 is sufficiently small.
Lastly, we show that under η < 1/2, (3.36) holds. In particular, the right-handed







is negative under η < 1/2
and γ < 1−β
β
. Then, by p0 > w0, we show (3.36) holds. Therefore, by Proposition
3.6.2, an E1 occurs under τ ∗(0). By the definition of E1 (Definition 3.6.1), the
platform serve all customers.
3.8.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4.4
The proposition holds because of Proposition 3.4.3 and Lemma 3.6.5.
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3.8.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4.5
The proposition holds because of Proposition 3.6.3. 
3.8.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4.6
The proposition holds because of Corollary 3.6.1. 
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Chapter 4: Demand Shocks and Supply Adjustment Friction in Two-
sided Marketplaces
Abstract. We explore the effect of sellers’ supply adjustment friction on two-sided
marketplaces’ reactions to unexpected demand shocks using an empirically-validated
analytical model. In the model, sellers, which are heterogeneous in terms of their
quality, engage in a quantity competition under a given demand. When the demand
structure changes, sellers strategically adjust their supply to maximize their profit,
incurring a cost for deviating from the original supply level. We find that sellers’
strategic responses can either benefit or hurt the marketplace, and adjustment fric-
tion is an effective factor in influencing sellers’ strategic decisions. By varying the
adjustment friction, the marketplace can amplify positive effects under favorable
demand shocks and reduce negative effect from unfavorable ones. In particular, a
marketplace that maximizes the total revenue (social welfare) benefits from increas-
ing (decreasing) the friction if the demand expands or the quality sensitivity level
increases, and it benefits from decreasing (increasing) the friction if the demand
shrinks or the quality sensitivity level decreases. We further validate our model em-
pirically by testing its predictions regarding demand impacts on sellers based on data
collected from a low-friction marketplace and empirical findings in a high-friction
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marketplace documented in the literature.
Keywords: Two-sided marketplaces, matching supply and demand, quantity com-
petition, difference-in-differences.
4.1 Introduction
The prosperity of online two-sided marketplaces, such as eBay, Airbnb, and
Upwork, has highlighted the online platform as a successful business model, which
promptly matches supply with demand at a broad scale and can grow virally. Some
of them have become the most prominent players in many traditional markets,
including retailing, and short-term rentals, and labor markets, once dominated by
offline companies. Nevertheless, the operations of online marketplaces encounter
new challenges that are little concerned by the traditional business models, such as
retailing and manufacturing.
One primary challenge is rooted in the decentralized nature of online mar-
ketplaces. Marketplaces’ value creation solely depends on matching supply and
demand; however, marketplaces control neither of the components. On the demand
side, buyers or consumers decide whether or not to join a given marketplace and
which sellers to transact with. On the supply side, sellers or service providers decide
how many products or services to list on the marketplace. Moreover, the transaction
prices of many marketplaces (e.g., eBay and Airbnb) result from buyers’ and sellers’
decisions, and marketplaces lack direct levers to manipulate them.
Many marketplaces feature heterogeneity on both sides of the market. On the
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one hand, sellers differ not only horizontally by what products or services they offer
but also vertically by the quality of their offerings. On the other hand, buyers make
trade-offs between quality and price, and they differ in terms of their valuation for
quality. Intuitively, between a set of products, buyers are willing to pay more for
high-quality products compared with low-quality ones. We henceforth use quality
sensitivity to characterize the trade-offs that buyers make between quality and price.
In a proprietary data set collected from an online B2B marketplace, we further
observe that buyers exhibit significantly different quantity sensitivities.
Moreover, among marketplaces specializing in different product types (e.g.,
merchandise, rental properties, and services), their sellers experience different levels
of friction when they adjust their supply. On eBay, sellers are relatively flexible in
adjusting their listed quantities. Relying on multiple sourcing channels, eBay sellers
can quickly scale up or shrink their listings. By contrast, it is difficult for Airbnb
hosts to modify the number of their listed properties. We show that the adjustment
friction is a catalyst to market expansion in some cases, yet, an obstacle in others.
Like any business, marketplaces operate in a dynamic environment, which
consists of unexpected demand shocks. Some demand shocks seem beneficial to
marketplaces. For example, when brand or bulk sellers enter a marketplace, they
bring their own buyers, who may later transact with other sellers in the market.
Some demand shocks seem detrimental—for example, demand shrinks after the en-
try of competing marketplaces, natural disasters, or economic contraction. However,
sellers’ strategic reactions to demand shocks increase the uncertainties of the actual
impacts on the marketplace. Therefore, it remains a challenge for marketplaces’
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managers to identify the impacts of unanticipated demand changes, and more im-
portantly, magnify gains under favorable shocks and reduce loss under unfavorable
ones.
Our first goal is to characterize how demand changes in size and quality sensi-
tivity affect a marketplace’s total revenue and social welfare. The second goal is to
compare these effects between marketplaces with different adjustment friction. To
achieve these goals, we develop an analytical model which specifies sellers’ supply
decision under adjustment friction and buyers choices. Moreover, it considers het-
erogeneity on both sides of the market and parameterizes demand’s size and quality
sensitivity. To validate the model, we derive a series of hypotheses based on the
model and test them employing a proprietary data set collected from an online B2B
liquidation marketplace.
First, we show that when the demand’s sensitivity level increases, the market-
place’s total revenue, and social welfare can improve even though the overall demand
size shrinks. In other words, a demand contraction is not necessarily an unfavorable
situation depending on the change of its sensitivity distribution. Second, we show
that under the same demand shock, marketplaces with different adjustment fric-
tion are affected differently. After a favorable (unfavorable) demand change, such
as demand expands (shrinks) and demand’s sensitivity level increases (decreases),
the total revenue increase (decrease) more when a marketplace has higher adjust-
ment friction, while social welfare increase (decrease) more when a marketplace
has less adjustment friction. Based on these observations, a revenue-maximization
marketplace should increase (decrease) sellers’ adjustment friction when the demand
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becomes favorable (unfavorable). A social-welfare-maximization marketplace should
decrease (increase) sellers’ adjustment friction when the demand becomes favorable
(unfavorable).
4.1.1 Related literature
Our paper connects to the literature that examines market design levers under
various demand structures. In a ride-sharing platform, [51] examine the effectiveness
of spatial pricing under various demand networks. They show that the platform
achieves the maximum profit when the demand pattern is “balanced”. In the same
platform, [52] characterize the optimal pricing under a demand shock.
Then, our paper is akin to the literature that investigates how demand-side
friction impact buyers’ behavior and the marketplace’s performance. Using a data
set collected from a holiday property-rental platform, [53] characterize the negative
impact of customer’s search friction, and how the friction is affected by the market
thickness. In an online B2B marketplace, [54] design the listing policy with the
consideration of buyers’ participation cost. This work is one of the few papers
investigating the impact of supply-side friction.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
We employ a two-period quantity competition in a vertically differentiated
duopoly to analyze how sellers of a marketplace react to unanticipated demand
changes. The demand varies across the two periods. The model characterizes sellers’
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adjustment friction, which sellers incur when deviating their supply in period 2 (after
the demand change) from the supply level in period 1 (before the demand change). It
also specifies demand changes in both size and sensitivity to seller quality. Using the
model, we characterize demand effects on the total revenue and the social welfare
of a marketplace. Furthermore, we establish that these effects vary substantially
across marketplaces with different friction levels. In this section, we describe the
model setup and the equilibrium concept.
4.2.1 Model setup
We assume there are two periods, denoted by t ∈ {1, 2}, and there are two
sellers, denoted by seller L and seller H, in a marketplace. Sellers list the same
generic product but differ regarding their quality. Seller H has a high-quality, θH ,
given that its product descriptions are accurate and credible. In comparison, seller
L has a low-quality, θL, given that its product descriptions are ambiguous (i.e.,
0 < θL < θH). We then assume that both sellers have the same marginal cost, and
we normalize it to zero.
At a given period, seller i’s profit, where i ∈ {L,H}, is characterized as follows:
Vi,t =

pi,1Qi,1, if t = 1
pi,2Qi,2 − c(Qi,2 −Qi,1)2, if t = 2
(4.1)
where Qi,t denotes its listed quantity, and pi,t denotes the price of its product.
Notice that at t = 1, sellers are not forward-looking as they do not expect the
demand change in the next period. After the unanticipated demand change at
t = 2, seller i adjusts its listed quantity Qi,2 to maximize its profit. At this period,
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term c(Qi−Qi,0)2 denotes the cost incurred by making the supply adjustment, where
Qi,1 is the supply level at period 1.
At period t, the demand consists of a continuum of buyers with mass µt > 0
who are heterogeneous regarding their quality sensitivities. We let x denote a buyer’s
quality sensitivity, and x is drawn from a cumulative distribution function (CDF),
denoted by Ft(x), with support on [0, 1]. Each buyer’s demand is infinitesimally
small and hence denoted by dx. Their utility derived from transacting with a seller
with quality θ or taking the outside option is:
Ut(x, i) =

xθi − pi,t, if i ∈ {L,H}, i.e., choosing seller with quality θi,
0, if i = 0, i.e., choosing the outside option.
(4.2)
If the buyer transacts with a seller, xθi is the buyer’s willingness-to-pay, and pi,t is
the transaction price.
Both the size and sensitivity of the demand may change. First, we change µ
to capture the change of demand size after the site launch. If the marketplace’s
demand expands (shrinks), we assume that µ increases (decreases) in period 2.
Second, we alter F to capture the changes in demand sensitivity. If the demand
sensitivity increases (decreases), we make F skew to the left (right) in period 2.
To obtain crystal implications of demand sensitivity effects, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 4 The sensitivity distribution F changes within the following class of
distributions:
F = {Fα(§)|CDF satisfies: Fα(§) = §α,where § ∈ [′,∞] and α > ′},
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Figure 4.1: Probability density functions of three examples in F .




















α = 0. 5
α = 1
α = 3
where we call α the sensitivity parameter.
We make this assumption for two reasons: (1) The class includes a broad spectrum
of distributions on [0, 1]. Its elements cover both left-skewed (i.e., α > 1) and right-
skewed (i.e., α < 1) distributions (as demonstrated in Figure 4.1). In addition,
the uniform [0, 1], which is commonly assumed in the literature on competition
with vertical differentiation, is in the class (i.e., α = 1). (2) All distributions in F
are ranked based on their sensitivity. In particular, if Fα1 , Fα2 ∈ F and α1 < α2,
then Fα2 first-order stochastically dominates Fα1 , indicating that given x0 ≥ 0, the
percentage of buyers with sensitivity x > x0 in Fα2 is higher than that of buyers
with x > x0 in Fα1 . That is, the sensitivity parameter α fully characterizes the rank
of the distributions in F .
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4.2.2 Equilibrium
For the notation associated with seller i ∈ {L,H} at period t ∈ {1, 2}, we let
Qi,t denote its quantity, pi,t denote the price of its products, and Di,t denote the
mass of customers, who transact with it. Using the notation, we formally introduce
the notion of equilibrium:
Definition 4.2.1 An equilibrium under a demand change from {µ1, α1} to {µ2, α2}
consists of {Qi,t, pi,t, Di,t}, where i ∈ {L,H} and t ∈ {1, 2}, such that at given period
t:
- Sellers set their quantity Qi,t to maximize their Vi,t.
- Customer x makes choice to maximize their Ut(x, i).
- The demand and supply match (i.e., DL,t = QL,t and DH,t = QH,t).
First of all, the above defined equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4.2.1 An equilibrium exists under any {µ1, α1}, {µ2, α2}, and c.
Then, we characterize the equilibrium prices as follows:






















where t ∈ {1, 2}.
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Besides, we characterize buyers’ equilibrium choice as follows:
Lemma 4.2.2 In equilibrium, buyers with quality sensitivity x ∈ [1−QH,t, 1] trans-
act with the high-quality seller, buyers with quality sensitivity x ∈ [1−QL,t−QH,t, 1−
QH,t) transact with the low-quality seller, and the remaining buyers choose the out-
side option.
Lastly, in two stylized cases, where c = 0 and c = +∞, we provide the closed-
form characterizations of sellers’ quantity under any demand structure.
Lemma 4.2.3 Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Then, the equilibrium quantities at
t = 1 are:
QL,1 = QL(µ1, α1) and QH,1 = QH(µ1, α1),
where QL(µ, α) =
αµ
1+α+α2A(α)
, QH(µ, α) =
α2A(α)µ
1+α+α2A(α)


























For equilibrium quantities at t = 2,
- If c = 0, then QL,2 = QL(µ2, α2) and QH,2 = QH(µ2, α2).
- If c = +∞, then QL,2 = QL,1 and QH,2 = QH,1.
4.3 Impacts of demand and adjustment friction
For the growth of many online marketplaces, they focus on maximizing either
the total revenue or social welfare. In this section, we first characterize various
demand impacts on the total revenue and the social welfare of a given marketplace.
We show that the marketplace can benefit from an increase in its demand sensitivity
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even though its demand size shrinks simultaneously. Moreover, we compare these
demand impacts across different adjustment friction. To our surprise, marketplaces
with high adjustment friction benefit from some demand changes more than those
with low friction.
Our analyses focus on two stylized types of marketplaces depending on how
difficult a seller can adjust its supply level instantly in response to unexpected de-
mand variation. The first type features zero adjustment friction (i.e., c = 0), where
sellers can immediately adjust their quantity after a demand change. Merchandise
marketplaces, such as eBay and Amazon, normally belong to this type, where sellers
vary their number of listings to react to demand dynamics. The second type fea-
tures infinite friction (i.e., c = +∞), where it is hugely costly for sellers to change
their supply within a short period. Service platforms, such as Upwork and TaskRab-
bit, fall into this category, where the number of tasks listed per user is inelastic to
demand dynamics Cu20.
Under Assumption 4, the total revenue, denoted by π, and the social welfare,
denoted by σ, at period t can be expressed as:


































Besides, Lemma 4.2.3 further specifies the equilibrium quantities of sellers at period
2 for both friction types. In Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, we analyze the total revenue
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and the social welfare, separately.
4.3.1 Total revenue
In this section, we focus on the effects of demand changes on the total revenue
of a given marketplace, which is characterized by Expression (4.3).
First, Proposition 4.3.1 provides a sufficient and necessary condition regarding
αt and µt such that a frictionless marketplace’s total revenue increases after the
demand change.
Proposition 4.3.1 Suppose Assumption 4 holds and c = 0. Then, the total revenue
increases after the demand change if and only if µ2/µ1 > π̃(α1)/π̃(α2), where









Besides, π̃(α) is increasing in α.
Proposition 4.3.1 implies that the total revenue is increasing in the sensitivity of
the demand. In particular, if the demand sensitivity increases (reduces), the total
revenue may increase (decrease), although the demand size shrinks (expands).
Second, we compare the revenue effect of demand changes between market-
places with different adjustment friction. Notice that if the demand size or sensitivity
changes slightly (i.e., µ2 = µ1 + ε or α2 = α1 + ε, where ε is a infinitesimal amount),










































captures the normalized total revenue effects of demand
changes, and they vary across marketplaces with different adjustment friction. In
particular, we compare the demand effects between a marketplace with zero adjust-
ment friction (i.e., c = 0) and a marketplace with infinite friction (i.e., c =∞). For












denote the demand effects in the friction-










c=∞ denote the demand effects in the
infinite-friction marketplace. Then, we have the following observations regarding
the comparison between the two types:





















When the demand enlarges or becomes more sensitive, Proposition 4.3.2 im-
plies that the total revenue increases in both infinite-friction and frictionless cases.
Moreover, it suggests that the revenue increase in the infinite-friction case is higher
than that of the frictionless case. In other words, it would benefit the total revenue
if the platform can deter sellers’ strategic reactions to the demand change and make
their supply remain stable.
When the demand contracts or becomes less sensitive, Proposition 4.3.2 implies
that the total revenue decreases in both cases. Moreover, it suggests that the revenue
decrease in the infinite-friction case is higher than that of the frictionless case. In
other words, it would benefit the total revenue if the platform can encourage sellers’
strategic reactions to the demand change and let them adjust their supply promptly.
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4.3.2 Social welfare
In this section, we focus on the effects of demand changes on the social welfare
of a given online marketplace, which is characterized by Expression (4.4).
Proposition 4.3.3 provides a sufficient and necessary condition regarding αt and
µt such that a frictionless marketplace’s social welfare increases after the demand
change.
Proposition 4.3.3 Suppose Assumption 4 holds and c = 0. Then, the social wel-
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Besides, σ̃(α) is increasing in α.
Proposition 4.3.3 implies that social welfare is increasing in the sensitivity of the
demand. In particular, if the demand sensitivity increases (reduces), social welfare
may increase (decrease), although the demand size shrinks (expands).
Second, we compare the social welfare effect of demand changes between mar-
ketplaces with different adjustment friction. Notice that if the demand size or sen-
sitivity changes slightly (i.e., µ2 = µ1 + ε or α2 = α1 + ε, where ε is a infinitesimal









































captures the normalized social welfare effects of demand
changes, and they vary across marketplaces with different adjustment friction. Sim-
ilar to the total revenue analysis, we compare the demand effects on social welfare
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between a marketplace with zero adjustment friction (i.e., c = 0) and a marketplace





















c=∞ denote the demand effects in the infinite-friction marketplace. Then, we
have the following observations regarding the comparison between the two types:





















When the demand enlarges or becomes more sensitive, Proposition 4.3.4 im-
plies that social welfare increases in both infinite-friction and frictionless cases.
Moreover, it suggests that the increase in the frictionless case is higher than that
of the infinite-friction case. In other words, it would benefit social welfare if the
platform can encourage sellers’ strategic reactions to the demand change and let
them adjust their supply promptly.
When the demand contracts or becomes less sensitive, Proposition 4.3.4 im-
plies that the total revenue decreases in both infinite-friction and frictionless cases.
Moreover, it suggests that the decrease in the frictionless case is higher than that
of the infinite-friction case. In other words, it would benefit social welfare if the
platform can deter sellers’ strategic reactions to the demand change and stabilize
their supply.
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4.4 Model validation by hypothesis testing
Using a proprietary data set collected from an online marketplace, where sellers
have considerable flexibility to adjust their supply, we conduct a series of hypoth-
esis testing to validate our theoretical model. The data set records two types of
demand changes in the marketplace, and we observe that sellers adjust their supply
instantly in response. In particular, we validate our model by testing two groups of
hypotheses.
The first set of hypotheses are associated with marketplaces with significant
adjustment friction. In this case, we develop hypotheses regarding sellers’ average
listed quantities and their changing rates of revenue after demand shifts. By empir-
ically rejecting these hypotheses, we verify the alternative case characterized by the
model, which corresponds to marketplaces with small friction.
The second set of hypotheses are associated with marketplaces with small
adjustment friction. In this case, we develop hypotheses regarding sellers’ average
listed quantities, their changing rates of quantity and revenue after demand shifts.
By confirming these hypotheses using consistent empirical observations, we defend
the validity of the model specification.
4.4.1 Hypotheses of marketplaces with large friction
Lemma 4.2.3 states that sellers do not change their quantity to react to any
demand changes when the adjustment friction is infinite. Based on the observation,
we derive the following hypothesis regarding sellers’ responses in marketplaces with
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large adjustment friction: In a marketplace with large adjustment friction, sellers
do not significantly change their listed quantities under any demand change.
Next, we derive hypotheses regarding how sellers’ revenues are affected under
the large adjustment friction. We let ri(µ1, µ2, α1, α2, c) =
pi,2Qi,2
pi,1Qi,1
, where i ∈ {L,H},
denote the revenue changing rate of seller i after the demand change. Notice that ri
depends on not only the demand structures in both periods but also the adjustment
friction c. Then, we have the following observations regarding ri in a marketplace
with infinite friction.
Corollary 4.4.1 Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Then,
- If α2 > α1 and µ2 > µ1, then rH < rL.
- If α2 < α1 and µ2 < µ1, then rH > rL.
Corollary 4.4.1 indicates that when it is difficult for sellers to adjust their quantity
to react to sudden demand changes, the revenue changing rate of seller H is lower
(higher) than that of seller L, when the demand expands (shrinks), and its sensitivity
increases more (less).
Moreover, the patterns revealed by Corollary 4.4.1 hold for sufficiently large
but finite c. In Figure 4.2, we numerically compute rH − rL as we increase c under
different demand changes. As evident in the figure, when c is large, it follows that
rH < rL when the demand expands and becomes more sensitive (i.e., the green
and blue curve) and rH > rL when the demand shrinks and becomes less sensitive.
Therefore, by Corollary 4.4.1 and Figure 4.2, we derive Hypothesis 4.4.1.
In a marketplace with large adjustment friction:
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Figure 4.2: Difference between rH and rL under different demand changes from
µ1 = α1 = 1


















µ2 = α2 = 0.90
µ2 = α2 = 0.99
µ2 = α2 = 1.01
µ2 = α2 = 1.10
A. If its demand expands and becomes more sensitive, then the revenue changing
rate of high-quality sellers will be lower than that of their low-quality peers.
That is, rH < rL.
B. If its demand shrinks and becomes less sensitive, then the revenue changing
rate of high-quality sellers will be higher than that of their low-quality peers.
That is, rH > rL.
In Section 4.5, we describe the empirical setting and the data collected from a
low-friction marketplace, which we employ to test and reject Hypotheses 4.4.1 and
4.4.1.
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4.4.2 Hypotheses of marketplaces with small friction
Lemma 4.2.3 characterizes sellers’ quantity reactions to demand changes when
the adjustment friction is zero. Then, we observe the following regarding sellers’
average quantity:
Corollary 4.4.2 Suppose Assumption 4 holds and c = 0. Then,














Corollary 4.4.2 implies that when sellers can flexibly adjust their quantity, their
average quantity is increasing in the demand size and sensitivity. Moreover, we
numerically compute the differences of the average quantity between periods as
we increase c and display them in the left plot of Figure 4.3. Notice that the
pattern revealed by Corollary 4.4.2 also holds for c > 0. Moreover, the difference
of average quantity shrinks as we increase c. It implies that in marketplaces with
small adjustment friction, we expect significant changes in the average quantity after
demand changes. By Corollary 4.4.2 and Figure 4.3, we derive Hypothesis 4.4.2.
In a marketplace with small adjustment friction:
A. If its demand expands and its sensitivity level increases, then the average listed
quantity per seller increases significantly.
B. If its demand shrinks and its sensitivity level decreases, then the average listed
quantity per seller decreases significantly.
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Figure 4.3: Difference between the average quantities (left) and difference between
qH and qL (right) under different demand changes from µ1 = α1 = 1
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Next, we derive hypotheses regarding how the quantity of sellers with vari-
ous qualities are affected differently when the adjustment friction is small. We let
qi(µ1, µ2, α1, α2, c) =
Qi,2
Qi,1
, where i ∈ {L,H}, denote the quantity changing rate of
seller i after the demand change. Notice that qi depends on not only the demand
structures in both periods but also the adjustment friction c. Then, we have the
following observations regarding qi in a frictionless marketplace.
Corollary 4.4.3 Suppose Assumption 4 holds, and c = 0. Then,
- If α2 > α1, then qH > qL.
- If α2 < α1, then qH < qL.
Corollary 4.4.3 implies that in a marketplace with zero adjustment friction, the
quantity changing rate of the high-quality seller is higher than that of the low-
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quality seller when the demand becomes more sensitive. On the other hand, the
high-quality seller’s quantity changing rate lower than that of the low-quality seller
when the demand becomes less sensitive. Moreover, for positive c, we numerically
compute qH − qL under several demand changes in the right plot in Figure 4.3. The
plot shows that qH > qL when the demand’s sensitivity increases and qH < qL when
the demand’s sensitivity decreases, and the patterns are consistent with Corollary
4.4.3. By Corollary 4.4.3 and Figure 4.3, we derive Hypothesis 4.4.2.
In a marketplace with small adjustment friction:
A. If the sensitivity level of its demand increases, then the quantity changing rate
of high-quality sellers will be higher than that of their low-quality peers. That
is, qH > qL.
B. If the sensitivity level of its demand decreases, then the quantity changing rate
of high-quality sellers will be lower than that of their low-quality peers. That
is, qH < qL.
Lastly, we derive hypotheses regarding how sellers’ revenues are affected when
the adjustment friction is small. We first observe the following in a frictionless
marketplace:
Corollary 4.4.4 Suppose Assumption 4 holds, ratio θH/θL is sufficiently large, and
c = 0. Then,
- If α2 > α1, then rH > rL.
- If α2 < α1, then rH < rL.
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Corollary 4.4.4 implies that when sellers can freely adjust their quantity to react to
demand changes, the revenue changing rate of seller H is higher (lower) than that
of seller L, when the demand’s sensitivity level increases (decreases).
Moreover, the patterns revealed by Corollary 4.4.4 hold for sufficiently small
but positive c. As evident in Figure 4.2, when c is small, it follows that rH > rL when
the demand becomes more sensitive (i.e., the green and blue curves) and rH < rL
when the demand becomes less sensitive (i.e., the black and red curves). Therefore,
by Corollary 4.4.4 and Figure 4.2, we derive Hypothesis 4.4.2.
In a marketplace with small adjustment friction:
A. If the sensitivity level of its demand increases, then the revenue changing rate
of high-quality unbranded sellers will be higher than that of their low-quality
peers. That is, rH > rL.
B. If the sensitivity level of its demand decreases, then the revenue changing rate
of high-quality unbranded sellers will be lower than that of their low-quality
peers. That is, rH < rL.
In Section 4.5, we describe the empirical setting and the data collected from
a low-friction marketplace, which we employ to test and verify Hypotheses 4.4.2,
4.4.2, and 4.4.2.
4.5 Data and empirical setting
To test the hypotheses developed in Section 4.4, we collect proprietary data
from a leading B2B liquidation platform that hosts multiple online auction market-
242
places for retailers to liquidate their big-box salvaging inventory through ascending
English auctions.
The platform owns a two-sided marketplace, where all small and midsize re-
tailers list and sell their salvaging inventory. It is open to all buyers and sellers to
participate, so we refer it as a public marketplace. The public marketplace will be
the subject of our empirical analysis, and we will describe it further in Section 4.5.1.
Besides, the platform helps branded retailers, such as Walmart, Costco, and
Home Depot, launch their own marketplaces for liquidation, which we refer to as
private sites. A private site is one-sided, where only one branded retailer can list and
sell its merchandise. The platform names each private site after the retailer’s brand.
After branded retailers launch their private sites, they direct their inventory and
buyers to the platform’s ecosystem. We exploit the launches of two private sites as
exogenous shocks to the public marketplace, which we will specify in Section 4.5.2.
Lastly, we outline the procedures for hypothesis testing. First, we identify the
demand impacts on the public marketplace resulted from each launch, and the cor-
responding methods are specified in Section 4.5.3. Second, we test all hypotheses by
identifying sellers’ reactions and how their revenues are affected under the identified
demand impacts. We describe the methods employed in this step in Section 4.5.4.
4.5.1 Public marketplace
We describe the public marketplace by specifying its participants on the supply
and demand sides, as well as their characteristics.
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Sellers.
We refer to all the retailers in the public marketplace as sellers. Most sellers
liquidate a variety of product categories, such as consumer electronics, apparel, and
appliances. Sellers create auction listings for their inventory to transact with buyers.
A listing contains an auction of multiple products for sale, which typically belong to
the same category and have similar conditions. The listing reveals necessary product
information, including product names, quantities, and conditions. Listings serve as
the only intermediary, where sellers and buyers interact on the platform.
Since auctions determine the prices, the listed quantities become the essential
lever for sellers to react to market dynamics. We observe that sellers vary their
number of monthly listings substantially in response to the launches of private sites
(specified in Section 4.5.2), which implies that sellers in this marketplace incur little
friction when adjusting their supply.
Sellers’ quality.
Since salvage inventory items come in a variety of different conditions, product
information disclosed within listings is instrumental to buyers’ evaluation of these
products and the decision process. Depending on how accurately each seller de-
scribes their products, buyers may later find that the received merchandise is not
as it was described in the listing. Hence, buyers bear a risk while transacting with
sellers whose listing information has low quality. We then use sellers’ dispute rates,
added by the platform to each of their listings, to approximate the quality of their
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Figure 4.4: Unbranded sellers’ dispute rates (left) and buyers’ quality-price trade-





























10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
listings. If a buyer finds the purchased merchandise not as described, the buyer
can file a dispute with the seller. Therefore, sellers’ dispute rates capture buyers’
feedback on how accurately their listing information describes the products.1
Given the central role of listings in the communication between sellers and
buyers, buyers discern sellers by their listing qualities. We henceforth use seller
quality to refer to sellers’ qualities of listings and measure the quality of a given
seller by its dispute rate. In the left plot of Figure 4.4, we notice that sellers’
qualities vary widely in the public marketplace.
1In addition to dispute rates, the platform includes other metrics of sellers in their listings
such as tenure on the platform, cumulative transactions, and the number of purchases from repeat
buyers. Among these metrics, we believe that the dispute rate characterizes listing qualities most
accurately.
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Buyers and their quality sensitivity
The demand on the platform consists of business buyers, including downstream
resellers and refurbishers from across the globe (henceforth referred to as buyers).
All buyers are for-profit downstream businesses that would prefer to get desired
products at the lowest prices. Besides, buyers specialize in different product cate-
gories, and some product categories, such as consumer electronics and appliances,
have little overlap in terms of the buyers.
In the public marketplace, we observe that buyers make trade-offs between
seller quality and price. Among the same type of products, buyers are drawn to
listings from high-quality sellers and pay more for their products than those listed by
low-quality sellers. This pattern indicates that buyers’ willingness-to-pay depends
on the seller’s quality. We henceforth use quality sensitivity to characterize the
trade-offs that buyers make between seller quality and price. In the right plot of
Figure 4.4, we use salvage iPhone 6 transactions in 2016 as an example to illustrate
the quality-price trade-offs that buyers make. The correlation between the final
price per unit and the dispute rate is −0.21, which indicates that high (low) seller
quality is associated with a high (low) final price per unit.
4.5.2 Launches of private sites
We can view the launches of private sites as exogenous shocks to the public
marketplace. Their launching decisions and dates depend on a confidential negoti-
ation process between the branded retailer and the platform, which relates little to
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the public marketplace. This process may last from weeks to months. Meanwhile,
unbranded sellers and all buyers have no clue whether or when a new marketplace
will appear.
We build our analysis on two launches of private sites specializing in consumer
electronics (henceforth referred to as CE ).2 The first launch involves two branded
CE retailers who launched their sites on the platform in January and March of
2013, respectively. Since these two launching dates are so close, we consider them
as one launch. Both of the private sites have low dispute rates (zero) than the public
marketplace, whose dispute rate is 13.3%. Then, we infer that the listing quality
in these private sites is higher than the public marketplace. The second launch
involves another branded CE retailer who launched its private site in July of 2015.
It has particularly a very high dispute rate of 44.4%, which indicates that its listing
quality is low.
We exploit the demand shocks resulting from these two launches to test the
hypotheses developed in Section 4.4. Both private sites specialize in CE, so their
launches primarily affect the public marketplace’s supply and demand of the same
category. It is worthwhile to mention that once a branded retailer launches its
private site, it starts attracting its buyer base to the platform. Since buyers can
cross bid in any private sites and the public marketplace, the entry of a private site
impacts the public marketplace by either bolstering or weakening its demand, which
2Some private sites liquidate merchandise from multiple product categories (e.g., Walmart lists
auctions of furniture and apparel), while others specialize in one category (e.g., Macy’s only liqui-
dates apparel).
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subsequently affects its sellers’ behavior.
To participate in the public marketplace or a private site, buyers need to reg-
ister an account with that marketplace. Using buyers’ first registered marketplaces,
we can distinguish buyers based on which marketplace brings them to the plat-
form. In this way, we identify the following two groups of buyers for both launches,
respectively:
- Original Buyer: a buyer whose first registration is with the public marketplace.
- New Buyer: a buyer whose first registration is with the newly-launched private
site.
4.5.3 Identification of private sites’ demand impacts
Before testing the hypotheses, which involves sellers’ reactions under a given
demand shock, we first identify how these two launches affect the public market-
place’s demand. Specifically, we characterize the two launches’ impacts on the de-
mand size (i.e., µ) and sensitivity to quality (i.e., F ) of the public marketplace.
For the effects on µ, we compare the buyer inflow from the newly-launched
private site to the public marketplace with the buyer outflow that moves in the re-
verse direction. In particular, we contrast the New Buyers from the newly-launched
private site who transact in the public marketplace (i.e., inflow) with the Original
Buyers who transact in the newly-launched private site (i.e., outflow). Then, µ ex-
pands (shrinks) if the inflow is more (less) massive than the outflow. We show the
results of the t-test comparison in Section 4.6.
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For the effects on F , we compare the quality sensitivity between the associated
New Buyers, who cross bid in the public marketplace, and the Original Buyers. If
the cross-bidding New Buyers are more (less) sensitive to the sellers’ quality than
are the Original Buyers, then F becomes more (less) sensitive. Moreover, Lemma
4.2.2 and Expression (4.2) imply that buyers with various quality sensitivities tend
to choose sellers with different qualities and have different willingness-to-pay, for a
given product (i.e., xθ). Therefore, we estimate two regression models regarding
buyers’ choice of sellers and their willingness-to-pay, respectively.
In addition to sellers’ quality, buyers’ choice between sellers and their willingness-
to-pay for auctions depends on product-related characteristics. For example, some
buyers are only interested in purchasing iPhones. These buyers will not participate
in auctions of Samsung Galaxy phones regardless of the seller’s quality of listings.
To tease out quality effects from product-related influences, we focus on buyers’
choice among sellers who list very similar products and buyers’ bids in response to
these listings. After the first launch, we select iPhone 5/5c/5s because they are
homogeneous, as well as one of the most frequently listed products. Likewise, we
consider iPhone 6/6s after the second launch.
In what follows, we define the variables for each regression. Then, the results
of the regression analyses are detailed in Section 4.6.
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Choice between sellers.
For the dependent variable, we consider buyers’ choice between sellers through-
out their lifetime in the public marketplace. The dependent variable of buyer j
choosing unbranded seller i is denoted by Cij.
Notice that product-related characteristics are controlled via the sample selec-
tion. As a result, a buyer’s decision about whether or not to choose a seller depends
primarily on the seller’s characteristics, including their number of completed trans-
actions (NumCompi), number of repeat buyers (NumRepi), and listing quality,
denoted by a dummy variable Qlti:
Qlti =

1, if seller i’s dispute rate is lower than the average.
0, otherwise.
Additionally, we include buyer fixed effects, denoted by νj, to control for buyer’s
idiosyncratic preferences, and a dummy variable, IsNBj, to indicate whether the
buyer is a New Buyer (IsNBj = 1) or an Original Buyer (IsNBj = 0).
3 The
corresponding regression is specified by Expression (4.7).
Willingness-to-pay.
For the dependent variable, we use buyers’ bids in a given auction, which is
normalized by its retail value. The reason is bidders’ willingness-to-pay is unob-
3Since high-quality sellers and low-quality unbranded sellers have listings of the selected prod-
ucts simultaneously during more than 83% of the observational weeks, buyers’ choice is unlikely
to be affected by sellers’ availability. Thus, we choose not to include availability-related variables.
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served, and their bids serve a valid proxy.4 Then, we let Bij denote the dependent
variable, where i stands for the auction and j stands for the buyer.
Though the major iPhone features are fixed (i.e., iPhone 5 series or iPhone 6
series), a buyer’s willingness-to-pay is still subject to other product specifications
(e.g., carrier), auction lot size, and the number of concurrent auctions with the same
product. Therefore, we explicitly control for specific product features, including
model (Modi), carrier (Cari), condition (Condi), per-unit retail price (UnitRPi),
auction lot size (Loti), and the number of concurrent cell phone auctions in the public
marketplace (NumAucti). Moreover, unbranded sellers’ characteristics, especially
their quality of listings, will also impact buyers’ bidding decisions. Hence, we include
NumCompi, NumRepi, and Qlti (defined in the Choice between sellers section) as
controls. As in the previous analysis, we use IsNBj to indicate whether or not
buyer j is a New Buyer. Lastly, we add seller fixed effects, buyer fixed effects, and
weekly fixed effects, denoted by ηi, νj, and µi, respectively, to account for unobserved
patterns. The corresponding regression is specified by Expression (4.8).
4.5.4 Identification of private sites’ supply impacts
After identifying each launch’s impacts on demand size and sensitivity, we
test hypotheses by estimating how sellers in the public marketplace react to these
demand changes using their quantities and how their revenues are affected. In
particular, we apply a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to identify these
impacts. We select the monthly CE listings per seller as the treatment group, as
4If a buyer places multiple bids in an auction, then we select the last bid.
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the demand for this category is most affected. Then, we focus on how sellers adjust
their monthly CE listings in response to each launch.
Notice that sellers adjust their monthly listings to react to other unobserved
platform-level shocks, such as website upgrades and marketing campaigns, in ad-
dition to the launches of private sites. To control for these unobserved shocks, we
construct a control group corresponding to each launch by selecting monthly list-
ings of other product categories in the public marketplace, whose demand is little
affected by the New Buyers from the private site. In particular, we select the con-
trol category that has the least demand overlap with CE. For the first launch, we
choose jewelry and toys as the control category, since the New Buyers participate in
only 3% of its listings. For the second launch, we choose appliances as the control
category, since the New Buyers bid in only 0.1% of them. As a result, these control
groups should barely react to the launches of CE private sites; meanwhile they are
subject to platform-level changes that apply to all listings in the public marketplace.
Moreover, we select the pre-launch and post-launch periods such that there
are no launches of private sites specializing in the control categories. To further
control for seasonality patterns that apply to CE listings (e.g., the release of newer
generation products), we select the pre- and post-launch periods such that they cover
the same months of a year. For the first site launch, the pre-launch period starts in
April 2012 and ends in November 2012, and the post-launch period begins in April
2013 and ends in November 2013.5 For the second site launch, the pre-launch period
5The pre-launch period begins in April 2012 to match the starting month of the post-launch
period. The post-launch period ended in November 2013, as another branded CE retailer launched
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is from January 2014 to May 2015, and the post-launch period is from January 2015
to May 2016.6
Next, we examine whether pre-trends are parallel in the treatment group and
control group concerning buyer registrations and sellers’ listings. Figure 4.5 shows
the trends of monthly registrants in the public marketplaces across categories. They
remain parallel during the pre-launch period in both natural experiments. Then, we
plot the trends of sellers’ monthly listings across categories in Figure 4.6, where we
notice that they are approximately parallel during the pre-launch period. Figures
4.5 and 4.6 imply that the supply and demand of consumer electronics, jewelry
and toys, and appliances have similar organic growth rates, and the parallel trend
assumption is likely to hold.
Lastly, we specify the variables in the DiD analysis. We denote the dependent
variables of interest by Yikt, where we use i to denote sellers, k to represent product
category, and t to signify month. When we estimate the effect on sellers’ monthly
listings and monthly transacted auctions, Yikt counts how many auctions are listed
and sold. When identifying the impact on sellers’ monthly revenues yielded from CE
listings, we discretize the outcome value by assigning rounded monthly revenues at
its private site the following month.
6The pre-launch period starts in January 2015, as a branded appliances retailer launched its
private site in December 2014. The post-launch period ends in May 2016 because a branded CE
retailer closed its private site the following month. We do not consider jewelry and toys as the
control category in the analysis because during the post-launch period there was a supply shock
of jewelry and toys listings in one of the private sites.
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Figure 4.5: Trends of monthly registrants in the public marketplace during the first


















































































Note. The two vertical dashed lines specify the periods before and after the launches of the private
site.



















































































Note. The two vertical dashed lines specify the periods before and after the launches of the private
site. The horizontal dashed lines specify the average monthly listings per seller per category.
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the level of a thousand dollars to Yikt.
7 Variable Trtk indicates whether or not the
observation is associated with CE (i.e., in the treatment group), and variable Postt is
the dummy variable indicating whether or not month t falls within the post-launch
period. Then, we let binary variable Qltit (defined in the Choice between sellers
section) denote the quality of seller i. We employ seller fixed effects, ηi, to control for
sellers’ unobserved time-invariant characteristics. We then consider monthly fixed
effects, µt, to control for the unobserved temporal trends of the public marketplace.
Lastly, we introduce the fixed effects of seller’s tenure (in months) on the platform,
τit, to control for any listing patterns associated with sellers’ learnings or previous
platform experiences. The corresponding regression is specified by Expressions (4.9)
and (4.10).
4.6 Demand impacts of private sites’ launches
In this section, we characterize the two launches’ impacts on the public mar-
ketplace’s demand. We show that the first launch expands the public marketplace’s
demand size and increases its sensitivity level. In contrast, the second launch im-
poses an opposite effect by shrinking the demand size, as well as decreasing its
7Given the underlying counting process (i.e., the number of listed auctions), the revenues yielded
by multiple auctions cannot be well-characterized by continuous distributions. About 52% of
observations have zero revenue due to either no listings or no sales. Additionally, in cases where
there is a sale, the revenues rarely take values near zero given the starting price (average of $374)
and high final price per auction (average of $946). Therefore, considering revenue levels as the
dependent variable, despite the loss of granularity, is sensible.
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Table 4.1: Average monthly listings purchased by Original Buyers and New Buyers
in public marketplace (denoted by Pub. Mkt.) and newly launched private sites
(denoted by NLPS).
Buyer type Pub. Mkt. NLPS Inflow - outflow
After the first launch
Original Buyer 531 115 (outflow)
24∗∗∗
New Buyer 140 (inflow) 216
After the second launch
Original Buyer 626 105 (outflow)
−46∗∗∗
New Buyer 59 (inflow) 87
Note. ∗∗∗p<0.01
sensitivity level.
First, we establish the two launches’ impacts on the size of the marketplace’s
demand. After a launch, Table 4.1 presents the average number of monthly CE
listings in the public marketplace and the newly-launched private site purchased
by Original Buyers and New Buyers, respectively. Then, the public marketplace’s
listings purchased by New Buyers capture the demand inflow to the public mar-
ketplace, and the private site’s listings purchased by Original Buyers represent the
demand outflow from the public marketplace. By comparing the difference between
the inflow and outflow with zero, we obtain the demand size impact of each launch.
As evident in the last column of Table 4.1, the differences are significant from zero,
which implies that the first launch expands the public marketplace’s demand size
while the second one shrinks it. We further explain the findings using the fact that
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the first private site brings more buyers relative to its listings to the platform, while
the other private site does the reverse.
Second, we establish the two launches’ impacts on the sensitivity level of the
public marketplace’s demand. After a launch, we adopt regression analyses to com-
pare the sensitivity levels between the Original Buyers and the New Buyers based
on their choice between sellers and their willingness-to-pay.
For buyers’ choice between sellers, Lemma 4.2.2 suggests that buyers, who
are sensitive to sellers’ quality, tend to choose high-quality sellers more often than
insensitive buyers do. Then, we employ a logistic regression to characterize New
Buyers’ and Original Buyers’ preferences between sellers with different qualities,
and the model is specified as:
logit(Cij) =β0 + γ0IsNBj + (β1 + γ1IsNBj)NumCompi + (β2 + γ2IsNBj)NumRepi
+ (β3 + γ3IsNBj)Qlti + νj, (4.7)
where β3 and β3 + γ3 measure how much Original Buyers and New Buyers, respec-
tively, prefer a high-quality seller (Qlti = 1) to a low-quality seller (Qlti = 0). The
estimates of Expression (4.7) for both site launches are displayed in Table 4.2. The
estimate of γ3 indicates that the New Buyers brought in by the first launch signifi-
cantly more inclined to choose high-quality sellers than the Original Buyers are, so
they are more sensitive to seller qualities than the Original Buyers. Therefore, the
sensitivity level of the public marketplace’s demand increases after the first launch.
By contrast, the New Buyers brought in by the second launch show less preference
for high-quality sellers than do the Original Buyers, so they are less sensitive than
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the Original Buyers. As a result, the sensitivity level of the public marketplace’s
demand decreases after the second launch.
Table 4.2: Comparison of Original Buyers vs. New Buyers regarding seller choice





Qlt × IsNB (γ3) 0.309∗∗∗ −3.369∗∗
(0.095) (1.458)
Buyer Fixed Effects Y Y
Observations 24,105 2,527
Log Likelihood −9,580.414 −736.210
Akaike Inf. Crit. 21,200.830 1,690.421
Note. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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For buyers’ willingness-to-pay, Expression (4.2) indicates that buyers, who are
quality-sensitive, value the high-quality sellers’ listings more and, hence, bid higher
than quality-insensitive buyers do. Then, we employ linear regression to compare
New Buyers’ and Original Buyers’ bids, which serve as a proxy for their willingness-
to-pay, and the model is specified as:
Bij =β0 + γ0IsNBj + (β1 + γ1IsNBj)Modi + (β2 + γ2IsNBj)Cari
+ (β3 + γ3IsNBj)Condi + (β4 + γ4IsNBj)UnitRPi + (β5,+γ5IsNBj)Loti
+ (β6 + γ6IsNBj)NumCompi + (β7 + γ7IsNBj)NumRepi + (β8 + γ8IsNBj)Qlti
+ (β9 + γ9IsNBj)NumAucti + ηi + νj + µi + εij, (4.8)
where γ8 measures the difference in bids between New Buyers and Original Buyers
in auctions listed by high-quality sellers. We present the regression results of Ex-
pression (4.8) for both site launches in Table 4.6, which reveals the same pattern
as Table 4.2. Specifically, the estimate of γ8 indicates that in high-quality listings,
the New Buyers from the first (second) private site bid significantly higher (lower)
than the Original Buyers do. Therefore, the first private site brings in more quality-
sensitive buyers, while the other private site brings more quality-insensitive buyers,
to the public marketplace.
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First launch (high-quality) Second launch (low-quality)
Dependent variable Bij
Qlt (β8) −0.005 (0.017) 0.209∗∗∗ (0.068)
Qlt × IsNB (γ8) 0.032∗∗ (0.014) −0.203∗∗∗ (0.058)
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y
Buyer Fixed Effects Y Y
Weekly Fixed Effects Y Y
Observations 1,611 996
R2 0.893 0.963
Adjusted R2 0.685 0.856
Residual Std. Error 0.044 (df = 549) 0.045 (df = 259)
F Statistic 4.305∗∗∗ (df = 1061; 549) 9.035∗∗∗ (df = 736; 259)
Note. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
In sum, we have identified the impacts of the two launches on the market-
place’s demand in the dimensions of size and sensitivity. By Propositions 4.3.2 and
4.3.4, we notice that the first launch leads to a favorable impact on the public mar-
ketplace’s total revenue and social welfare by expanding its demand and increasing
the sensitivity. On the other hand, the second launch results in an unfavorable im-
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pact regarding these two metrics by shrinking its demand size and decreasing the
sensitivity level.
4.7 Effects of launches on sellers
In this section, we focus on the effects of newly launched CE private sites on
sellers in the public marketplace and test all the hypotheses developed in Section
4.4. First, we test Hypotheses 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 by examining the average impacts
on sellers’ monthly listings. Second, we test Hypotheses 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.2 by
examining heterogeneous impacts on the monthly listings and monthly revenues of
sellers with different qualities.
4.7.1 Average impacts on supply
We reject Hypothesis 4.4.1 by showing that sellers’ supply of CE varies signifi-
cantly after both launches and verify Hypothesis 4.4.2 by showing that their supply
increases after the first launch and decreases after the second launch. In particular,
we specify the DiD model for these tests as follows:
Yikt = f(β0 + β1Trtk + β2Postt + β3Trtk × Postt + γQltit + ηi + µt + τit + εikt),
(4.9)
where f is the negative binomial link function.8
We present the regression results associated with both launches in Table 4.3,
and the estimate of β3 captures the average effects of a launch on sellers’ listings,
8We conduct a Wald test and reject the hypothesis that the data follow a Poisson regression.
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transactions, and revenues of CE per month. First, we reject Hypothesis 4.4.1, which
states that sellers’ listed quantities are irresponsive to any demand shocks when the
adjustment friction is large, as the estimates of β3 are significantly different from zero
for both launches (i.e., Models (1), (2), (4), and (5)). Second, we observe that the
first launch increases sellers’ monthly listings (Model (1)) and monthly transactions
(Model (2)) by 114% and 94%, respectively,9 and the second launch decreases sellers’
monthly listings (Model (4)) and monthly transactions (Model (5)) by 64% and 59%,
respectively.10 Given the demand impacts of both launches revealed in Section 4.6,
we thus confirm Hypothesis 4.4.2, which characterizes sellers’ average reactions to
demand shocks when the adjustment friction is small. Therefore, the estimated
average supply effects validate our analytical model.
4.7.2 Heterogeneous impacts on supply and revenues
In this section, we first reject Hypothesis 4.4.1 and verify Hypothesis 4.4.2,
simultaneously, by showing that the revenue changing rate of high-quality sellers
(i.e., rH) is higher (lower) than that of low-quality sellers (i.e., rL) after the first
(second) launch. Next, we verify Hypothesis 4.4.2 by showing that the changing
rate of high-quality sellers’ listed quantities (i.e., qH) is higher (lower) than that of
low-quality sellers (i.e., qL) after the first (second) launch, which is stated by the
9By the negative binomial link function, we note that exp(1.145)−1 = 1.14 and exp 1.079−1 =
0.94.
10By the negative binomial link function, we note that 1 − exp(−1.029) = 0.64 and 1 −
exp(−0.903) = 0.59.
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Table 4.3: Average listing effect of both launches.
First launch (high-quality) Second launch (low-quality)
Dependent variable
Listings Sold auctions Revenues Listings Sold auctions Revenues
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trt × Post 1.145∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗ 1.142∗∗∗ −1.029∗∗∗ −0.903∗∗∗ −0.694∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.359) (0.396) (0.212) (0.213) (0.234)
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Monthly Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 543 543 543 3,976 3,976 3,976
Log Likelihood −838 −777 −1,212 −3,526 −3,421 −2,997
Note. ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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hypothesis. Sepcifically, we obtain the DiD model for the tests by interacting the
term of sellers’ quality (i.e., Qlt) with the cross-term Trt×Post in Expression (4.9),
which is specified as:
Yikt = f
(
β0 + γ0Qltit + (β1 + γ1Qltit)Trtk + (β2 + γ2Qltit)Postt
+ (β3 + γ3Qltit)Trtk × Postt + ηi + µt + τit + εikt
)
, (4.10)
where β3 and β3 + γ3 represent the treatment effect on low-quality sellers and high-
quality sellers, respectively.
We present the estimates of Expression (4.10) for the first and second launches
in Table 4.4. First, Models (3) and (6) of Table 4.4 estimate that rH is higher than
rL by 224% after the first launch and rH is lower than rL by 58% after the second
launch.11 Therefore, the estimated heterogeneous effects on sellers’ revenue contra-
dicts Hypothesis 4.4.1, which specifies the opposite differentiated revenue impacts
under large adjustment friction, and confirm Hypothesis 4.4.2, which specifies the
same effects under small adjustment friction. Next, Models (1) and (4) estimate that
qH is higher than qL by 374% after the first launch and qH is lower than qL by 56%,
12,
which are consistent with Hypothesis 4.4.2’s claims. Therefore, the heterogeneous
effects revealed by Expression (4.10) further validate our analytical model.
11By the negative binomial link function, we note that exp(1.446) − 1 = 224% and 1 −
exp(−0.874) = 58%.
12By the negative binomial link function, we note that exp(1.748) − 1 = 374% and 1 −
exp(−0.843) = 56%.
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Table 4.4: Heterogeneous effects of both launches on sellers with various qualities.
First launch (high-quality) Second launch (low-quality)
Dependent variable
Listings Sold auctions Revenues Listings Sold auctions Revenues
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trt × Post 0.378 0.262 0.501 −0.569∗ −0.591∗ −0.146
(0.488) (0.498) (0.632) (0.342) (0.342) (0.401)
Trt × Post × Qlt 1.748∗∗ 1.718∗∗ 1.446∗ −0.843∗ −0.595 −0.874∗
(0.737) (0.741) (0.857) (0.450) (0.450) (0.505)
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Monthly Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 543 543 543 3,976 3,976 3,976
Log Likelihood −835 −774 −1,209 −3,523 −3,419 −2,995
Note. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
265
4.8 Additional evidence for model validation
To further validate our analytical model, we collect additional empirical ev-
idence to test the hypotheses developed in Section 4.4. First, we test Hypothesis
4.4.1B by citing an unfavorable demand shock (i.e., Airbnb’s entry to compete for
demand) on a marketplace with high adjustment friction (i.e., hotel market) doc-
umented by [55]. Their findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4.4.1B’s claim.
Second, we select an alternative category as the control group for both launches and
retest all the hypotheses using the DiD method. We obtain the same testing results
as revealed in Section 4.7.
4.8.1 Empirical evidence from high adjustment-friction market
[55] empirically investigate the revenue impact of entry of Airbnb on Texas’
hotels. The hotel industry is known for its inflexibility in making supply adjust-
ments, so we consider it as a marketplace with large adjustment friction. Besides,
when Airbnb enters a state, it substantially weakens the demand for the hotels.
Hypothesis 4.4.1B implies that the high-quality hotels suffer less compared with
those with lower quality. In Table 5 of [55], they identify the same pattern, where
the negative revenue impact exacerbates as the tier of hotel downgrades (i.e., from
luxury to budget). Therefore, [55]’s findings enhance our analytical model’s validity
in characterizing demand shocks on high friction marketplaces.
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4.8.2 Alternative control group in DiD method
We show that the empirical investigation in Section 4.7 is robust to the control
group selection, by retesting all five hypotheses using another qualified product
category as the control group. For both launches, we select listings of a particular
category called “mixed lots” in the public marketplace as the control group. Each
mixed-lots listing contains a set of unsorted merchandise from any categories, such as
consumer electronics, jewelry, toys, and appliances. Sellers list mixed-lots auctions
to expedite the liquidation process by reducing the time of sorting items. Mixed
lots listings qualify for the control group as they have little overlap with CE listings
in terms of buyers. Only 3% mixed-lots listings are participated in by New Buyers
from the first CE private site, and only 0.1% mixed-lots auctions are participated
in by New Buyers from the second CE private site.
Employing the alternative control group, we rerun the DiD analysis of Sec-
tion 4.7 entirely. First, the estimated average supply effects of both launches are
displayed Table 4.5, which contradict Hypothesis 4.4.1 and verify Hypothesis 4.4.2.
Then, the estimated heterogeneous impacts on the listings and revenues of sellers
with various qualities are displayed in Table 4.6, which reject Hypothesis 4.4.1 and
confirm hypotheses 4.4.2 and 4.4.2. Therefore, our hypothesis testing results in
Section 4.7 are robust to the control group selection, which further increases the
validity of the analytical model.
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Table 4.5: Average listing effect of private site launches (use mixed lots auctions as
control group).
First launch (high-quality) Second launch (low-quality)
Dependent variable
Listings Sold auctions Revenues Listings Sold auctions Revenues
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trt × Post 0.861∗∗ 0.967∗∗ 0.947∗∗ −0.412∗∗ −0.426∗∗∗ −0.731∗∗∗
(0.423) (0.423) (0.475) (0.162) (0.165) (0.200)
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Monthly Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 557 557 557 2,962 2,962 2,962
Log Likelihood −751 −710 −590 −5,724 −5,560 −4,708
Note. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Heterogeneous Effects of private sites on unbranded Sellers with Various
Reputations
First launch (high-quality) Second launch (low-quality)
Dependent variable
Listings Sold auctions Revenues Listings Sold auctions Revenues
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trt × Post 0.386 0.434 0.471 0.179 0.169 −0.091
(0.503) (0.509) (0.556) (0.251) (0.259) (0.308)
Trt × Post × Qlt 1.398† 1.484∗ 1.657∗ −0.927∗∗∗ −0.943∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗
(0.864) (0.853) (0.977) (0.316) (0.323) (0.396)
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Monthly Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 557 557 557 2,962 2,962 2,962
Log Likelihood −750 −708 −588 −5,717 −5,554 −4,702
Note. †p=0.10; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
269
4.9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we build an analytical model to study how a two-sided mar-
ketplace reacts to unexpected demand shocks in terms of size and sensitivity. By
incorporating the friction of sellers’ supply adjustment, we compare various demand
impacts on a given marketplace under low and high friction levels. Regardless of
whether a given marketplace maximizes the total revenue or social welfare, we es-
tablish that manipulating the friction can amplify the positive impact of favorable
demand shocks and alleviate the negative impact when the demand shocks are un-
favorable.
We further validate our analytical model by a series of hypothesis testing.
Employing two demand shocks on an online liquidation marketplace, where sellers’
adjustment friction is low, we test the model’s hypotheses under both the low-
friction and the high-friction scenarios. All test results strengthen the validity of the
model. Moreover, we cite a demand shock on a high-friction marketplace empirically
investigated by [55] to test our model in the same scenario. As a result, their
empirical evidence is consistent with the model’s predictions.
4.10 Appendix: Parallel Assumption Checks Using Pseudo Treat-
ment
We apply DiD model (4.9) to the pre-entry period of each entry to check the
parallel assumption. We choose the mid-point of the pre-entry period as the pseudo
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treatment. In other words, if an observation is before (after) the mid-point of the
pre-entry period, Postt is equal to 1 (0). The corresponding estimates are displayed
in Table 4.7. We notice that the coefficients of the interaction term in both entries
are statistically insignificant, which implies that the trend of each group remains
parallel over time.
Table 4.7: Check of parallel assumption using pseudo treatment
Dependent variable
Entry of high-quality retailer Entry of low-quality retailer
Listings Sold auctions Revenues Listings Sold auctions Revenues
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trt × Post −0.352 −0.478 0.657 0.213 0.155 0.478
(0.338) (0.341) (0.464) (0.278) (0.279) (0.318)
Seller Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Monthly Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Age Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 242 242 242 1,658 1,658 1,658
Log Likelihood −342 −310 −293 −1,473 −1,435 −1,367
Note. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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[42] Marko Terviö. Superstars and mediocrities: Market failure in the discovery of
talent. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(2):829–850, 2009.
[43] Amanda Pallais. Inefficient hiring in entry-level labor markets. American Eco-
nomic Review, 104(11):3565–99, 2014.
[44] Antonio Moreno and Christian Terwiesch. Doing business with strangers: Repu-
tation in online service marketplaces. Information Systems Research, 25(4):865–
886, 2014.
[45] Christopher T Stanton and Catherine Thomas. Landing the first job: The value
of intermediaries in online hiring. The Review of Economic Studies, 83(2):810–
854, 2016.
[46] Ajay Agrawal, John Horton, Nicola Lacetera, and Elizabeth Lyons. Digitization
and the contract labor market: A research agenda. In Economic analysis of the
digital economy, pages 219–250. University of Chicago Press, 2015.
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